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Suunnary 
Planners and administrators in developing countries with 
a dominating smallholder agriculture face difficult problems 
in the formulation and implementation of development 
progrannnes. Such programmes must at the same time form an 
integral part of macro-level planning for balance and 
consistency in the development effort and be meaningful and 
workable at the micro-level in the eyes of the farmers who 
are expected to act on and benefit from them. 
Some of the normal difficulties in establishing effective 
micro-macro links are compounded by the requirements of the 
'new' production technology in agriculture. These call for 
considerable initiative and flexible management - whether 
it be in seed multiplication, raising of nurseries, pest 
control, soil and water use - on the part of farmers and 
the local field staff. There have been many studies of 
farmer response to innovation; but not �nough of the response 
of government and other public agencies involved in the 
process. 
This research monograph focusses on one major aspect of 
this complex question, namely, the organization of farmers 
for group action and its implications for planning techniques 
and methods of implementation. The discussion takes place 
primarily in the context of Indian agricultural development. 
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Chapter 1 
The focus 
Programs to improve productivity and incomes in the 
agricultural sector with the help of modern technology have 
achieved notable results in recent years in many developing 
countries. This is particularly true of cereals production. 
But there is growing concern that only a section within even 
the relatively privileged land owning class in the rural 
areas has benefited so far from such programs. This has 
been the case even where the declared objective of policy 
has not been to extend benefits selectively. In the meanwh�le, 
population pressure keeps building up, adding urgency to an 
already difficult problem. It is but natural, therefore, 
that among academics and international agencies no less than 
among governments in developing countries, there is currently 
intense interest in the problems of rural poverty in terms 
of ensuring broad-based development in the rural areas. 
This study focusses attention on one aspect of this 
challenge of rural poverty, namely, making the improved 
techniques of production more broad-based among cultivators. 
Faced with this fact of uneven spread of improved 
techniques, one approach which has strong appeal on grounds 
of equity is to reallocate scarce inputs more widely, 
correcting any tendency that might exist for a minority of 
influential farmers to corner supplies. To the extent that 
a highly-skewed pattern of distribution of these inputs has 
led to some of them being over-applied on some farms in 
relation to other inputs for a given technology while other 
farms are applying them in sub-optimal doses, reallocation 
can lead to an increase in total putput. But as a basis for 
promoting sustained growth in output, this approach has 
limitations. Sustained growth can occur only when the more 
basic scarcity aspect in the availability of inputs is tackled 
successfully. This involves not merely producing more 
inputs, but also training masses of farmers and equipping 
them to utilize the new inputs efficiently. This is a simple 
enough proposition. 
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What is perhaps not equally obvious, however, is the 
full operational implicat ion of the term ' input s ' in the 
context of agricultural product ion . Besides such ' purchased ' 
items as chemicals and implements, it also includes the 
basic resources of soil and water .  These latter are 
described as resources rather than as input s . If  the 
dist inct ion sought to be conveyed by the use of these two 
terms is that while the one is fixed in supply, the other 
can be increased at will, it is misleading for policy-making . 
Bo th so ciety and the individual farmer can augment supply 
of the resources by improving their quality . The quality 
no les s  than the quantum of  these twin resources of soil 
and water set s the tone, so to speak, for the productive 
efficiency of the other inputs .  Better soil and water 
management can, for instance, serve as subst itutes to a 
certain extent  for addit ional fert ilizer for supplying a 
given level o f  nutrition to the plant crop . This aspect 
assumes increas ing importance as cultivable land gets 
progress ively s carce.in a country, and consequently on each 
tm.it of land the technology that is being promoted calls 
for a much larger investment in other inputs than under 
traditional technology . 
Certain elements in good soil and water management 
are within the scope of individual farmer action . Cert ain 
others, however, require a unit of  act ion that is beyond 
the typical farm in As ia . The individual farmer who tries 
to protect his farm from soil eros ion, to improve drainage, 
or even to provide himself with a tubewell is not likely 
to go far . He will either have to.look to the government 
to provide such facilit ies, or to j oin with his neighbours 
before he can accomplish any of these tasks . 
There is yet another factor that can make individual 
effort quite ineffective . This is inherent in agriculture 
to some extent . It is heightened, however, by the impact 
of modern technology tm.der condit ions of small farms . This 
arises from externalities in such aspects of crop husbandry 
as protecting plants from attacks o f  pests and diseases . 
The need for s imultaneous or co-ordinated action in such 
cases again places a premium on group act ion . 
This view of  modernizat ion of  peasant agriculture has 
important implicat ions for policy . In the pages that 
follow an attempt· is made to isolate factors relat ing to  
s carcity and complementarity o f  input s on the one hand and 
economies of  s cale and externalit ies in operat ion on the 
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other under field conditions . This is followed by an attempt 
to analyse the maj or implications of these inter-relat ionships 
for planning and extens ion techniques . Experience seems to 
suggest that while macro-level act ion in devising strategies 
and providing facilit ies to promote development are necessary 
and important, it does not seem to be sufficient in the 
cont ext of small-farm agriculture . It still leaves a gap in 
tapping available potential for improvement . This is a gap 
which more flexible approaches to planning and less structured 
and formalized group act ion on a modest scale by farmers 
might be able to fill . The possibilities of such act ion and 
the lines on which they might be generated in respect o f  
specific act ivities connected with agricultural product ion 
in the broades t  sense of  that term are explored in this study . 
The discussion is developed in the immediate context of 
Indian agriculture .  However, some o f  the concept s  and 
approaches might have a more general relevance to peasant 
agriculture in As ia . 
Chapter 2 
The obj ect ives 
During a quarter century of economic planning in India , 
the cent ral obj ective has been stated in somewhat different 
terms from t ime to t ime - somet imes simply as ' raising 
living standards ' ,  or ' removal of poverty ' and sometimes 
more grandly as ' generating a dynamism in the economy which 
will lift it to continually higher levels of material well­
being and o f  intellectual and cultural achievements ' . The 
foremost concern, however, has been to make sure that the 
people have enough to eat . When planning started in 1950 
soon after the country had attained Independence, per capita 
foo d consumpt ion was not only low in .some absolute sense, 
but it had been falling in the decades immediately preceding 
the departure of  the Brit ish (Blyn 1966 : 95-106 ) . That was 
at a t ime.when populat ion was growing at less than 1 per 
cent per year . Between 1951 and 1971 , population increased 
by a little over 50 per cent, but there was a near doubling 
o f  foodgrains product ion . 
The performance o f  the agricultural sector, of  course, 
goes beyond the supply of foodgrains to the people . It 
provides raw material for the more tradit ional indust ries 
(such as cot ton text iles and sugar) and has a role in 
determining the level of  export earnings (j ute and tea) . 
But the maj or effort is on the foodgrains front . This is 
partly because the sheer size of the food requirements makes 
it virtually impo ss ible for the government to rely on imports 
on a regular bas is . At best imports can help to cover 
marginal def icits in years of low product ion . Partly also 
it has been one of  the obj ect ives of  policy no t to rely on 
out s ide sources, except when it proves completely unavoidable . 
The preference is to import the inputs for agricultural 
product ion (such as chemical fertilizers ) rather than the 
foodgrains themselves .  Behind this policy has been the 
assumpt ion that given the existing low output per unit of  
land, there are ample opportunities to expand production 
internally . Self-reliance, in this sense of  the term, has 
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been the second plank o f  policy in regard to agricultural 
production in general and o f  food product ion in particular . 
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The third obj ect ive - and one that has come into 
prominence in recent years - is that the increase in pro­
duction and product ivity that is being aimed at should be 
broad-based and not confined to a few farmers or regions in 
the count ry . The value attached to this particular objective 
was by no means un iform over successive Plan periods . To 
start with , the obj ect ive was all-round and broad-based 
development . 'I hope that these Community Centres [ around 
which agricultural development programs were then being 
organiz ed] will not merely pick out the best and most 
favourable spots  and help them develop ' ,  declared Jawaharlal 
Nehru in 1952 , ' but also try to work out the problems of the 
other spots which are backward economically , socially and 
in other respects . • •  ' (Nehru 1969 : 7 ) . By the middle sixt ies , 
however ,  the emphasis was shifting perceptibly . The aim was 
to concentrate available input s on select farmers in select 
areas and to maximiz e output within the shortest possible 
time . The impact on output was quite encouraging but the 
imbalances being created could not be ignored . The government 
noted with evident concern that 
• • .  the new agricultural technology tends to 
add a further dimension of disparity between 
those who have the resources to make use of it 
and those who have not . There is thus the 
danger of emergence o f  a sharp polarisation 
between the m0re privileged and less privileged 
classes in the rural sector , the privilege in 
this instance relating to the resources and 
tools of development ( India , Planning Commission 
19 70a : l4 9 ) . 
In spelling out the obj ect ives of  policy for the current 
( fifth) development Plan , the government took part icular 
care to emphasize the need for improving the production base 
of the ' small and marginal farmers ' everywhere . That this 
approach would make addit ional demands on the available 
administrat ive and organizat ional resources of the country 
was recognized . Its j ustification was related to the more 
basic obj ect ive of ' raising the consumption levels of the 
lowest 30 per cent of the populat ion ' .  This called for 
expanded opportunit ies for product ion and employment within 
agriculture , more part icularly for the relatively backward 
classes and the backward areas . Achieving the same obj ect ive 
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by an alternative strategy of  letting product ion go up only 
where it could at the least cost , and redistribut ing the 
resulting output in favour of the bot tom 30 per cent of the 
population, was no t favoured . The reasons were only partly 
ideological - an aversion to an approach to development 
based on a permanent transfer of doles and subsidies . Partly 
also there was the recognit ion of the immense difficult ies -
political and administrat ive - of  extract ing surpluses from 
a minority to sustain a maj ority.  In the condit ions of  the 
cotmt ry , ' the process of redistribut ion ' declared the 
government roundly , ' must be woven into the process of 
production itself ' ( India , Planning Commission 19 73 , 
Part 1 ,  p . 25 ) . 
It is the pursuit o f  such a combined obj ect ive - to get 
a larger output and to secure that increase on a broad base 
of  farmers and regions - that makes other aspects of  planning , 
namely , the choice o f  strategies , instruments and t echniques , 
particularly complex . 
In the pages that follow we turn to a study of  the 
particular strategies , inst ruments and techniques of agricul­
tural development that have been pursued in the Indian 
context . Points of comparison with experience from other 
developing cotmt ries in the region are provjded where it is 
felt they would help to illustrate a more general trend . 
Chapter 3 
The effort 
Strategies 
For countries faced with growing population pressures 
on the available land and with low crop yields , the choice 
of a ' strategy ' for achieving increased output now tends to 
be assumed , explicitly or implicitly , as something simple 
and straightforward - apply modern technology to push up 
yields per acre . In fact, this near axiom is believed to 
have a wider applicab ility . ' Even where there is new land 
to be opened up ' declared an FAQ Survey in 1968 , ' this is 
often a costly and lengthy pro cess . There are thus many 
attract ion s in emphasiz ing the raising of yields on the 
exist ing area by means of technological improvements ' (FAQ 
1968 : 111) .  
' Basically , development involves securing higher 
productivity all round and this is a funct ion of the degree 
of technological advance the comnn.mity is able to make ' 
observed the First Five Year Plan do cument of  India in 1952 . 
The Second Five Year Plan echoed the same sentiment : 
the main source of  increase in agricultural product ion ' 
noted  this document , ' must be increase in yields from more 
intens ive , more efficient and more pro fitable agricultural 
pro duction ' .  But a look at the pat tern o f  allocation o f  
resources within the agricultural sect9r shows that right 
up to the mid-sixties infrastructural development claimed 
more than two-thirds of the total resources committed for 
agricultural development , with expansion of irrigat ion 
facilit ies winning the pride o f  place invariably . Annual 
investment on agricultural research and educat ion was hardly 
Rs . 5  crores t ill 1965 ; it j umped to Rs . 1 7 crores for the 
Fourth Plan period (1969-74) , and is currently of the order 
o f  Rs . 50 crores per year . l Fuller details are furnished in 
�ote : 1 crore = 10 , 000 , 000 
Before 6 June 1966 1$ (U . S . )  = Rs . 4 . 76 
After 6 June 1966 (U . S . ) = Rs . 7 . 5  
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Appendix I .  There are problems in estimating the exact 
amount invested in a given sub-sector o f  a Plan in India , 
with it s federal set-up and peculiarit ies of  budget classi­
ficat ion between ' Plan '  and ' non Plan ' expenditures . Never­
theless , as indicat ing broad patterns of relat ive priorit ies 
over a period o f  t ime ,  the Table does give a reasonably 
meaningful picture . The low priority for promotion o f  
improved technologies i s  quite striking in the earlier Plans . 
The assumption tended to be that what the situat ion called 
for was to encourage farmers to apply a few techniques 
developed elsewhere , and no t necessarily to evolve , through 
innovation or adaptat ion , techniques tailored to the lo cal 
environment . This 'neglect ' o f  technology in the country ' s  
agricultural development strategy t ill the mid-sixties 
subsequently came in for criticism (Brown , D. D. 19 71 : 92-7 ; 
Mellor and others 1968 : 79-85) . 
Quite apart from the problems associated with classif i­
cat ion of expenditure , it is also easy to exaggerate differ­
ences of policy b etween count ry and country and within a 
country , over a period of  time , in regard to the importance 
attached to particular aspects of  development . These differ­
ences are b etter understood as shifts in relat ive emphasis 
rather than as abandonment of one philosophy in favour of  
another in some absolute  sense . Also , the inter-relat ionships 
between these aspects � b etween research and organizat ional 
development , between·extension and infrastructure improvement -
and the manner in which investment in one can complement and 
reinforce another should not be lost sight of . However ,  it 
is interesting to enquire on which element in the ' package ' 
a part icular strategy of  agricultural development leans more 
st rongly at a given t ime . 
The possible variat ions are many , but one can perhaps 
distinguish three maj or candidates for priority , where the 
accent is not directly on technological improvement . One is 
simply to encourage more land to be brought under cultivat ion , 
another is to step up supplies of specific inputs such as 
water and fert ilizers to the farmers and the third is to 
operate on the economic incentives , particularly altering 
price rat ios . The choice in actual pract ice is not necessarily 
very deliberately made , with a careful weighing of the 
relat ive costs  and returns ; once made , in whatever fashion , 
it is also liable to change under pressure of  circumstances . 
In planning agricultural development , the undoubted need for 
flexibility in strategy can cover up a good deal of confused 
ad hocism. An official report published in 1967  on 
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agricultural development in India , for instance , ca stigated 
previous policies as strategies ' of production drives by 
fits and j erks starting on the heels of famine and closing 
with a good monsoon ' ,  and pleaded for a more sustained and 
realistic program of  act ion ( India , Admin . Reforms Commission 
196 7 : 5 ) . In retrospect , however , one could get an idea of  
shifting priorities and strategies from the following data . 
Net area sown in India went up by about 14 . 5  m .  hectares 
(12 per cent) between 1951 and 1961 . Of this , 10 . 5  m .  
hectares was added in the first five years . In the decade 
b etween 1961 and 1971 , the addit ion was much more moderate -
8 m .  hectares (6  per cent ) . By 1970 , the Government in it s 
Fourth Five Year Plan was viewing the situat ion as character­
ized by a ' virtual exhaustion o f  tmcommitted land resources ' 
in the cotmtry ( India , Planning Commission 19 70a : l21) . The 
present strate gy is clearly to make land already tmder 
cult ivation yield better . 
Within a strategy o f  increased production through 
increased input use , it is useful to differentiate between 
two approaches ,  though these two are not mutually exclusive . 
One approach emphasizes a more intensive use o f  the human 
input , namely , labour where it is in abtmdant supply , and 
the other pins its faith on a greater application of material 
inputs such as water and plant nutrients . Arguing the case 
for the human input strategy on the grotmd that South Asian 
work practices in agriculture are not labour intens ive , 
Myrdal , for instance , asserted in the context o f  cotmt ries 
such as India that ' a  fuller utilization of the labour force 
and a higher level o f  agricultural product ion are not only 
compatible object ives but , indee d ,  two asp ects of the same 
thing (Myrdal 1968 : 1254-5 ) . At an early stage , however , 
Indian planners did not appear to subs cribe to this view.  
The model of development implicit in their prescriptions was 
that o f  a heavily labour-saturated agriculture relative to 
available land , with no real increase in output poss ible 
without accumulation of  capital .  The country ' s  First Five 
Year Plan ( India , Planning Commission 1952 : 2 0-5 ) warned that 
' mobilisation of idle manpower for the development programme 
will generate new money incomes , divert larger quantities 
of essential commodities like foodgrains into the hands of 
those with the addit ional purchasing power , and thus create 
problems for those whose incomes remain more or less f ixed ' .  
It went on to declare that ' a  programme o f  full employment , 
with assurance of  at least the current level o f  real wages 
to the newly employed and with no reduction in the real wages 
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of  those already employed , can get into swing only as 
cap ital format ion in the comnn.m ity goes up ' ( India , Planning 
Connniss ion 1952 : 20-5 ) . The government seems to have 
retreated from this polar view o f  late . However ,  j udged by 
the less than enthusiastic response to the Dandekar proposal 
for an employment guarantee in the rural areas to build up 
product ive assets for agricultural development , one would 
suspect that there has b een no maj or change of policy in 
this regard during the last 20 years . 
In taking a measure of  the input intensive strategy in 
India ' s  agricultural development over success ive Plan 
periods , one might as well begin by looking at the attent ion 
that irrigat ion development has received from the planners . 
In the investment budget for agricultural development this 
item has remained the s ingle most important entry consistently . 
It accounted for nearly two-thirds of the total Plan invest­
ment for the agriculture sector and a little over a quarter 
of the total investment for the economy as a whole in the 
First Plan (1951-56 ) .  Gradually , however , it has been los ing 
ground , the proportions dropping to less than hal f and less 
than a tenth respectively , within two decades of  planned 
development . There are , however ,  two specific features 
relating to irrigat ion development that we may note at this 
po int . One is the fact that even though in absolute figures 
the progressive increase in the cult ivated area provided 
with irrigat ion has been an impressive achievement , in terms 
of the proport ion of the total cultivat ed area that has this 
facility , the improvement has been rather limited - from 
1 7 . 0  per cent in 1951 to 22 . 8 per cent in 19 71 . This has 
impo rtant implications for policy ; an approach to agricultural 
development that requires irrigat ion as an essent ial 
component can have direct relevance in India to only one in 
four farms . The other feature worth no ting at this stage is 
that during these two decades privat e initiat ive in expanding 
irrigat ion has outpaced expansion of irrigation under 
government canals . This again has important implications 
for policy . To the extent that the strategy adopted places 
a premium not merely on availab ility but controlled avail­
ab ility of water for i rrigat ion , it confers an advantage 
within the irrigated farms on those with privately controlled 
sources of water . This has been con firmed by some field 
studies (Nanj annna Chinappa 1974 : 18) . We shall examine these 
implicat ions in greater detail later in this study . 
In regard to the other inputs , the increase in the 
level o f  their use has b een quite remarkable . Details are 
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provided in Appendix II . The overall posit ion is best summed 
up in the finding that there was a 39 per cent increase in 
purchases by agriculture from non-agriculture for intermediate 
consumpt ion between 1951-2 and 1960-1 . Increased use of  
chemical fert ilizers and of  diesel oil for pumping purposes 
marked the two largest increases (Thamaraj akshi 1972 : 84-5) . 
The trend continued in the sixties also . In evaluating the 
pace of agricultural development , one often tends to make 
j udgement s based on t rends in output . But as pointed out by 
Dr Khusro (1969 : 18-20) , this could be misleadin g in two 
different ways . Firstly , in a situat ion where monsoon 
condit ions have such a vital b earing to the performance o f  
this sector , output variat ions may reflect changes that at 
least in the short run do not tell us about the effectiveness 
or suitab ility of the overall strategy for development that 
is being pursued .  Secondly , in terms of what Dr Khusro called 
' human endeavour and amb ition ' ,  i . e .  of success in motivating 
farmers to use new inputs or even tradit ional inputs more 
intens ively , t rends in the consumpt ion of int ermediate goods 
are more directly relevant than trends in output that are 
the result of various other factors , outside the control of 
farmers and planners alike . While on this quest ion of  
st rategy , attent ion should be given to  certain specific 
aspects of  input use beside the overall rate at which it has 
been increasing over t ime . 
Before we turn to cons ider this , we may very briefly 
refer to the third possible strategy alternat ive mentioned 
earlier - the economic incentives strategy . A lament , often 
voiced strongly by v.isit ing experts during the fifties and 
early sixt ies to India , was that this element had been sadly 
neglected by planners . There is perhaps some force in this 
argument , though it is not clear whether the possible limit­
at ions of  this approach (given the structure of rural markets 
in a country like India) or the implications for food prices 
to the urban consumers in the eyes of  government s under 
st rong pressure to keep these prices as low as possible , are 
fully appreciated by those who rather airily advocate a 
system of  incentive prices for agriculture . More generally , 
it would appear that even the strongest proponent of  the 
price incentive road to agricultural development will not 
regard it as the mainspring of growth in a situat ion where 
the techniques of cult ivat ion are backward and inefficient . 
In a situation of  land scarcity , it is at best a j unior 
partner in a larger package that aims at facilitat ing a wider 
use o f  improved techniques . 
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We may now revert to the quest ions that we wished to 
raise in seeking to go behind data relating to trends in the 
use o f  agricultural inputs in the aggregate to understand 
their significance for development . 
The first of  these quest ions centres on to whom these 
input s are being supplied . Here , st rategy has to take it s 
cue from overall obj ectives of  policy . As mentioned earlier , 
during the fifties the approach in India was that every 
region and every farmer should get some benefit . Selectivity 
was rej ected , even where it could be shown as more ' efficient ' 
in some narrow technical sense . There was , o f  course , no 
quest ion o f  supplying an input such as water for irrigation 
to every farmer . But o thers such as fertil izers and quality 
seeds were to reach as wide a clientele as possible . This 
was declared policy; to what extent the part icular inst itut ions 
and me chanisms adopted for carrying out this policy fulfilled 
this aim is a different mat ter . But by the early sixt ies , 
this strategy it sel f came to be abandoned in favour o f  .a 
more select ive approach . The aim this t ime was to get a 
quick increase in output of foodgrains from those areas and 
farmers that had a ready pot ent ial for development . From a 
total o f  320 districts in the country , 15 were selected for 
concentrated attent ion . Scarce resources ,  both material and 
p ersonnel , were to be supplied liberally in these favoured 
areas . An important criterion for select ion was availability 
of plent iful water for irrigat ion . Of the 15 dist rict s 
selected , eleven were devoted mainly for growing paddy , two 
for wheat , one for millet and one for j owar . 
There have been a number o f  evaluation studies of  how 
well this select ive-cum-package strategy performed in relation 
to its pro fessed aim o f  increasing yields per acre o f  the 
principal foodgrains mentioned above . The general conclus ion 
has b een that the pro gram was but moderately success ful . 
After a detailed comparison o f  changes in crop yields in the 
selected districts with corresponding figures for other 
districts , as also on a time-series study of yields in the 
selected districts before and after the int roduct ion of the 
program respectively , D . D .  Brown (1971 : 59 )  concluded that 
gains in output and yield were no better and no worse in the 
' package ' dist ricts than in the others ; as that per time­
series data significant changes had occurred in only thrae 
out of  the 15 districts .  After a similar analys is , Mellor 
(1968 : 86 )  concluded that the program had little impact on 
product ion or product ivity of paddy in the selected district s 
in comparison with the other dist rict s ;  that in the case of  
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wheat the program merely strengthened an upward tendency in 
yield and production ; and that the only distinct ive gain was 
a spurt in the use of  chemical fert ilizers . Desai (1972 : 
144-5 3) also arrived at a similar conclusion . 
To what extent the program suffered for want of  a 
clear-cut improvement in technology or price support , or , 
pos it ively , contributed to the preparation of  farmers and 
extension personnel for a more intensive strategy of crop 
product ion that was to follow soon with the availability of 
high-yielding variety seeds, are mat ters that we shall not go 
into here . What is more directly relevant is to see what 
changes in strategy were cons idered necessary in the light 
of emerging circumstances .  
Interestingly enough , both the po ints of view - one in 
favour of  abandoning select ivity and the other in favour of  
even greater selectivity - were pressed with vigour on the 
government . The pressure for abandoning selectivity was 
mainly polit ical . State government s were getting increasingly 
restive about defending a strat;egy that was touching such a 
small proport ion o f  the cultivated area and o f  farmers . 
Thanks to their lobbying , to the 15 ' package ' districts , 
140 were added for intens ive development . By the time the 
High Yielding Variet ies Progrannne (HYVP ) came to be introduced 
in 1966 , 250 districts had qualified for special attention . 
Within a period o f  five years , roughly one out of  every two 
cereals farmers with facilities for irrigation was to be 
helped to swit ch to a cult ivat ion program based on the high 
yielding new seeds , with all their associated inputs and 
practices . This development can only partly be regarded as 
a deliberately thought-out st rategy on the part of the 
cent ral government . In part it represented recognition of a 
fait accompli p resented by the State government s to the 
Cent ral Planning Connnis sion . A June 1967 report on the 
working of the HYVP in the first year complained that 
though the Govt . of India had advised the States 
to take up the progrannne in a few districts in 
the interest o f  compactnes s  and proper supervision 
over implementat ion , the reports received from 
the States indicated that the kharif progrannne 
of  high yielding variet ies was implemented in 
1747  blocks in 258 districts  in the country • • •  
The selection o f  such a large number of  districts 
and blocks resulted in the dispersal of production 
efforts over wide-spread areas raising problems 
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of staffing , supply of input s and field 
supervis ion ( India , Directorate of  Economics 
and Stat ist ics 196 7 : 11 ) . 
The arguments in favour of even greater select ivity 
found a strong advocate in Pro fessor D . K .  Desai . He wrote 
in 1969 : 
Unless a strategy is evolved to combine the scarce 
resources of technical , financial and adminis­
trat ive input s  with the managerial input s of the 
efficient farmers , rapid growth in agricultural 
production may no t be achieved . This lesson of  
the I . A . D . P . experiment should not be lost and 
the same mistake should not be repeated in the 
High Yielding Variet ies Programme . Let the most 
efficient farmers adopt this progrannne wherever 
they are (Desai 19 72 : 154 ) . 
Given the processes of  economic and political decis ion­
making in the coun try , this advice evoked little support 
among policy makers . The trend towards greater and greater 
dispersal has gone unchanged in sub sequent years . 
In the event , the availab ilit ies o f  the crit ical inputs 
such as fertiliz ers and pure seeds lagged well behind the 
requirements o f  a quick saturat ion of large areas that was 
the cornerstone of this strategy .  Two important results 
followed which we may note briefly here . To the extent that 
the strategy was very faithfully implement ed in particular 
States or for particular crops , the input s including the 
technical and extension services have had to be spread 
rather thinly . Such thin spreading could take the form of 
everyone gett ing small and po ssibly sub-threshold level 
do ses of crit i cal input s; or , particular input s being supplied 
in adequate doses fo r given farmers and areas - ' area X has 
b een given the benefit of an irrigat ion proj ect this year , 
let area Y get the benefit of  a seed mul tiplicat ion farm ' 
type of phenomenon . In either case , given the complementarity 
of the inputs , yield was likely to suffer . The other 
possibility was , of course ,  notwithstanding protestat ions 
of policy , a limited number of farmers in each area selected 
fo r the program might succeed in cornering scarce input s ,  
from seeds to credit , in the process negat ing the obj ective 
of taking moderniz at ion to every farmer . Empirical evidence 
seems to suggest a mixed phenomenon in different areas at 
different points o f  t ime . We shall review this evidence , 
15 
though only in a summary form, in the next chapter . 
Instruments 
The terin ' instruments ' is used in a broad sense here , 
to include both organizat ions and personnel employed in the 
process o f  agricultural moderniz at ion . Such organizations 
and agents may have a wider role to play than merely spreadin g  
improved production techniques among farmers . In India , for 
instance , the system of ' Panchayat Raj ' initiated during the 
late fifties to take over a number of local development 
functions was also expected to provide training opportunit ies 
for the rural populat ion in the politics of self-government . 
But our interest in these organiz ations will be limit ed to 
their role as agents of agricultural development . 
As the innnediate focus of  this study is on technological 
imp rovement in agr icultural product ion , we could begin this 
suIDll1cS.ry descript ion of maj or organiz at ions connected with the 
development pro cess of Indian agriculture by looking at the 
research base . The Indian Council of Agricultural Research 
( ICAR) was established in 1930 , following the reconnnendat ion 
of the Royal Connnission on Agriculture (1928) . Over the 
y ears the Council has developed into a broad-based research 
organizat ion , sponsoring or co-ordinat ing research work in 
a number of  research stat ions and experiIIJ2.ntal farms and also 
liais ing with it s international counterparts .  Given the 
wide variety of crops and agronomic conditions in the country , 
it is impo ssible to develop a viable research system through 
a few maj or nat ional institutes . The emphasis in the Council 
of late has b een to st imulate adapt ive research at the State 
level to tackle specific local problems . This it tries to 
achieve through State-level research stations and agricultural 
universit ies . Some good result s have been claimed from 
attempts at promoting localized adaptive research . For 
instance ,  the Punj ab Agricultural Univers ity is said to have 
released two varieties of  wheat and two variet ies of rice to 
suit local conditions and requirement s between 1971 and 
1973  (Johl and Mudahar 1974 : 124) . That the country has 
developed a research base of very considerable potential 
has b een acknowledged by a number of  ob servers ( Crawford 
1974 : 6 7 ;  Mcclung 19 72 : 30-1) . There are over 70 agricultural 
colleges , turn ing out on an average 5000 graduates in 
agriculture every year . Compared to other developing 
countries of As ia or Africa , India is perhaps more strongly 
placed in its capacity to generate research and trained 
personnel . 
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The other efforts of the last decades relate to creat ion 
of  new organizations to tackle specific tasks or the 
strengthening or restructuring of older ones . These relate 
mainly to product ion/ dist ribut ion of  essent ial input s for 
agricultural development or supply of extension services 
in the rural areas . Bo th publicly-owned and privately-owned 
organizat ions have been pressed into service for this 
purpose .  Let us take chemical fert iliz ers , for example . 
The level o f  nitrogen use in India was about 40 , 000 tonnes 
in 1951-52 . Of this 11 , 000 tonnes (2 7 per cent ) was produced 
within the cotmtry . By 1973-74 , the use level had gone up 
to 1 . 7 m. tonnes . Of this 1 . 1  m .  tonnes (65  per cent) was 
lo cally produced and much o f  the expansion catne from privately 
owned fertiliz er factories . It is perhaps in the supply of  
credit that one can not ice a range of  tact ics employed by 
the government in promoting organizat ions for agricultural 
development . The initial emphasis was on strengthening and 
expanding co-operative societ ies of farmers . This policy 
served its purpo se in some areas for some of the farmers . 
The Agricultural Refinance Corporat ion set up by the 
government was intended to fill the gap in areas where the 
co-operative st ructure was weak , part icularly in lending 
for land-improvement purposes on a medium and long term 
basis . In some cases , privately developed inst itut ions 
have been taken over by government with a view , at least 
partly , to orient their operat ions towards agricultural 
development . The nationalization of leading commercial 
banks in 1969 with the direct ive that they turn away from 
their near-exclusive attent ion on urban business requirement s 
to the needs of  farmers is a case in point . Under the 
impact of this policy and within a period of five years , 
the number of branches of these banks in the rural areas 
increased by nearly 50 per cent , and the number of farmers 
served and the amount s advanced for agricultural product ion 
purposes went up nearly ten times . Another pub lic sector 
organizat ion; founded in 1965 , natnely the Food Corporat ion 
o f  India , began to trade in imported fertiliz ers at the 
wholesale level as a supplement to and in some ways as a 
check on the act ivit ies of private dealers . In regard to 
water development , besides the usual act ivit ies of the 
Public Works department in constructing maj or irrigat ion 
datns , et c . , the main emphasis has been to provide infra­
structural services to the farmers for developing their 
private sources of water , by provis ion of credit , ground­
water surveys , etc .  
We can now turn to look at the machinery employed by 
the government for administering the development program . 
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The importance o f  the administrat ive element in the development 
process has been rather elaborately underlined in India 
from the beginning.  The approach was made explicit by the 
Indian Planning Commission when it stated in the First Five 
Year Plan ( India , Planning Commission 1952 : 111) that ' in 
all direct ions , the pace of development will depend largely 
upon the quality of public administrat ion , the efficiency 
with which it works , and the co-op erat ion which it evokes ' .  
The Commission also observed that ' in some fields of develop­
ment , the existing agencies will need to be supplemented and 
strengthened ; in others , new agencies will be required to 
carry through the Plan ' . The most important single agency 
newly created for purposes of agricultural development since 
the attainment of Independence was , of course , the Community 
Development and the National Extens ion Service . 
The Collllllunity Development ( CD) program was inaugurated 
in October 1952 , in the form of 15 pilot proj ects in 
different part s of  the country , drawing upon the experience 
of isolated rural improvement proj ects . Each of these 
proj ect s covered a ' block ' of 60 to 100 villages , with a 
multi-purpose village level worker (VLW) for a group of  
five or s ix villages each . Within a year , the National 
Extension Service (NES)  was integrated with the CD block 
organizat ion , and a st ring of extens ion o fficers (EOs ) in 
agriculture , animal husbandry , rural industries , etc . , 
headed by a team leader , designated as the Blo ck Development 
Officer (BDO) was made available by the government to each 
block .  By March 195 6 , 1075 such blocks covering 25 per cent 
of villages had been established , and by the mid-sixt ies the 
rural populat ion was fully covered by this agency for rural 
development . 
The obj ectives envisaged for the movement were compre­
hens ive and ambitious . The then Deputy Chairman of the 
Planning Commission had described them as the creation ' in 
the millions of  rural families a burning des ire to change 
their old-time outlook and arouse enthusiasm in them for 
new knowledge and new ways o f  life ' . It was to be ' ensured ' 
that ' every family has a programme for increased employment 
and production for which it is assisted ; that every family 
is represented on at least one mult i-purpose co-operat ive 
society in it s own right ; that every family makes its 
voluntary contribut ion to works of b enefit to the community 
as a whole ' .  
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There is a s izeable lit erature on the strengths and 
weaknesses of this program (Balwantray Mehta Committee 195 7 ;  
Dube 195 8 ;  Hanson 1966 : 2 82-4 ;  42 0-7) . For our l imited purpose , 
we shall merely take note of the following : 
(a) Organizat ionally, the program was based on a view of 
Indian rural society that stressed the commonality, if not 
the homogeneity, of interests of the different classes 
constitut ing that society . The wat chword was community 
spirit , co-operat ion and voluntary effo rt, and not divergence 
of interest s  or imbalance in influence among the clas ses . 
On the face of it this may appear surprising, for the highly 
different iated and hierarchical character of Indian rural 
society has been a by-word among sociologis t s . Pos s ib ly , in 
the minds o f  the planners what was init ially perceived as 
an ideal to be achieved became confused with reality . As 
Hanson observed , ' rural development policies have rested on 
an ideologically-inspired assumpt ion of a degree of unity 
and common purpose among the p easantry that is at variance 
with the real it ies of village life ' (Hanson 1966 : 534) . 
P . C .  Joshi voiced a similar view.  ' The existence of  mut ually 
antagonistic interests in rural society is hardly favourable 
for the success of the type of community part icipat ion which 
the (CD) pro gramme visualises ' (Joshi 1968 : 461) . 
(b ) Stemming from the above view, the mechanisms developed 
and the organizat ions set up for stimulat ing popular partici­
pat ion and lo cal init iat ive in development activit ies were 
such that by and large they best-owed greater prominence and 
power to the tradit ional elite in the rural areas . It would 
appear that this development was not peculiar to India 
(Myrdal 1968 : 1334-46 ; 1366-84) . 
( c) The ' delivery system'  fo r this program was almost 
exclus ively bureaucratic to start with . The dominance of 
the bureaucrat ic element came in for severe criticism as the 
years went by and it culminated in the establishment of 
' Panchayat Raj ' (a three-tier system of locally elected 
councils, at the village , block and district levels )  to give 
direct ions to and control the activit ies of the officials 
involved in the program. Whether this change marked an 
improvement in either the nature or the speed of rural 
development has been hotly debated . 2 We shall merely note 
2 
For the two confl ict ing views, see India , Administrat ive 
Reforms Commission 1967 : 20-4 ; and Ram Reddy 1974 .  
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here that the controversy has never been as to whether the 
basic field-agent , directly in touch with the farmer , should 
be an official or a non-official , but only whether at 
part icular levels of supervision the agency should be a 
bureaucrat ic or  a non-official one. For all it s declared 
commitment to socialist ic ideals and policies , the part ies 
in power did not attempt to generate a cadre of party workers 
or other non-bureaucratic agents to act ively undertake rural 
development work , in conj unct ion with the official agencies , 
or on its own momentum. 
In the flood of crit icism that has been heaped upon the 
CD and Panchayat Raj programs , it is easy to overlook one of 
its solid achievements , and one which has endured beyond 
its immediate purposes. This was the wide network of 
extension workers in various dis ciplines connected with 
rural development that was built up all over the count ry as 
part of this program. A summary picture of the personnel 
recruited and t rained for this purpo se over a period of 
about ten years has been provided in Appendix III. They 
constitute the arteries , the general conveyance system, for 
the package of rural development services chosen at any 
given t ime. Jawaharlal Nehru had once described the 
Community Blo cks where these administ rat ive personnel were 
located· as ' cent res of human act ivity which are like lamps , 
spreading their light more and more in the surrounding 
darkness ' . The torch has been lit , even if the bat tery 
charging it has proved weak. 
A brief reference to the general administrative 
machinery in the rural areas , with which the specialized 
extens ion machinery has also been meshed , would be in order 
before we proceed to look at the techniques employed to 
plan and implement rural development programs. ' Under­
developed societ ies t end , almost by definition , to have 
underdeveloped administrations. As it is to the adminis­
t rations that a maj or share of the practical tasks of 
development is confided' , wrote Hanson (1966 : 268) , 'we have 
here another of the notorious vicious circles that whirl 
around in developers '  nightmares ' .  But he was quick to add 
that 
India , for all the administrat ive deficiencies 
which she displays , is except ionally fortunate. 
The British left her with a well-articulated , 
smoothly-functioning administ rative machine , 
headed by an elite corps which could stand 
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comparison with any analogous body o f  senior 
adminis trators anywhere in the world (Hanson 
1966 : 268) . 
Of late, however, there has been some dispute as to 
whether the colonial legacy was more an asset or a liability 
for the demands of a development administration . A recent 
study sponsored by the United Nat ions described the adminis­
trative legacy in the context of India and Pakistan as an 
' irrelevance ' (Lefeber and Datta-Chaudhuri 1971 : 78) . What 
was recognized quite early on was that a different spirit or 
approach would be required among the bureaucrats when the 
task is promotion of rural development, instead of merely 
collecting t axes or keeping order. While drawing up the very 
first Plan, the Planning Commission describ ed in somewhat 
lyrical terms what it regarded as an es sent ial need for a 
change in philosophy within the administ ration in keeping 
with its new responsibilit ies . ' By approaching the people as 
comrades in the same cause, disclaiming privilege and status 
and eager to learn and to help, those engaged in administration 
can make an immen�e contribut ion towards creat ing the 
conditions in which public co-op erat ion can grow ' ( India, 
Planning Commission 1952 : 146) . In the realm of rural 
development administ rat ion, this new spirit in dealing with 
the people was also to be mat ched by a change in the 
t radit ional authoritarian boss-subordinate relationships in 
favour of a team spirit among the officials themselves 
(Dube 1958 : 90) . We shall not go further into the quest ion 
as to what extent such a change in philosophy has in fact 
shown signs of emerging . 
The more tangible aspect of the change had to do with 
the st ructures and the styles of administrat ion . There were 
repeated if somewhat vague calls for reform in successive 
official and non-official reports ; but little concrete act ion . 
More than 2 0  years after the first Plan had been launched, 
the Planning Commission began its chapter on ' Plan Implement­
ation ' in the Fifth Plan with the following words: 
In every Plan, the problems of implementat ion 
have b een dis cus sed and general remedies have 
also b een suggested . Some of the bas ic weak­
nesses in the process of implementat ion have 
been identified from t ime to time • • .  In spite 
of this, there has been no significant improvement 
in the levels o f  performance ( India, Planning 
Commission 197 3 ,  Part 1 ,  p . 92 ) . 
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The verdict was more direct when the document reviewed 
the implementat ion machinery for an aspect of agricultural 
development policy on which government had invested a lot o f  
importance from the very beginning,  namely , land reforms . 
' The administrative organisat ion has proved to be an inadequate 
instrument for the speedy and efficient implementat ion of 
land re form'  (India , Planning Commission 197 3 ,  Part II , p . 44) . 
There is perhaps a touch here of  what Hanson called the 
practice of using the administration ' as a whipping boy ' for 
the economic miscalculations or political vacillations of the 
leadership; b ut the point itself is well-taken . 
There were two aspects of the adminis trative legacy that 
directly impinged upon the performance of rural development 
programs and which were perhaps more directly amenable to 
change had the planners pushed for the change st rongly enough , 
as compared with changes in such intangible things as the 
' spirit ' of administ ration . These were (a) the one-way flow 
of ideas and o rders , within the administ rat ive structure; and 
(b ) the increasing severity with which administrative activity 
was reduced to a set of t ightly prescribed ' tasks ' as one 
went down the hierarchy . The tasks themselves were , in turn , 
reduced to targets , which the funct ionaries had to fulfil , 
not to unders tand , much less evaluate crit ically or quest ion . 
Successive Plan documents waxed eloquent upon the theme o f  
the feed-back and iterative pro cess of  agricultural development 
planning . But there was little systematic examination of 
whether the administrative system prevailing in the country , 
which at bes t  stressed horizontal co-ordination but not 
vertical consultat ion , was even consistent with the planning 
process that was sought to be ushered in . Another corollary 
of the old system was that there was lit tle flexibility at 
the operat ing level , and little s cope for field workers to 
develop initiat ive in response to the particular environment 
in which they may be working.  Moreover , in the minds of  
field workers adherence to pres cribed procedure took precedence 
over ful filling the larger obj ect ive of administrative act ion . 
The position was fairly sunnned up in the report of  the Study 
Team on Agricultural Administration of the Administrat ive 
Reforms Commission : 
The administrative pattern , agricultural 
administ ration being no exception , is oriented 
more to procedure than to performance . Checks , 
counterchecks and inspect ions have assumed more 
importance than service . Per formance is geared 
to inspect ions; inspect ions are bas ed on targets; 
22 
and targets are related to financial provision 
( India, Admin . Reforms Commission 196 7 : 254 ) . 
Professor Ram Reddy (19 74 : 64)  highlighted another 
feature of the admini stration which has a direct bearing on 
the implementat ion o f  agricultural development programs, 
namely, lack of consciousness of the t ime element . ' The 
system '  said Professor Reddy, 
is based on suspicion and distrust and encourages 
the administrator in charge of a programme to 
play for safety • • •  The inadequacies of  the 
Indian bureaucracy are not due simply to the fact 
that it is a bureaucracy but due, to a considerable 
extent to the fact that it carries too much 
baggage from the past . Pro cedures place relatively 
too little emphasis on ' dispat ch ' . Agricultural 
adminis tration in relat ion to the evolut ion and 
commtmicat ion of agricultural policies and 
programmes at the national and State levels is the 
vict im o f  these outmoded procedures (Ram Reddy 
1 9 74 : 64 ) . 
Enough has been said to indicate the weakness of the 
system in meeting the two dimens ions of ' dispersed decision­
making ' and that too ' within comparatively rigid t ime-spans 
and sequences '  which, as Professor Raup (1967 : 29-58) pointed 
out, are the dominant features of administration and management 
of agricultural development . 
Technigues 
In the federal system of India, agricultural development 
falls primarily, though not exclusively, within the compet ence 
of State government s .  However, in two important ways the 
Centre has a l arge influence on the manner in which the 
States tmdertake the tasks connected with agricultural 
development . First, development programs for agriculture 
have to fit into a larger national plan of development for 
the economy as a whole .  The crucial decisions of linkages 
with the manufacturing sector (e . g . the fertilizers indust ry) 
and with imports and export s can be made only at the Centre . 
Secondly, the syst em of financing of plans is so heavily 
dependent upon Central government loans and grants that the 
values, perceptions and j udgement s of the Central authorities 
dominate the plans of the State governments . To these 
factors, one can add the further fact that helps this t rend, 
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namely , the arrangement b y  which top posit ions in development 
agencies in the State bureaucracies are usually filled by 
civil servants who are recruited by the Centre and who shuttle 
between the Cent re and the States during their career. This 
arrangement reinforces the consensus deriving from power at 
the Centre and in that of the States having b een held by the 
same political party during the fifties and the sixt ies. 
The choice of the specific obj ectives of the plan and 
of the strategies for achieving the obj ect ives is very much 
within the ambit of the Central government , even though the 
Nat ional Development Cotm.cil on which the State Chief Ministers 
s it has to approve these obj ect ives and strategies. Given 
a set of requirement s of particular crops , etc. , for a given 
time-horizon , every other decision on the mix of programs , 
their relative weight and t iming is made with reference to 
one important , almost over-riding principle , namely , ensuring 
consistency and balance inter-sectorally. Coupled with the 
strongly entrenched administ rative t radit ion of clearly 
defined tasks within a hierarchical command-structure , this 
approach to planning leads to a poor view of local initiat ive 
or improvizat ion , and a high premium on fulfilling t argets 
set from above. This is the key to tm.derstanding why the 
applicat ion of highly sophist icated techniques of planning , 
which as pract ised in India ' could stand as a text-book 
classic ' (Mellor and others 1968 : 124)  can sometimes lead to 
very curious results , particularly where it impinges on the 
activities of millions of farmers in widely differing agro­
climat ic and socio-economic condit ions. 
The point  being made here is rather important for the 
main theme of this paper ; and it would be as well to put it 
in some p erspective. A central planning authority in a 
country , whether tm.der a federal or a unitary set-up , has to  
make the init ial decisions of  a broad nat ure - assessment of 
resources for investment , design of strategy , etc. It has 
to give concrete shape to these decis ions and fit them into 
the government budget , taking a variety of factors into 
account. In the Indian s ituat ion , for instance , the Federal 
government has to give advance informat ion of the likely 
order of imports and total supplies of chemical fertilizers 
for the country. Without this kind of informat ion , the 
field-worker will have no means of deciding whether he should 
encourage farmers to use more or less fertilizers in one 
year compared with the previous year. In addition , the 
cent ral authority has to make clear the ' ground rules ' - the 
incent ive system, infrastructual support - for act ion by 
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local officials and guidance of farmers themselves .  The 
arguments in favour of more flexible planning and greater 
local init iative are not , therefore , in any way pleas for 
leaving undone any of these essential tasks that can be done 
only at the higher levels .  
The real quest ion , however ,  is to what extent , for 
which act ivit ies , and in what manner the planning process 
get s  reduced in pract ice from above to quant itat ive budgeting 
and target in g .  To indicate , for example , to the district , 
block ,  or village level development worker that the price 
of fert ilizers in the coming season will be such and such , 
or that supplies will be roughly of a certain order is one 
thing . But to lay down to these funct ionaries t argets for 
fertilizer consumpt ion , as if it is they , and not farmers 
who use fert ilizers , is a different thing altogether . In 
the paragraphs that follow , some concrete instances of how 
misplaced t argetry can make a travesty of planning are cited 
from published reports . They are meant to illust rate the 
more general point that when planning get s  equated with 
achievement of targets ,  means become the ends and form takes 
precedence over substance . 
The first example comes from a village-level study by 
Professor S . C . Dube ( 1958) . He was particularly int erested 
in studying how the VLW performed under the syst em of 
planning in vogue . He points out that the VLWs had been 
taught in their training inst itutes that their role was t o  
st imulate the village community to discover potentials for 
development . They were expected to mob ilize local resources , 
particularly manpower ,  for promoting development . Professor 
Dube then goes on to describe the realit ies of the VLWs work 
actually on the field - the preponderance of the old-style 
administ rative over extension methods , the need to fulfil 
targets regardless of the consequences to the local community, 
and the resultjng bewilderment and frustration among the 
extens ion staff closest to the farmer . One part icular 
example cited by Dube relates to distribut ion of improved 
seeds . This had become part of the ' approved ' schemes of 
CD b locks , which meant not only financial and other inputs 
were available , but in fact were pressed upon the village 
extens ion staff right from Delhi . Target s were laid down at 
the b eginning of the year from the Centre to the States , from 
State capitals to district headquarters , from district s t o  
blocks an d  finally from the blocks t o  the villages .  For the 
funct ionary at any given level , fulfilling the target was 
the test of good performance and the surest way to sat isfy 
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the ' boss ' a t  the next higher level . T o  the twin bosses , 
one polit ical and the other bureaucratic , sit t ing at the 
very top of the pyramid at Delhi , the fulfillment o f  the 
target tended to be equated with ' success ' in the mind of  
the bureaucrat and with ' p rogress ' in the mind of  the 
polit ician . But where did all this leave the farmer and 
the VLW? Here in Dube ' s  own words is the story of improved 
potato seed : 
It was not only received too late for sowing,  it 
was of an inferior quality ( some of  it being 
actually deteriorated) and was priced much higher 
than comparable or even b etter seed in the market . 
As a last  resort , the VLWs had to appeal to the 
rich villagers to help save their j obs by buying 
this seed even though it was not needed.  Not­
withstanding these appeals , they could not thrust 
all the unwanted seed on unwilling villagers and 
had actually to pay the price of the unsold seed 
from their own salaries . 
• • •  In some cases the seed received by the Proj ect 
headquarters was obviously of  an inferior quality . 
It was evident that its use would not produce the 
desired and promised result s .  Yet VLWs were asked 
to distribut e  it in the area . The VLWs took it 
to the villagers who , after considerable pressure , 
accepted it with great reluctance and scepticism. 
The yield j ustified their misgivings . In the 
following y ear the VLWs found it difficult to 
sell more seed,  though t.his t ime it was certainly 
excellent in quality (Dube 1958 : 186-7) . 
A study in the early sixt ies illust rated the same 
phenomenon in Andhra Pradesh ( Ramana 1962 : 2 88-9 ) . 
The question arises : why did the CD proj ect authorit ies , 
who must have had a clearer underst anding of local problems 
than their counterparts at more remote levels , act in this 
manner , when s imple commonsense would have told them that 
what they were doing was counter-product ive ? The answer 
is , of course , that they were under the same kind o f  
straightj acket as the VLWs b elow them. There were approved 
budgets and schemes , t arget s to fulfill and expenditures 
to show . Planning had become synonymous with this approach 
all along the line . For a description o f  how the disease 
af flicted the block level ' planners ' ,  we turn once again to 
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Dube : 
In this region3 people pract ise a local variant 
of the improved method of rice cult ivation 
known as the ' Japanese method ' .  A comparat ively 
small acreage was under rice in this area , and 
the method in use was almost as productive as 
the Japanese method . Yet because the Japanese 
method was being popularized throughout the 
state , even in this Proj ect a great deal of t ime 
and energy had to be spent on it in compliance 
with direct ives from state headquarters . The 
same amount of effort could have been used much 
more product ively in other areas of development 
work . S imilarly , the Proj ect officials had to 
spend a great deal of  t ime exploring the 
possibilit ies of launching a sericulture proj ect 
(and even making some init ial preparat ion for it ) 
in the clear knowledge of  the fact that this region 
was unsuit ed for it (Dube 195 8 : 9 3) . 
For an example o f  how ' targetry ' can overrule commonsense 
at the next higher level of  the dist rict , we turn to an 
official report itsel f .  This is a sample of  what an evaluation 
team found o f  the manner in which the High Yielding Variet ies 
Programme (HYVP) was being put through : 
In February , 1966 , the district authorit ies were 
informed that they would have to achieve a target 
of 15 , 000 acres in TN -1 variety during the kharif 
season o f  1966-6 7 .  Already over 218  acres in . • •  
talukas were covered under the variety • • •  On 
8th March , 1966 , the Chief Execut ive Officer of  
the Zila Parishad was informed that the Government 
had decided to allot to the district a target o f  
1 lakh acres under the HYV Programme during the 
kharif season ( India , Directorate of Economics & 
Stat istics 1967 : 1 7-8) . 
The report goes on to describe how the district council 
managed to bring the target down after pointing out that 
there was a total of only 65 , 000 acres in the whole dist rict 
that would be suitable for growing this particular variety 
of paddy and concludes as follows : 
3i . e .  the particular state where Dube did his f ieldwork . 
The formulation o f  targets in the villages , 
blocks and at the dist rict level , thus , went 
through numerous revisions unrelated to 
suitability of the area for growing the variety , 
and resources in seed or fert ilizers or either 
the preparat ion of [ s ic ] the cult ivators for 
growing TN-1 ( India , Directorate of Economics 
& Statistics 196 7 : 18) . 
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I t  may b e  added that as the process o f  b argaining took 
t ime and as the district authorit ies were never sure whether 
they would succeed in their efforts with the State Government 
in making the program more realist ic in coverage , the blocks 
were asked to rai se their sight s  to mat ch a dist rict target 
of 1 lakh acres ( India , Directorate of Economics & Statist ics 
196 7 : 18) . The experience was repeated in the following year . 
The repo rt for 1968 observed rather gingerly ' that past 
experience and the local condit ions were not fully taken 
into considerat ion while fixing targets and to this extent 
they suffer from lack of realism ' (Programme Evaluation 
Organisation , June 1969 : 5 ) . In part the phenomenon cited 
here reflects dilut ion of the earlier strategy of  selective 
development to which a reference was made earlier in this 
chap ter ; but it also illust rates how the t echniques of 
planning and implementat ion in use t ended to convert aims of 
policy into st rategies , programs and target s in a one-way 
pro cess with ever diminishing concern to relate what is 
being done to what was needed lo cally or aimed at when the 
process started . 
We may round o f f  this part of the discussion by citing 
an example , again taken from an o fficial report , 4 of how 
the process operates at the State level . This part icular 
example relates to a poultry rather than a crop improvement 
scheme , but the point it illust rates is the same : 
In Andhra Pradesh , a duck extension scheme 
involving Rs .  200 , 000 was init iated because the 
Government of India offered a sub s idy . The 
obj ective was to raise an exotic variety of 
duckling and upgrade the local stock by cross­
breeding . Of the three centres planned , two 
4 see reference in Nayar 1969 : 93-4 , to Government of Andhra 
Pradesh , Planning Department , Report on the Working of the 
Duck Extension Centres , Hyderabad , 1965 . 
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were started in 1959 . An amount was allocated 
for cold sto rage hiring charges without first 
seeing if such facilit ies were available anywhere 
near the centres . A mammoth incubator with 2500 
capacity was ordered for one of the centres while 
the maximum expected laying s trength was only 
100 eggs . After the buildings had been erected 
and equipment purchased , it was found that this 
particular breed of duck was not available 
anywhere in the country except in numbers too 
small to run even one centre efficiently . To 
solve this problem, the officials-in-charge o f  
the centres bought the lo cal breed which were 
mult iplied and dist ributed among the people , 
even though the specific obj ect ive of the s cheme 
was to dis courage the spread o f  the local breed . 
A related problem arose - the eggs could not be 
dispo sed of  b ecause of lack of demand by the 
local market . These problems were still tmsolved 
when a third centre was opened in 1962 (Nayar 
1969 : 9 3-4 ) . 
What is interesting to note in this case is not that 
there were some mis calculat ions ; but the manner in which the 
person ( s )  working the scheme felt obliged to fulfil targets 
(even by running cotmter to the bas ic obj ective of  the 
program) , rather than point out to the higher level planners 
that what they were promoting did not make sense . That some 
centrally conceived program, reinforced by the particular 
financial arrangement of development act ivit ies in India , 
takes priority over lo cal reality and plain commonsense is 
al so illustrated in the Report of the Agricultural Adminis­
trat ion Committ ee , 195 8 , which states that ' in a State over 
35 lakh acres were said to be water-logged but no scheme had 
even been included in the State plan to effect ively check 
this menace and its adverse effect s on product ion ' (quoted 
by D . R. Gadgil in Khusro 1968 : 565 , 1 lakh = 100 , 000) . 
While on this point , we may take note o f  how this 
particular style of adminis tration can and does affect 
fulfilment o f  the obj ectives of  planning in the first instance . 
Given that for the VLW, planning activit ies are commtmicated 
as a set of targets to be fulfilled , the aim of ' conveying ' 
the new technology - the know-how as well as the input s  - to 
the general body of farmers and not a select few among uhem 
who are ready to receive them get s compromised . Clive Bell 
described the process by which this happens in the following 
terms : 
Convince a man holding 50 hectares that he should 
put hal f his land under high-yielding wheat and 
you5 have contributed as much to fulfilling your 
target as you would in success fully persuading 
fifty cult ivators , each holding 1 hectare , to do 
likewise . And this does not allow for the 
likelihood that each small farmer may be more 
difficult to convince than the big farmer alone 
(Bell 1972 : 152 ) . 
To select more such examples that show the planning 
and implementat ion mechanism in a particularly bad light 
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might be easy ; but i t  i s  important not to lo se perspective 
here . The point that is being made is not that the bureaucracy 
in India is unusually dense or perverse . If one looked 
close enough , similar instances of apparently unproduct ive 
and irrat ional · behaviour could perhaps be found in other 
bureaucracies . The disab ilities of bureaucrat ic inst itut ions 
even in discharging routine responsib ilit ies , not to ment ion 
in init iat ing and sustaining change , that affects the daily 
life of millions , have been well documented . Our purpose in 
cit ing these examples is more limited , namely ,  to illust rate 
how a pronounced reliance on the administ rative instrument 
which it sel f  works on the tradit ions and techniques of an 
earlier era , with a strong aversion to variety and improviz­
ation can handicap the development process . 
The issue , however ,  goes beyond familiar polemics between 
cent raliz at ion versus decentralizat ion , and between concen- · 
trat ion and delegation o f  planning decisions and administrative 
act ion . It touches , in a more basic sense , on what is being 
planned , on the planners ' perception of the nature and purposes 
of administrative action . Agricultural planning has t ended 
to be practised as the formulat ion and implement at ion of a 
series of investment proposals - on irrigat ion works , on seed 
farms ,  et c .  - by fulfilling which some desired results will 
be achieved - such and such order of increase in the output 
of  part icular crops , etc .  What tends to be lost sight of in 
the process is something which is as obvious as it is 
important , namely, (a) the relat ion between input and output 
cannot be so mechanistically determined in a b iological 
process that characterizes agricultural production as 
5i . e .  the extension personnel . 
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cont rast ed with , s ay ,  indust rial act ivity,  and (b ) even if 
the nature of the relat ionship could be ascertained with 
reasonable accuracy in advance for a particular area , farmers 
and crop , the decisions themselves , in a system of  private 
own ership o f  land , rest with farmers . To quote Pro fessor 
Dandekar on the subj ect : 
A plan is a plan in the t rue sense of  the term 
only when it is a proposal for act ion on the part 
of the one who makes the plan . . .  The reasons 
our plans for agricultural development have not 
been plans in the t rue sense is that they have 
not b een essent ially plans for state act ion . • •  
Consequently , many of  their targets lack real 
meaning , validity , and sanct ion . . •  We witness 
the dist rict and block agricultural o fficers and 
the extension workers under them rtm.ning around 
with t argets of agricultural product ion , crop by 
crop , t arget s of areas to be sown tmder different 
crops , t argets of areas to be brought tmder new 
minor irrigat ion , target s of green manuring ,  and 
t argets of compost pits to  be dug • • •  In all 
these cases the o fficers and extension workers 
know full well that what they can do in achieving 
these t argets is very limited , and that the final 
decisions lie with the farmers . But they receive 
orders from above in terms o f  t arget s ,  and they 
must report their progress in terms of these 
target s • . .  In consequence , a whole make-believe 
world is created in which target s are determined 
and progress is reported in terins of items over 
which the parties concerned have no authority or 
control whatever (Dandekar 196 7 : 11) . 
This may sotmd like a fairly s elf-evident proposit ion ; 
but a glance at current plan documents as well as processes 
of  working at various levels of  administration would show 
that old ideas and habits die very hard indeed . A 1970 
study by the Planning Commission covering 39 s elected blocks , 
2 86 villages and over 1200 rural households not ed that 
the tm.iform pattern (of plan formulat ion , proj ect 
selection and budgeting) o f fered very little 
s cope for flexibility in planning and implement­
at ion of the detailed schemes in relat ion to local 
needs . A more flexible budget and s taff structure 
to area needs would have tm.doubtedly resulted in 
well-tailored schemes to fulfil local 
aspirat·ions bet ter than what was observed in 
this study ( India , Planning Commission 1970b : 
173) . 
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This marked a hard-earned insight ; what it st ill missed was 
something that Professor Dandekar had spelled out in some 
detail in 1967 , namely , apart from infrastructural investments 
directly within the control of government , the processes of 
product ion in agriculture could only be indirectly influenced 
through incent ives , education and organizat ion . ' Planning ' 
as it touches the farmer directly can only be to teach him 
how to make use o f  an exist ing facility bet ter , and to  expand 
and improve that facility wherever feasible . There is as 
such something that is inherently iterat ive and therefore 
tentat ive about this process of t rial and learning between 
the farmer and the development agent , of  j ointly looking for 
opportunit ies for development in each local situat ion and 
devi sing the t actics and the techniques of action that suit 
the participants in that situat ion , rather than mechanical 
fulfilment of target s prescribed from above . And it would 
seem that a planning process that is so sparing of the scope 
for init iat ive and improvization for it s own agent on the 
field is unlikely to be appreciat ive of the need and scope 
for such init iat ive and improvization on the part of the 
farmers . 
One o f  the strong arguments in favour of trans ferring 
a large numb er of programs administered by permanent officials 
to locally elected councils has b een that the latter are 
likely to be less wooden and more aware of local condit ions 
and requirement s .  This was the pillar on which the Balwantrai 
Mehta committee based it s recommendat ions for what it called 
a system of ' democrat ic decent ralizat ion ' in rural development 
planning in India . What this argument overlooks is the fact 
that decentralization , whether ' democrat ic ' or not , at the 
district level and b elow , without any change in the approach 
to and techniques of planning at the more crucial decis ion­
making levels of the State and Central governments , would 
not be very effective . The tyranny of targetry , backed by 
financial sanction , can be very potent , as some of the elected 
bodies have themselves found to their cost . There are 
occasional cases (Programme Evaluation Organisat ion , June 
1969 : 4-5 ) where a local body has defied target s given from 
above and devised its own programs , but as a rule , the effect 
of  democratic decent ralization , within an tIDchanged planning 
straightj acket , is that the village level bureaucrat finds 
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company from the ranks of  polit ical leaders in fret t ing at 
en forced and irrat ional uniformity . 
Chapter 4 
The achievement 
The share o f  agriculture and allied act ivities in the 
national income of India fell from about 50 per cent in 
1960 to 40 per cent in 1972 (at constant prices ) . However ,  
nearly 7 0  per cent o f  the population continues t o  be 
dependent on agriculture for a livelihood .  Hence , the 
per formance o f  the agricultural sector remains crucial for 
the ent ire economy . 
Table 1 presents , in a capsule form, main trends in the 
use of inputs , output and productivity in agriculture during 
two decades o f  planning.  The picture presented by Table 1 
is quit e impressive . Within two decades , output has doubled 
( cereals output going up by a little more than 100 per cent , 
and of  total output ris ing by a little less than 100 per 
cent ) , and yields have improved by 50 per cent to 60 per 
cent (depending on the choice of the terminal year) . This 
is an o rder o f  improvement that is unmatched in the country 
during a corresponding int erval of t ime in the previous 
hundred years . 
For all this showing , however ,  a persistent impression 
is· one of dissat is faction . Some of it is derived from 
stagnation or worse during part icular years . The Government ' s  
Economic S?A:PVey 1 9 74-75 (19 75 : 6 ) , for instance , observed 
that ' The tmsat isfactory p erformance o f  agricultural sector 
is the root cause of  the stagnation of  nat ional income and 
the acute inflat ionary pressures which have emerged since 
1972-73 ' .  Looking at the general trend , however ,  the causes 
for dissat isfaction are to be t raced to one or other of the 
following maj or  considerations ( some of these are perhaps 
relevant to countries other than India) : 
(a) Output is not growing fast  enough , in relat ion to 
populat ion growth , desired increases in per capita 
con sumpt ion , e t c .  
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Table 1 
Main t rends in inEut s and outEuts in agriculture 
T 
Input s Output s  Product ivity 
Total Gro ss Chemical fert- HYVP cereals All agrl comds All agrl comds Cereals Cereals Year cropped area irrigat ed area ilizers used area (1959-60 to (m. tonnes) (1959-60 to 
(m. hect.) (m. hect . )  (NPK-m. tonnes) (m. hect . ) 1961-62=100 ) 19 61-62=100 ) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1950-51 131 .  9 22 . 6  (Negligible) 68 . 9  42 . 4  8 3 . 2  76 . 7 
55-56 147 . 3  25 . 6  0 . 1  84 . 4  55 . 9  9 1 .  9 90 . 1  
1960-61 152 . 8 2 8 . 0  0 . 3 102 . 7  69 . 3  103 . 3 102 . 0  
65-66 155 . 4  30 . 9  0 . 8 95 . 8  62 . 4  92 . 2  89 . 8  
66-67 1 . 1  1 .  9 95 . 9  64 . 9  
6 7-68 163 . 7 3 3 . 2  1 . 6  6 . 0  116 . 6  83 . 0  111 . 5 114 . 3  
68-69 159 . 7 35 . 4  1 .  8 9 . 2  114 . 8  8 3 . 6 107 . 6  110 . 4  
69-70 16 3 . 8 3 7 . 3  2 . 0  11 . 4  122 . 5  87 . 8  112 . 7  117 . 4  
19 70- 71 1 6 7 . 4  38 . 6  2 . 3  15 . 3  131 . 4  96 . 6  118 . 0 12 3 . 8 
71-72 ) 2 . 7  18 . 0  130 . 9  94 . 1  117 . 2  122 . 2  
72-73 - ( a) ) - (b )  2 . 8  22 . 1  120 . 6  85 . 7  110 . 4  114 . 5  
7 3-74 ) 2 . 8  25 . 5  131 . 6  9 3 . 9  
Notes : (a) Comparab le data not availab le ; as per indirect evidence there was little change in 19 71-72 and perhaps a marginal 
decl ine in 1972-7 3 .  Area figures for 19 73- 74 have not yet b een publ ishe d .  (IAB 13th Ed.  1974 : 70-2 ) . 
(b ) Comparable figures not available but there is some evidence to indicate that the expansion cont inued after 19 70-71 
also , roughly at the rate of 2 m.  hectares per year during 19 71-72 and 1973-74 . (Economic Survey 19 ?4-?5 , p . 6 7) 
Sources : Col . 1-2 Indian Agriculture in Brief (IAB) ; 13th E d ,  1974 , pp . 10-11 ; Economic Survey 1 9 ?4-?5 , p . 6 7 .  
3-4 Economic Survey 1 9 ?4-?5 , p . 6 7 .  
5-6 IAB ,  Thirteenth Edit ion , 1974 , pp . 116 , 122 ; Economic Survey 1 9 ?4-?5 , pp . 62 ,  63 , 6 8 .  
7-8 IAB ,  Thirteenth Edit ion , 19 74 , pp . 12-3,  118-9 . 
(,,.) +:--
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(b ) The rate o f  increase ,  such as it was , has t ended to 
slow down of  late - (Economic Survey 19 74-75 (19 75 : 3) not ed 
that ' There is considerable evidence to suggest that India ' s  
agriculture seems to have lost the momentum for growth it 
exhibited in the late sixt ies ' ) . 
(c )  Instab ility is t ending to increase with the rate of  
growth ( Sen 19 6 7 ) . 
(d) The cropping pattern and the composit ion of  output are 
changing in ways that should cause concern from a long-term 
point of  view , part icularly from the point of  view of 
maintaining balance - between food and clothing,  between 
internal consumption and exports , and more part icularly from 
the point of  view of improving living standards of the poorer 
sect ions of the community (Lipton 19 70 : 12 7 -48 ; Narain 1972 ; 
Raj 19 74 ) . 
(e)  Imbalance , as between regions and classes of  farmers 
within the country , are get ting accentuated under the 
influence of  the new technology ( India , Planning Commis sion 
19 70a : l49 ; Frankel 1971 : 191-3 ; Bansil 1972 : 104-1 7 ) . 
These f ive maj or strands of  crit icism raise a whole 
host  of issues of theory and policy . We shall take up for 
cons iderat ion only such of these that are directly relevant 
to our study here . The first point relat ing to inadequate 
growth is obvious enough . Point ( d) relating to  shift ing 
composit ion of output raises important questions . There are 
many imponderables in this situation and we shall not indulge 
in speculat ion as to what role miscalculat ion or prej udice 
on the part o f  authorit ies should be held accountable for 
the observed result s to the extent that these result s were 
within their control at all . Nor shall we pursue ( c) 
relating to increas ing instab ility as it is perhaps premature 
to take a view on this question in relat ion to the technology 
now being pushed through. Points (b) and (e)  reflect a 
swing of the pendulum from the euphoria of  the Green 
Revolut ion of the late 1960s . As comments on the ef ficacy 
of the ' new '  technology in generat ing a sustained increase 
in output , and the costs to society of that strategy , they 
call for a somewhat closer examinat ion . 
It  has of  late become commonplace to use as an index 
of ' progress ' or  ' modernizat ion ' the area planted with high 
yielding variety seeds from y ear to year . Reviews of ' the 
state o f  agriculture ' are replete with such dat a ,  part icularly 
in relat ion to developing countries that are dependent on 
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these cereals . This is , however , a very part ial index . 
Table 1 shows that the direct correlation b etween the area 
covered by HYV seeds on the one hand and yield per acre under 
actual field condit ions is not very striking , even though 
for part icular crops such as wheat , yield improvement s  
associated with the new seeds was quite spectacular , specially 
in the early years . It was as recently as 19 70 that Mr 
Lester Brown had written that ' the paramount threat to the 
Green Revolut ion is increas ingly the availab ility of markets  
rather than product ion technolo gy ' (Brown , L . R. 19 70 : 9 7 ) . 
A review only four years later in respect of  Sri Lanka 
brought forth this comment : 
What has struck us most forcib ly is that adopt ion 
by itsel f  does not neces sarily lead to agricultural 
development or even to  substantial increases in 
product ivity . . .  We have a situat ion of adoption 
with the results obtained from it cons iderably 
lower than what was expect ed . Much o f  the 
research up to now has had adopt ion itself as 
it s fo cus , whereas the evidence from this survey 
as well as others indicate that S ri Lanka has 
moved beyond that stage . The focus should be on 
identificat ion of the factors limit ing the benefit s 
from adopt ion . . •  
A level o f  adoption beyond the capacity of the 
farmers and the ecological and the socio-economic 
environment to support it could be cons idered as 
over-adopt ion . • .  over-adopt ion has probably 
increased the vulnerab il ity of agriculture to 
adverse changes in the ecological and socio­
economic factors af fect ing farming . Over­
dependence on a technology which can produce 
efficiently only in a fairly exact ing ecological 
and socio-economic environment is particularly 
dangerous for a developing country which cannot 
ensure favourable condit ions for its farmers 
(Dias and Gunawardena 19 74 : 7-13) . 
Having presented the above view as an example o f  the 
react ion against the earl ier ' over-sell ' of  the green 
revolut ion , we now proceed to look more closely at the 
charact erist ics of ' the technology ' and the characteristics 
of  the ' ecological and socio-economic environment ' which 
are relevant to it s adopt ion . 
Chapter 5 
The questions 
Quest ions relating to the ' socio-economic environment ' -
the pattern o f  landholdings , systems of irrigation , structures 
of market , et c .  - in which farmers act are reserved for 
con siderat ion in the next chapter . In this chapter we 
discuss i ssues relat ing to  the technology as such , the 
aspects that are relevant to it s adopt ion by farmers , and 
by the same t oken , relevant to its act ive promot ion by the 
Government as a strategy of development . First it is 
necessary to dispose of the stat ist ical as dist inct from the 
more substant ial aspects . Official data on the subj ect are 
prone to some error . In India , for inst ance , the coverage 
figures by land area reported to be sown with HYV seeds are 
often notional , computed from seeds dist ribut ed to farmers 
and as sumed norms of seed usage per acre . This indirect 
index is used because of pract ical difficult ies of collecting 
in reasonable t ime areas actually sown with HYV seeds . It 
is much easier to get a measure of the seeds dist ributed , 
much of  which takes place through public agencies (official 
and co-operat ive) , than their subsequent use by individual 
farmers . To the extent that farmers adopt seed rates 
dif ferent from the norms assumed by the Department ,  there is 
liable to be error . Field studies! show that , as a rule , 
farmers use a higher dosage than that reconnnended to them. 
Hence the coverage figures are likely to contain an upward 
bias . For purposes of gauging t rends in use over a period 
of t ime , this b ias may not pose a serious difficulty .  Even 
here , there exists  the possibility of the seed not reaching 
farmers in t ime for the sowing season . When such delays 
occur farmers may take delivery of the seed because they are 
committ ed to their use ,  but may later use it for consumption 
purposes . To the ext ent that the duration of such delays -
or , more generally , the occurrence of factors that result in 
1Muranj an 1967 : 78-9 ; India , Directorate of  Economics and 
Stat istics 196 7 : 19 ,  48 ; Lockwood and o thers 1971 : 116 ; 
Nanj annna Chinappa 19 74 : 6 .  
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the use of  the seed for purpo ses other than that int ended by 
the authorit ies - from year to year may not be of  a random 
nature , there are difficult ies of  countering this bias even 
for purposes of  assessing trends , part icularly where the 
number of observat ions is limited . 
Also , where variet ies considered as merely ' locally 
improved ' one year are upgraded and classified as HYVs in 
subsequent y ears , part o f  the reported expans ion in the HYV 
acreage is a statistical illusion , as far as effect s  on 
yield are concerned.  In international comparisons this 
definit ional problem exists even in a given year . 
In relat ion to agricultural product ion it seems useful 
to distinguish between the terms ' techniques '  and ' technology ' .  
One can simply say that a technology is no more than a bundle 
of alternat ive techniques of doing a given funct ion or 
act ivity . An advance in technology so-called can take more 
than one form. It may s imply open up a more convenient or 
cheaper way of  performing an old j ob - j ust one aspect of 
agricultural product ion such as ploughing . This kind of  an 
improvement is more likely to be the result o f  an advance in 
engineering than in , say ,  genet ics , though for that reason 
it may be o f  no less consequence to the farmers . At any given 
t ime , there fore , farmers have a range o f  choices or techniques 
of do ing various things connected with crop product ion . 
Thus a farmer may avoid machines in ploughing (using a 
bullo ck-drawn implement rather than a t ractor) , but may 
resort to  machine-pumping o f  water for irrigat ion . S imilar 
examples of alternat ive techniques of att empt ing other tasks 
in rais ing a crop can be given . 
What the seed-chemical advance for rice , wheat , corn , 
et c .  represents is that , for a given comb inat ion of inputs 
( such as water and fertilizer) , a much larger output becomes 
· possible . One must ask whether this innovat ion implies an 
advance , a new technology - a different isoquant standing 
for a decidedly more efficient input /output comb inat ion in 
convent ional diagrams on the subj ect - which everyone must 
ut iliz e if he is not to be cast igated as a ' laggard ' ;  or 
whether there is now , as a result of this innovat ion , a 
unique package where there was a bundle o f  alternat ives 
earl ier . To answer this quest ion , one must first define 
' input s ' and ' techniques ' more rigorously . For our purpose ,  
it is enough to note that to the ext ent that the new seeds 
embody certain characterist ics ( in regard to absorpt ion of  
nitrogen and yields ) which make them superior to the 
traditional ones , with less than perfect substitutability 
between them,  we have a new ' input ' rather than a new 
' technique ' .  At this stage , therefore , one can say that 
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while alternat ive ways remain of performing specific tasks 
in agriculture ( i . e .  in applying the input s ) , the new seeds 
embody a unique technology by giving rise to a new input . 
But this is only the starting , not the stopping point , 
for analysing the implicat ions for policy . It is known that 
the market situat ion faced by different farmers in developing 
. count ries is not uniform even within a small locality . The 
prices charged for inputs ( including credit ) , and the prices 
obtainab le for the output can vary considerab ly from one 
class of farmers to another . Some can mobilize cheap labour , 
others have access to cheap credit . Some are obliged to sell 
their produce soon after harvest when prices t end to be low , 
others can hold on to  their stocks and reap the benefit of  
higher prices . Under the circumstances , farmers can be 
expected to make different choices not only as to what 
inputs and how much of  the input s they should use , but also 
in what way they should use them. This problem can arise 
because o f  lack of freedom or  knowledge on the part of  
particular farmers in making the choices . But more importantly , 
it arises because farmers are not driven by some overwhelming 
desire to maximize phys ical output , without reference to the 
particular set of prices they face as producers . The greater 
the reliance on purchased input s ,  the more sensit ive are the 
farmers likely to be to calculat ions of cost s and returns . 
The point has b een analysed by Keith Griffin (19 74 : Ch . 2 )  in 
relat ion to the new seeds , and more specifically by P . A. 
Yotopoulos ( 19 74 : 2 6 3- 74 )  in the context of  Indian agriculture . 
It follows , therefore , that a recommendation to farmers in 
favour of  one tmique package of inputs ignores this reality.  
In t rying to understand how an advance in technology 
presents itself to the farme rs on these lines , we seem to 
have fallen back on the view ment ioned earlier of agriculture 
as a range o f  tasks which it sel f varies with t ime (e . g . 
irrigat ion , when it is first int roduced) , or some of  which 
assume a special significance (e . g . plant protect ion while 
using seeds which are part icularly prone to pest s and diseases) 
and alt ernat ive ways of doing each of these tasks , rather 
than some specific comb inat ion of input s .  We shall keep 
coming back to this view. 
The merit o f  the new seeds , as commonly explained , is 
that it yields better when used in comb inat ion with water 
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and fert iliz er .  Let us now look at some data on fert ilizer 
appl icat ion by farmers using the new seeds on their (irrigated) 
rice farms . Table 2 compares doses of nitrogen recommended 
by the research scient ists with the actual doses applied by 
the farmers , by size group of farms , between 1967  and 1969 
in four prominent ri ce growing States of  India . 
Table 2 
Fert ilizer aEElication by Eaddy farmers 
in four states - 196 7-69 
Actual dose 
Fert ilizer applied 
State District dose (kg . N /hect . )  recommended Decile size group kg . N /hect . 
I II III IV 
Tamilnadu Coimbatore 45 18 16 13 19 
N. Arcot 45 5 12 8 7 
Thanj avur 48 4 6 9 3 
Orissa Sambalpur 24 16 13 2 3  16 
Cut tack 24 0 7 1 12 
Uttar 
Pradesh Varanasi 22 1 15 21 19 
Basti 22  15 15 21 19 
Maharashtra Thana 24 9 13  10 12 
Bhandara 18 1 6 6 10 
Note : The decile groups were formed as follows : farmers 
were ranked from lowest to highest by operat ional 
farm area and the ranked list was then divided into 
ten groups with equal numbers ( deciles) of farms . The 
ten groups were then comb ined to form four broader 
groups , the smallest three deciles into  Group I ,  the 
next three into Group II , the next higher three into 
Group III , and the last and highest decile into  
Group IV . 
Source : Lockwood and others , 1971 . Computed from Table J2 , 
p . 1 7 7 ,  and Table K3 , p . 180 . 
The f irst point that strikes anyone is that in none 
o f  the district s llllder study did any of the farmer groups 
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apply the full dose of fert ilizer recommended to them. It 
is no doub t  important to what extent this was the result of 
sheer shortage of  fert ilizers in the relevant years , defect ive 
supply arrangement�' unfavourable price ratios , or scepticism 
on the part of the farmers in acting on the recommendations 
given to them on a somewhat general basis for whole areas 
without reference to soil and o ther characterist ics of 
part icular farms . But we shall not go into causes here . 
Let us look merely at the effect on yields of such ' sub­
opt imal ' use o f  one input , in this case chemical fert ilizers . 
Here one innnediately runs into data problems . In an 
experimental farm ,  under controlled condit ions it is po ssible 
to study yield changes in response to varying intens ities 
in the use of one input . This procedure becomes impossible 
when we are t rying to study yield behaviour on actual farms 
spread over a wide area . To compare actual farm yields 
with yields obtained in research farms for the variet ies 
under considerat ion will not help in ident ifying the effect 
of sub-opt imal use of one particular input in which we may 
happen to be interested for the moment . It is interest ing , 
however ,  to see what levels of fertiliz at ion the research 
scientists themselves use in the demonstrat ions arranged by 
them on farmers ' fields to show the superiority of the new 
seed variet ies , the levels they reconnnend to the general body 
of farmers through the extens ion p ersonnel , and compare these 
with the dosages actually being applied by farmers .  Once 
again we have some data problems in analysing the sit uat ions 
for thousands of farmers , using a variety of improved seeds 
in a variety o f  agronomic condit ions . But let us look at 
the broad magnitudes . In the four rice growing States 
referred to , nit rogen application by the scientists in the 
demonstrat ion farms was above 100 kgs /hect . ( India , Ministry 
of Agriculture 1974 : 103) . With fert ilizers get t ing more 
scarce the Indian Council of  Agricultural Research has also 
set it s sight s lower . A recent publicat ion describ ing the 
results from certain experiments conducted by them noted 
that ' even with a moderate level of  50-60 kg . /hect ' (and 
with some careful management) , 80 per cent o f  the potential 
yield could be obtained . The same report went on to caut ion , 
however , that ' the minimum threshold level of  N should not 
be less than 40 kg . N/ha as the response at lower levels of 
N was not found to be pronounced ( India , Department of 
Agricultural Research and Educat ion 19 75  : 7 ) . The paddy 
varieties used by the farmers in the four states during 
196 7-69 were not necessarily the variety in respect of which 
this part icular research result has been reported . But the 
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quest ion does remain : given the concept of  a threshold level 
of applicat ion of an individual input that is in short supply , 
to what extent a development strategy that pushes a large 
number of farmers to use not merely inadequate but possibly 
inef fect ive doses of the crucial inputs  is j ustified in terms 
of either increasing nat ional production or of  farmers ' net 
incomes . The quest ion goes back to the choice between a 
broad-b ased versus a select ive strategy o f  development 
referred to  earlier in Chapter 3 .  A re-examinat ion of  strategy 
in the light o f  the known characterist ics of the t echnology 
now being promoted everywhere and given the scarcity of 
crit ical input s would seem to  be called for . 
Let us now turn to look at the other characteris t ic of  
the new technology , which has been stressed so strongly , 
namely , complementarity in the use of  the different input s .  
As an FAO document put it , ' the returns from several input s 
used together exceed the sum of  the returns from them when 
used singly , provided the input s are used in the right 
proportions and are properly adapted t o  the ecological 
conditions ' ( FAO 1968 : 80) . The policy implicat ion o f  this 
view is also clear . The same document of the FAO put it 
rather categorically : ' . • •  it is essent ial that technological 
improvement s  should no longer be introduced piecemeal in 
developing count ries but as a "package'" (FAO 1968 : 80) . 
What this prescript ion amount s to is this : if you are 
going to give the new seeds to a farmer , make sure he gets 
everything else that has to go with it . Let us overlook for 
the moment the inj unction ab out the ' input s being used in 
the right proport ions ' , and concent rate on the mere fact or 
otherwise of certain component s of  the package being applied . 
(Owing to difficult ies of  gathering data,  we shall also 
ignore the quest ion of the t iming and manner of the use -
which for items such as water and pest control chemicals may 
be as important as the quantum of use) . Table 3 summarizes 
findings from field surveys on the use of the package recomm­
endat ion under the HYVP in India . 
The figures cited have been taken from sample studies 
and cannot be taken as indicat ing anything more than the broad 
magnitudes of the extent of penet ration of the new technology 
in its full package form. We have little direct informat ion 
as to why farmers adopt some but not others of the input s 
and practices , or why they vary , in the part icular agro­
economic condit ions facing them ,  int ensity of particular 
measures and input s in comparison with the 'norms ' recommended 
Table 3 
Extent o f  adoEtion o f  Eackage of Eractices b� farmers 
us ing HYV seeds 
% of farmers us ing Elements 
Year Season Crop HYV seeds who also in the package adopt a minimum set 
of  the Eackage considered 
1968 (a) Kharif Paddy 15 . 4  ( Seed treatment Maize 14 . 9  ( Baj ra 3 . 8 ( Fert iliz ers Jowar 47 . 9  ( 
1969 (b ) Rabi Wheat 9 . 4  ( Plant protect ion 
Paddy 16 . 6  ( 
Jowar 55 . 8 ( Int er-culture 
19 7 3- ( c) Semavari ( Seed t reatment 74 (June/Aug) Paddy Nil ( Transplant ing Samba ( Manure (organic) (Aug/Dec) Paddy 21 . 0  ( Fert ilizers Navarai ( Pest icides (Jan /Mar) Paddy Nil ( 
Sources : (a) Programme Evaluat ion Organisat ion , June 1969 . 
(b ) Programme Evaluation Organisation , November 1969 . 
(c)  Nanj amma Chinappa , 1974 : 20 ,  Table 17 . (Data relate t o  eleven villages 
in North Arcot district of Tamil Nadu , India.  Number of cult ivators 
covered were 309 in Somavari , 4 9 3  in Samba and 2 7 7 in Navarai . ) 
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to them. A somewhat common explanat ion of this phenomenon 
is that farmers find the recommended package uneconomic , and 
that they obt ain accept able yields without opt ing for the 
full package (Mukherj ee and Lockwood 19 73) . Defect ive 
arrangement s for the t imely supply o f  input s and lack of a 
sufficiently broad-based research-extension feed-back t o  
ensure that the recommended package i s  specific to  each area 
and class of farmers , are also equally plausible explanations . 
Whatever may be the proximate causes , let us get back 
to the quest ion we started with , namely , the impact on yield . 
We seem to run across not only inadequate empirical dat a ,  
but inadequate knowledge on the basis o f  which predict ions 
of yield tmder such suboptimal conditions in farmers ' fields 
could be made . But the quest ions that arise are important 
for making policy . What levels of yield is the planner to 
expect when it appears probable that most of  the farmers will 
be using less than the full package ? Besides the seed , are 
there other crit ical element s in the package , such as pest 
control , without which the rest of the package is rendered 
1.IDpro fitable ? For particular elements ,  such as fert ilizers , 
are there minima , below which their applicat ion is l.IDrewarding? 
On a given combinat ion o f  inputs ,  what are the further 
influences of ' environment ' and ' management ' respect ively on 
product ivity ?  Are there indispensable element s of ' environ­
ment ' or ' management ' in the technology , and if so are they 
within the reach o f  the farmers ? The int eract ions among 
inputs and their effect on yield are patently complex ; we 
seem to have inadequate knowledge of yield patterns at lower 
int ensities of resource use and less than perfect management 
l.IDder actual field condit ions . This is not s o  much a comment 
on the technolo gy itsel f , as on the manner in which it is 
' sold ' to the policy-makers in the first instance , and in 
turn diffused by them in the countryside . 
Let us try and look at this problem as it might present 
it self to the individual farmer . For the reasons j ust noted , 
the yield behaviour on his farm is liable to  be much less 
predictable than simple-minded recommendat ions may appear t o  
suggest . But the farmer faces the further problem o f  having 
to commit himsel f  to the adoption o f  the full package at the 
t ime the new seed is o ffered to him on the eve of crop season . 
But there are so many uncertaint ies in the situation , environ­
ment ally and managerially .  There is no as surance in advance 
about the supply of other input s in the local market as the 
crop season advances . There is perhaps even less assurance 
as to how much of the stocks get ting to the local supply 
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point would come his way . Part o f  the uncertainty is 
inherent in agricultural operat ions . There is no way of 
predict ing reliably whether there would be suf ficient water 
for irrigat ion all through the season , or whether a pest 
att ack on his plant might not materializ e . The init ial 
uncertainties regarding input-output relationships under 
varying packages and management are thus compounded for the 
farmer by uncertaint ies regarding what inputs are likely to 
be availab le t o  him at the t ime they are needed . This is 
not to ment ion uncertainty about price changes . Given these 
facto rs , it seems to be singularly inappropriate to classify 
farmers , as some studies tend to do , as ' progressive ' and 
' laggards ' respectively on the · basis of whether or not they 
are using new seeds . 
It is , of  course , expected that a government which set s 
out to promote increased product ivity in the agricultural 
sector will al so t ake steps to mitigate such uncertaint ies 
to the extent feasible , and possibly set up some insurance 
mechanisms to protect the farmer from losses arising from 
unforeseen changes . The extens ion agency can t ry to supply 
a self-contained kit of essential inputs  right at the 
beginning of the crop season . There will be immense organ­
iz at ional and administrat ive problems to overcome , before 
this could be done for millions of farmers in villages served 
with poor transport and other facilities . There may also be 
the problem of inducing the farmer to purchase particular 
inputs (e . g . pest control chemical) to be used on a contingent 
bas is ( in the event of an outbreak of disease) . But there 
is the further problem of implementat ion . Even assuming that 
government has supplied the inputs and has set up a price 
guarantee mechanism, et c . , there is the further problem of 
ident ifying the t iming and the exact nature of the operat ion 
to be carried out according to the conditions of the farm 
and inducing or guiding the farmer to take it up . Thus , it 
is not merely a quest ion of supplying the chemical , but also 
of  ensuring that it is used at the right t ime and in the 
right manner . This could be a maj or challenge in a country 
that is t rying with a small band of  experts and extension 
workers to modify age-old hab its  of management among farmers 
who are largely illiterate and in villages served by poor 
communication and other facilit ies . But these are the kinds 
of considerations that have to be weighed carefully before 
bland prescript ions of policy - ' promote a package and your 
food problems are solved ' - are handed down by national 
governments .  
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Let us for the moment leave the complement arity aspect 
in the inputs , and turn to consider the other feature of the 
technology , namely , its divisibility , or returns to  s cale . 
This subj ect has received wide at tent ion in recent years . 
Dr Griffin after a survey o f  the possible variat ions in the 
adoption of improved techniques by farmers with different 
endowments  and access concluded that 
The new technology • • •  is not characterized by 
important economies of scale and the growth in 
inequal ity which has in pract ice accompanied 
technical change is not a necessary consequence 
of  att empt s to raise yields . The problem arises 
not from the nature of the most appropriate 
technology , but from the bias of government 
policy and the fact that public inst itut ions 
clearly are not s cale-neutral (Griffin 1974 : 69 ) . 
Rao (19 74 : 2 )  came to  a similar conclus ion in a recent 
study of Asian agriculture . The Government of India explicitly 
subs cribes to  this view (India , Planning Commission 1973 , 
Part I ,  p . 2 3) and the Indian Council of  Agricultural Research 
( India, Dept Agricultural Research and Educat ion 1975 : 189-90) 
claimed reconf irmat ion of  this thesis by cit ing data to show 
that in 1178  nat ional demonst rat ions conducted in farmers ' 
fields in different part s of the country , no significant 
relat ionship emerged b etween size of  landholdings and yields . 
Occasionally , a dissident voice could be heard . A paper by 
Raj vir Singh and R. K .  Patel (19 7 3 : 43-8) argued on the basis 
of field data that increasing returns t o  scale were found to 
be operating in the selected area and that the old hypothesis 
of  inverse relationship between per hectare productivity and 
farm siz e  does not hold t rue under the new agricultural 
technology . Even on a given sample , int erpretat ions and 
conclusions can vary depending on the standardiz ation pro­
cedures adopted for varying inputs , and the techniques used 
for eliminating the· influence of  differing managerial and 
other facto rs . We shall not here attempt a comparat ive 
evaluation o f  which finding is theoretically more defensible , 
but turn our at t ent ion to an unders t anding of the more 
important elements in this quest ion as they might present 
themselves in pract ice to the average farmer . 
Let us start with a considerat ion o f  how s ize might 
influence the first step in cult ivat ion , namely , preparat ion 
of the soil . For loosening the soil , as a rule it does not 
make any s ignificant difference whether the land is tilled 
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with bullock-drawn implement s  or by machines . But in the 
subcontinent , there seem to be areas where soil character­
istics may make deep ploughing advantageous , and in some 
cases perhaps even essent ial . The required depth of ploughing 
in such tracts or clusters of  farms may be unobtainable with 
animal-drawn equipment . In areas where HYVs are being grown 
and where moisture stress is a recurring phenomenon (and 
this may become an increasingly frequent occurrence in India 
as the government plans to push the HYV seeds program to 
areas not regularly served by irrigation facilit ies) deep 
ploughing may assume a special signif icance in view of it s 
efficacy in improving moisture retent ion qualit ies of the 
soil (Lawrence 1970 : 15-7 , quoted in Owens and Shaw 1972 : 170) . 
Under these circumstances , a larger farm siz e · which can take 
mechanized equipment could prove an advantage , part icularly 
where facilit ies for hiring t ractors by the small farmer are 
not well developed . 
A s imilar argument can be developed , and in fact was 
developed at some length by Frankel , in the relat ionship 
b etween farm s ize and ab ility to provide controlled , 
privately-owned irrigat ion • 
• • •  the connnand area o f  the smallest tubewell 
is about 20 to 25 acres . Extension workers and 
the economist s at P . A. u . 2 agree that the opt imum 
siz e  of the holding for the efficient cultivat ion 
of  the high yielding variet ies , assuming a 
tubewell and bullock power , is about 2 0  to 2 5  
acres ; this floor c an  be reduced with efficient 
management to 15 acres , but not below. Necessarily , 
therefo re , the small farmer is denied the economies 
to scale enj oyed by large landowners .  The returns 
to his investment in a tubewell will be lower than 
on 20 to 25 acre farms ( Frankel 19 71 : 2 9 ) . 
Instead o f  looking further for such examples , let us 
rather analyse their significance in more general terms . 
Firstly , one might distinguish between returns to scale of  
the specific elements of  the Green Revolut ion technolo gy 
explicitly , such as seeds or fertilizer and returns to scale 
from the appurtenances of any technology of agricultural 
product ion . In other words , it is possible to take the view, 
in the examples given earlier , that the higher returns to 
2Pllllj ab Agricultural University . 
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larger siz e ,  or the threshold size owing to indivisib ility 
of  the tractor or the tubewell reflect economy of  scale from 
these machines , and not economies of  the product ion technology 
in agriculture per se . If the technolo gy of  producing 
tractors or  tubewells could improve so that their divisib ility 
problem is got over , then this apparent advantage of  larger 
farms in the Green Revolut ion technology will vanish . In 
fact , there are some who deny that modern 'llll.its o f  agricultural 
technology are necessarily or even generally so large as to 
make their use on small farms 'llllworkable or 'llll.economic . This 
is done either by pointing out that smaller machines are in 
fact available , or that less sophisticated but equally 
efficient agricultural operat ions such as the bamboo tubewell 
have been , or can be , devised , which will bring them within 
the reach o f  the small farmer (Donmten 1975 : 483-9 ) . 
Let us not succumb to the t emptation to pursue this 
line of enquiry - whether it is the crop-breeder or the 
machine-maker who has been less mindful of the interest s  of 
the small farmer . From the point o f  view o f  this study , 
what emerges is the simple enough proposit ion that for each 
agricultural op erat ion there seems to be a certain convenient 
and economic 'llllit or siz e .  This size is partly dependent 
on the nature o f  the operation and partly on the type of  
facilit ies generally available (equipment , physical access ,  
et c . ) .  Thus , for planting seeds , the minimum size for 
convenient operat ion is so small that size of  the farm makes 
virtually no difference . The same thing can perhaps be said 
of applicat ion of fert ilizers . But the physical environment 
in which these activit ies are at tempted is important . Thus , 
for instance ,  the use of  chemicals rather than bulky farmyard 
or organic manure makes the access problem easier for a 
farmer who wants t o  t ake the needed material across other 
farme rs ' fields . Chemical fertilizers can be carried in 
small bags and applied by hand ; farmyard manure usually has 
to be transported in carts , and availability of carts and 
access across fields could both be difficult , part icularly 
for a farmer whose ' farm ' lies in scat tered bits all over 
the village . In this sense ,  one could make the claim that 
the chemical revolut ion removed or at l east greatly mit igat ed 
one disabil ity from which these farmers were suffering 
earlier . 
But when we extend this analys is to 
agricultural op erat ions , the usual small 
arguments appear rather simplis t ic .  Let 
instance , drainage or plant protect ion . 
certain other 
versus large farms 
us take , for 
Quite obviously , 
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there is a certain minimum size of operat ion here , below 
which it will b e  either ineffect ive or prohibitively expensive . 
Under Indian condit ions , even the farmer in the highest 
farm-size decile in the village may find that his farm is not 
b ig enough to undertake really effective soil conservation 
or drainage improvement . This may be t rue even for a current 
(as dist inct from a capital investment ) op erat ion such as 
fight ing an attack of pest on his farm. There is a degree 
of interdependence among the farmers that is inherent in the 
nature of the op erations , and the physical continuity of the 
fields becomes an import ant feature in itself . It seems 
useful , there fore , to examine quest ions about minimum size 
proport ionality , ext ernality , etc . , in relat ion to  each given 
agricultural operat ion specifically in the context o f  available 
alt ernat ive techniques , rather than for some vaguely-defined 
' technology ' o f  cultivat ion as such . The introduct ion of  
' the ' new technology perhaps merely adds to  the range o f  
operat ions in respect of which the right or the minimum size 
quest ion has to be expli citly examined ; the stakes or the 
economies involved are perhaps higher . The only general­
iz ation that one could hazard under the circumstances is 
that in the condit ions of Asian agriculture there may be no 
effect ive alternative to some form- of co-ordinated act ion , 
if part icular operat ions in agricultural product ion are to 
be carried out efficiently . And other things being equal , 
the smaller the operative farm unit , the greater will be the 
need for group act ion . Organizat ionally , this view of  
agricultural technology and product ion - pract ices has 
important implications for policy . And it is to a study of  
some of  these implications that the rest of this study is 
devoted . 
Chapter 6 
The set t ing 
Many developing count ries have pro ceeded on the basis 
that the range and type of  changes needed for agricultural 
development call for planned act ion . Further , they have 
assumed that government s will need to play a maj or  role in 
initiat ing and sustaining the process o f  change . Within 
this b road view , one could distinguish two further categories : 
one where a government ' s  role is conceived somewhat restrict­
ively , and the other which regards it as responsible for 
promot ing bas ic changes . In the former cas e ,  the aim is 
to provide incentives to farmers and to build up infrastructure 
in a general way , leaving it to the ability and init iat ive 
of  individual farmers to make the best use of  these incentives 
and fa cilities . In the latter case , more ftmdament al act ion 
is contemplated , such as in property relat ions (e . g . ceiling 
on individual land ownership , reform of tenancy , etc . ) ,  and 
the aim may be not merely to reach a part icular level , but 
a predetermined pattern of production . These two approaches 
are not o f  course mutually exclusive , but India would seem 
to fall into  the second category . 
Against this backgrotmd of  policy , let us take a b rief 
look at what may s imply be called the physical facts of 
Indian agriculture . There is no gett ing away from these 
phys ical features - of  soil st ructures and slopes , of  water 
flow and seepage , of  ridges and paths , of typical holdings 
and their parcels - if we wish to study how well particular 
agricultural op erat ions are being carried out , and what 
potential exists  for their improvement within the limit s of 
known technology .  This is the start ing point in designing 
a strategy of development in agriculture . 
The estimated 130 m. hect . of  net cultivated area in 
India in 1960-61 was divided into about 5 1  m. operational 
holdings . The number o f  ownership holdings was even larger 
at 64 m. , the dif feren ce being accounted for by the pract ice 
o f  leasing . The average size of  an operat ional holding in 
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that year was 2 . 6 3 hect . This is  a low enough figure ; but 
not perhaps too low in comparison with the size o f  farms in 
countries such as Japan (1 . 18) , Egypt ( 1 . 89 ) , Taiwan ( 1 . 2 7) 
or South Korea (0 . 85) , where productivity levels per hect . 
are decidedly highe r .  
But what t ends to be of ten lost sight of  in considering 
the Indian situat ion is that the operat ional holdings are , 
on an average , split into five or six scattered parcels . 
The effect ive size o f  the farm as an operating unit is 
therefore only 0 . 4 7 hect . Two other physical attributes of  
this pattern o f  land ownership and cultivat ion may be noted . 
Firstly , access to dif ferent parcels , or sub-unit s of  the 
holding , for the farmer is often dif ficult and necessarily 
t ime-consuming . Secondly , a considerable area has to be 
set apart for ridges , to mark the boundaries between these 
t iny parcels of land . There is no reliable est imate of what 
area is left uncultivated as a result o f  such numerous and 
criss-cross ridges . A UNDP Team found recently in Raj asthan 
that a realignment of  water courses and paths , combined with 
reorganization o f  land boundaries with some partial consol­
idat ion o f  holdings through exchange of parcels , resulted 
in a gain of 10 to 20  per cent of  cult ivated land . There is 
no reason to think that this was a very untypical situat ion 
(Task Force on Integrated Rural Development 1972 : 37) . A 
government sponsored program of  consolidat ion of  holdings 
through mutual exchange of parcels o f  land on a voluntary 
or compulsory basis has been in operat ion in many States . 
According to one recent report ( India , Dept of  Agriculture 
1975 : 64) , a quarter of the agricultural land in the country 
has already b een consolidated.  Even where consolidat ion 
proceedings have been put through , the pooling has b een only 
part ial , i . e . , a land-holder with say six parcels init ially 
might end up with three , and not necessarily one compa.ct 
holding . In some o f  the States , the program has not attained 
much momentum, and the process of further fragmentat ion 
through sales, inherit ance , etc . must b e  making the situat ion 
worse . Hence ,  the current posit ion is not likely to  be 
materially better than that revealed in the survey in 
1960-61 .  
A word here about the irrigation systems , particularly 
in the rice-growing tract s .  Roughly 50 per cent of the 
irrigation is from public ( government) systems and the other 
50 per cent from private canals and wells . As a rule , only 
those cult ivators who have their holdings in some reasonable­
s ized units  can think of providing themselves with privately-
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owned irri.gat ion sources . The pract ice in India has b een 
that even where the government builds an irrigat ion system, 
it provides water courses for blocks of not less than 40 
hect . of land to be i.rrigat ed . The further distribut ion of 
water takes place in a somewhat haphazard fashion , through 
cross-bunds and cut s acros s farmers ' fields . As a result , 
ensuring controlled water supply (which is regarded as an 
important element in the e fficient ut iliz ation of  the new 
seeds technology for rice) can pose serious dif ficulties for 
farmers dependent on maj or irrigat ion networks . There are 
also the related problems of controll ing erosion of the soil , 
of  conserving soil nutrients and protect ing the crop from 
the spread o f  diseases , all within this framework of  public 
irrigation and scat tered land holdings . The applicat ion of  
improved technology in the Indian s ituation , in effect , means 
enabling millions of cult ivators to plough the land deeply 
enough , to arrange irrigation , to control drainage , to 
preserve soil quality , to check growth of weeds , to prot ect 
the crops from attacks from pests and to collect the harvest 
from something like five different and scattered plots of 
land , each less than 0 . 5 hect . 
The other feature of the economy is the scarcity o f  
many o f  the important inputs  for agricultural product ion . 
Here one must make a distinction between macro- and micro­
level scarcity . At the macro-level , the f irst input that is 
constantly growing scarce is , of course ,  cult ivab le land per 
rural family . As regards water for irr igation , though net 
irrigated area increased by over 10 m. hect . (50  per cent ) 
between 1950 and 19 70 , the proport ion of net irrigated area 
to net area sown even now is only 22 per cent . Rice and 
wheat are the two maj or cereals in respect of which the HYVP 
program is b eing vigorously pursued ; yet only 54 per cent o f  
the area under wheat an d  4 0  per cent o f  the area under rice 
have irrigat ion facilit ies of some sort . The supply posit ion 
in regard to chemical fert iliz ers has become particularly 
difficult in the wake of the oil crisis . On a rough est imat e , 
current domestic product ion of fertilizers is barely adequate 
to meet the requirements , and that too on the basis of  
considerably scaled down dosages now worked out by  the 
research scient ists , for j ust two of the cereals for the area 
reported to be under improved seeds . The requirement s of 
these cereals under the tradit ional variet ies , as well as of 
those of other food and non-food crops have to be met by 
costly imports . The posit ion in respect o f  quality seeds is 
no better . The o f ficial Economic Survey 1 9 74-75 ( India 
19 75 : 7) est imated that supply of certified seeds was only 
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30  per cent of  the requirements . In terms of personnel for 
extension activities , India with about 700 operat ional holdings 
per extens ion worker is somewhat worse off than some of it s 
neighbours in Asia (As ian Product ivity Organiz ation 19 75 : 5 ,  
Table 1) . Such global comparisons without reference t o  the 
local environment ( levels of literacy , facilit ies for communi­
cat ion , et c . ) are perhaps of l imited value . The Study Team 
on Agricultural Administration in India made a specific study 
of the requirements in relat ion to the ongoing programs of 
development and came to  the view that one graduate extens ion 
worker was needed for 30 to 40 villages , as compared with 
the exist ing one graduate per 90 or 95 villages presently . 
Deficiencies in the availab ility of specialist s to act as 
b ack-up staf f  for field workers have also b een commented 
upon ( India , Planning Commi ss ion 197 3 ,  Part I ,  p . 102 ) . 
For purposes of realist ically evaluat ing the impact o f  
given policies , one has to look beyond these b road , macro­
level dat a ,  and into the pro cesses of allocat ion at the lower 
levels . A given order o f  scarcity is not necessarily evenly 
dis tributed over all areas and classes of farmers . Economic , 
polit ical and sociological factors influence this process . 
There is cons iderable disparity in power and influence within 
the rural community . To a large extent , this disparity is a 
funct ion o f  the pattern of  land ownership . About 90 per cent 
o f  land-owning cultivators own less than 55 per cent of the 
total area in India . This great maj ority has an average 
holding of 1 . 6  hect . A minori ty of  less than 10 per cent of  
the owners account for over 40 per cent of the area . This 
was the posit ion in the early sixt ies ; the posit ion is not 
l ikely to have altered radically s ince , despite measures for 
land reform and redist ribut ion . 
More than one author has described the imperfections of 
market organizat ions for supply of credit material input s ,  
o f  techniques o f  product ion , storage , processing , et c . , in 
the rural areas of developing countries . Governments  in 
these countries have also been advised frequently on the need 
to counter these imperfect ions . The structure of the market 
to the extent to which it has developed it s relat ionship to 
the rural social structure is obviously relevant in the des ign 
of  strategy and instruments of act ion . In a study based on 
empirical data of  the processes of  market operations in the 
countrys ide in India , K. Bharadwaj not ed recently : 
. . •  while markets have penetrated into the rural 
economy in a deep and signif icant manner , the 
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extent and � of involvement in market s  of  the 
different sect ions of the p easantry are not at 
all uniform. The character o f  market s  reflects 
and to a s ignificant ext ent is  determined by the 
local patterns of power . At the same t ime , the 
funct ioning of the market s  is itself such as to 
reinforce the pattern of power • • •  the init ial 
resource posit ion defines the ' bargaining posit ion , _  . 
o f  the part icipant s • . •  The relat ive ' bargaining 
strength ' (reinforced by forces of tradit ion , 
custom,  social mores ) determines the acceS's to 
resources , the terms on which they can be obt ained 
and the fields of feasible choices open to the 
individual producer in the various market s or , in 
short , his current product ion act ivit ies and his 
income and asset pos ition resulting therefrom. 
This , in turn , influences his relat ive " bargaining' 
posit ion in the succeeding period (Bharadwaj 19 74 : 3) . 
More specifically , the author points out , there is an 
interlocking of  market s  - the landlord act ing as a lessor of 
surplus land , as a local merchant and as moneylender . This 
mult iple role helps to reinforce an init ial advant age in 
terms of , say ,  surplus land for leasing.  As part o f  the 
lease , what is laid down is not only the money rent , but 
o ft en the type of crop to be grown , the mode and t iming of 
the payment of the lease amount , as even the manner in which 
the share of output of the tenant is to be disposed o f . 
Rural market s  thus exhib it highly differentiated 
characterist ics in terms of not only prices for input s and 
output s ,  but even the freedom of choice in the use of  inputs 
and the sharing of co sts and returns . This however is a 
long-standing phenomenon , and it is more int erest ing to ask 
how this pattern has responded to the new opportunit ies of  
development . 
First ly , to the extent that traditional inst itutions 
such as co-op erative societ ies and panchayat s have been 
relied upon to ' deliver ' and even ' plan ' development , those 
already ent renched in these inst itut ions have been able , by 
and large , to siphon o f f  the new input s  to their immediate 
advantage . This has been fairly extensively documented 
(Myrdal 196 8 : 1334-46) . An official committee (the All India 
Rural Credit Review Committee) obs erved in 1969 that the 
small cult ivator cont inues to be handicapped over large 
parts of the country in ob taining credit from the co-operat ives 
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because of one or more factors , o ften by exclusion from 
membership ( quoted in India , Nat ional Commiss ion on Agric­
ulture 19 7la : l0 ) . An unfortunate feature from the point of 
view of product ion was that the tenants and small cult ivators 
were not in many parts of the country able to obtain credit 
required by them for modern inputs .  More importantly , 
however ,  these elements have also , in many cases , developed 
what the Indian sociologist A. Beteille ( 19 74 : 112 ) has 
described as an ' ambidexterity ' that is to say , to comb ine 
ownership of land and capital with skills in manipulat ing 
both tradit ional and modern institut ions , particularly those 
set up under government auspices . A recent document from 
the FAO ( 19 74 : 6-8) regarded this as a fairly widespread 
phenomenon in Asia . It is not surprising , therefore , that 
a series of studies in India on the working of the HYV seeds 
program found a- persistent positive relat ionship between 
adopt ion o f  new techniques and the size of the farm. 
The discussion in this and the previous chapters was 
int ended mainly to bring out the complexit ies involved -
between obj ect ives , strategies , and instruments  - in formul­
at ing and implement ing a broad-based program of t echnological 
improvement . It is one thing to devise plans for tackling 
the more obvious gaps in the nat ional economy . Transfers of 
technology , internat ional aid , deputat ion of expert s ,  et c . , 
can at best all help in designing maj or irrigat ion systems , 
fert ilizer factories , and experimental stations for crop 
research or soil analysis . But beyond these symbols of  
development are the kind o f  factors that have been ment ioned 
above - the more localized facts of the pattern of land­
holdings and use , the different iated market s ,  the b iases in 
organizations - which clearly in fluence behaviour of  different 
farmers . To appreciate the micro-level dimensions of a more 
generally conceived strategy is dif ficult . But without this 
appreciation there can be no meaningful planning in the sense 
o f  achieving specified goals through a set of  policies . 
Chapter 7 
The possib ilit ies 
The picture that emerges from the foregoing account of 
the factors and processes relevant to agricultural development 
with numerous small producers is in many ways complex . The 
sheer variety in the physical , inst itut ional and economic 
circumstances facing the farmers is something that cannot 
be wished away b ecause of a misplaced concern for t idiness 
in plannin g .  The point is not that the ' big ' things -
research stat ions , fert iliz er factories , et c .  - or overall 
economic policies are unimportant . They obviously are ; 
without them the very po ssibility of  advance may be denied . 
The point , howeve� is while necessary , they are not sufficient . 
A gulf seems to exist between what the overall policies and 
macro-level inst itut ions can attempt and the act ions of the 
individual farmer in the local environment . One way out o f  
this difficulty i s  t o  decent raliz e  both plan formulat ion 
and plan implementat ion . This can make for realism in 
planning , but there are limit s to what planning in the 
convent ional sense and within a bureaucrat ic framework can 
accomplish . It can provide support and technical guidance , 
but this it can at b est do as types of  act ivity to promote , 
rather than as a series o f  proj ects . A type o f  activity 
that is cons idered desirable can be given a proj ect shape 
only at the level closest to  and in consultat ion with the 
farmer .  That i s  the only level where the physical pos s ib il­
ities , to gether with the psycholo gy of the farmers in 
undertaking the work can be gauged directly . The response 
o f  the farmers can be influenced by a variety o f  means but 
the final out come cannot be normally planned and t argeted 
in advance in concrete detail . Our earlier discuss ion 
indicated that one aspect of development , which seems 
important from the point o f  view of modernizat ion of specific 
act ivit ies in agriculture , relates to  the poss ibilit ies of  
promot ing group action among farmers . The s ize of  the group , 
the purposes for which it is being promoted , it s nature 
( formal or informal , structured or ad hoe) and methods of  
operation are important factors that call for  some systematic 
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invest igat ion . This chapter attempts  to examine these 
factors in relat ion to specific act ivities in the first 
instance ; it then goes on to look at more general principles 
that appear relevant to this approach to development . We 
start with the pos sib ilit ies as well as the associated 
problems of producing quality seeds locally . 
Seed supply 
Seed is the least expensive input used by the farmer , 
but it is a vital input that greatly influences the returns 
to more costly inputs such as fertilizer and water . Both 
the physical and the genet ic qualit ies of the seed are 
important . Defect in one of  these aspects may suffice to 
neut ralize potential advantages from other input s .  Use of  
poor quality seeds may , through introduct ion of  hannful 
pathogens , seriously undermine yields not j ust in the field 
of the particular farmer using it , but in a whole neighbourhood . 
In the product ion of hybrid seeds requiring as it does 
mult iplicat ion and maintenance of  specific inbred lines and 
single crosses , expert attention and special facilit ies are 
necessary . There is little that can be done by farmers 
themselves in producing genet ically pure seeds on their 
farms . But the position is different in regard to self­
pollinated crops such as wheat and paddy - the two maj or 
cereals the product ion of which largely determines food 
consumption standards in many developing countries . The 
pro.duction o f  these seeds typically t akes place in successive 
stages . The starting point is the nucleus or what is some­
times referred to as the breeder stage . This refers to the 
seed that the breeder responsible for evolving the variety 
produces for further mult iplicat ion and distr ibut ion . This 
is usually done in research inst itutes and in small quant it ies . 
At the next stage of mult iplicat ion for the dif fusion 
of this variety (after it has been tested and approved for 
release) , expert handling and controlled conditions are 
st ill neces sary . This is generally attempt ed in large-sized 
farms under expert guidance . This is referred to as the 
foundat ion stage of seed product ion . 
The third and final stage is the product ion of  what are 
described as certified seeds . The purpose here is to produce 
from the foundat ion stock larger quant it ies of seed for use 
by farmers . The operation at this stage is thus generally 
dispersed . Consequently , technical control of  product ion 
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and control of  quality becomes more dif ficult . 
An idea o f  the magnitude o f  the task involved in India 
can be had from the fact that for covering in any year the 
quarter of the area currently said to be under HYV paddy 
( 11 m. hect . )  and of HYV wheat at ( 12 m. hect . ) ,  the seed 
requirement at 30kg/h . a . ( farmers are known to use a higher 
dosage) will be roughly 200 , 000 tonnes per y ear . Actual 
supply as we noted in Chapter 6 was barely 30 per cent of 
requirements in 19 7 3- 74 . 
There are two further aspects to this seed supply 
quest ion that are important . One is the quest ion of variety 
and the other is the t iming and manner of supply . 
The number of  HY seed varieties being evolved , t ested 
and released for each crop is constantly on the increase .  
This i s  a t rend that will perhaps cont inue , given the varying 
needs of different agro-climat ic condit ions in which the 
crops , particularly rice , are being grown . Moreover , 
varieties may have to be different even for a given set of  
agro-climat ic condit ions , depending on whether the aim is to 
maximize yield to nitrogen , water or a given unit o f  land , 
or to improve cooking quality , et c .  Given this variety in 
environment s  and obj ectives , it becomes necessary to  tailor 
seed production to the local environment and preferences . 
Correspondingly , it becomes difficult to have the seeds 
produced in giant farms at a handful of locat ions . There 
are strong grounds , therefore , for decentraliz ing this 
act ivity . 
The other aspect to the seed supply problem is that of 
the t iming and manner of  supply . Success ive evaluation 
report s  on the working of the HYV programs have drawn 
att ent ion to delays in good qual ity seeds reaching the 
farmers from public agencies . This · is partly perhaps 
inherent in any bureaucratically controlled organization 
attempt ing to reach millions of farmers with small quantit ies 
of this input per farmer and t rying to  dovetail supply with 
the agricult ural calender in each area . Partly these delays 
are also the result of sheer inadequacies of the needed 
facil it ies in communicat ion , market ing and finance that 
inevit ably handicap a nation-wide operat ion of this sort , 
irrespect ive o f  whether the agency involved with the work is 
controlled by government or by private ent repreneurs . 
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Related t o  the t iming quest ion i s  the form of supply , 
whether as seed or as seedlings . Farmers somet imes prefer 
to get their supply as seedlings , for this facilitates 
transplant ing of the crop as soon as water start s flowing in 
the canals . This could save a few weeks at the start of  the 
irrigat ion season , which might make all the difference 
between taking one somewhat long durat ion crop and taking 
two shorter duration crops for a farmer who lacks a supple­
mental source of water . It is also easier for the experts 
to ensure proper care and treatment of the seedlings , give 
them prophylactic treatment against diseases , etc . , where 
they are raised in bulk than on the individual farms in 
minute b it s  of  land . 
But there is a cos t  also here . Where the distribution 
is in the form of  seedlings , there is very little margin of  
time between the removal of  the seedling from the common 
nursery and it s replanting by the farmers .  The operation 
has to be completed within a matter of a day or two , if not 
within a few hours ' interval . This involves making sure that 
the farmer ' s  f ield is ready for the t ransplant ing operation 
before the seedling is taken out from the nursery . Given 
the limitat ions o f  communicat ion , transport and paucity of 
market ing agencies that typically characterize a developing 
country , the ent ire operat ion at this stage of  the mult i­
plicat ion process has to be necessarily locally planned and 
executed . 
The seed supply posit ion in the context of  the policy 
of promot ing HYV technology among the masses of farmers was 
recently (October 19 71) reviewed by the National Commis sion 
on Agriculture in India . Drawing upon the findings of an 
earlier (1968) Review Team ( India , Seed Review Team Report 
1968)  and on the basis of  it s own enquiry , the Commiss ion 
noted that the quality of seeds being distributed and used 
was ' deteriorat ing rapidly ' .  This is notwithst anding the 
fact that a number of specialists have been assigned to this 
work in a string of national and State level corporat ions 
and in nearly 2 , 000 seed farms under Government control . 
The problem of assessing requirements o f  variety and t iming 
of seeds for distribut ion in each local area and of making 
arrangements for their supply of  reliable quality are proving 
in creas ingly difficult even as the HYV program coverage is 
sought to be cont inuously expanded . The Commiss ion caut ioned 
against Government taking on the work of production at the 
third stage of certified seeds and proposed instead that 
every po ssib le agency, co-operat ives , seed firms , et c .  - be 
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encouraged to enter this field in each locality ( India , 
Nat ional Commission on Agriculture 19 7lb ) . 
It may be asked why , if  good quality seed is in short 
supply , private enterprise does not develop .  Government 
policy explicitly encourages private enterprise in this work. 
Partly the answer is what was indicated earlier , namely , 
infrastructural inadequacies for the development of an 
organized seed industry in large-siz ed tmits , except in a 
few limited areas that are well served by the needed 
facilit ies of transport , storage, marketing and credit . 
There are difficulties in the development o f  even smaller­
scale units specializing in commercial product ion . One 
significant fact noted by the Nat ional Commiss ion in 1971 
as well as by the Review Team in 1968 is worth recalling 
here . There seem to be a good number of farmers with the 
facility and the ability to produce seed of requir�d quality 
beyond their own needs . But very few wish to undertake 
supply in sub-commercial quantities to numerous small 
producers . At the same t ime they lack the storage facilities , 
the financial resources , and above all the .business confidence 
to undertake commercial production and marketing ( India , 
Seed Review Team Report 1968 : 6 3 ; India , Nat ional Commission 
on Agriculture 197lb : 9 ) . 
One way out of this difficulty is for a public agency 
to guarantee an outlet . This may appear a simpler operation 
than a dire ct involvement in product ion by the government . 
This is  a device already in use in India and it has had 
some successes . But it is not always a sufficiently reliable 
guarantee in the minds of the farmers . There are always 
po ssibilit ies o f  s lips and delays in the actual working of 
such a program. Of ficials may be transferred without notice , 
subst itutes may not arrive in time , budget allocations may 
be cut unexpectedly . There are such reservations in the 
minds of potential producers to acting on a government 
guarant eed purchase program. The same considerat ion would 
apply to use rs of seed .  This is quite apart from the oper­
ational difficult ies to the government itself of planning 
and executing such a guarantee scheme , on a widely dispersed 
basis , in a sector where the physical facilit ies for t rans­
miss ion of  in format ion , collection , storage and movement of 
stocks are very limited . Another way of tackling this 
problem is to encourage a common nursery for each village 
for a given crop . Government s have experimented with this 
policy also in the past . In some of the areas this is said 
to be producing encouraging results . But the very nature 
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o f  the organiz ation through which this program is executed 
could create complicat ions . The local body would be 
expected to be the unit o f  operat ion , whether the respons­
ibility is ass igned to it directly or through the VLW. There 
is no guarantee that with reference to even such tangible 
physical features (as availability of  suitable land with 
independent irrigat ion facilit ies) ,  not to ment ion the 
psychology of farmers interested in growing a part icular 
crop and who have to act together as a group , for this 
purpose the village panchayat (delimited as a polit ical 
unit ) is the right or the convenient unit for attempt ing such 
an operation . There is the further problem as to whether 
the lo cal bodies to the extent that they are dominated by an 
elite will be really int erested in producing a vital input 
for the benefit o f  the masses o f  small farmers and tenants . 
The same dangers exist in having this sort of  act ivity under­
taken by the tradit ional type of co-operative society . 
Moreover , a predetermined formal structure , f ixed membership 
and j urisdi ction o f  these societ ies may prove unsuitable for 
the task as it develops from season to season and from crop 
to crop . There would seem to be advantages in act ing in a 
less formalized or structured group basis . 
Here is a role that is important to someone to play as 
part of a process of  triggering development . In essence 
this is a market role in a sector where market facilities 
are ill-developed and the few that exist (like the 
co-operatives) are not sufficiently b road-based or flexible . 
This is a role that the local development agent can attempt 
to fulfil , at l east t ill such time as alternat ive marketing 
inst itut ions and mechanism develop .  Reliance on the bigger 
ins titut ions through a s tructured program for this kind of  
promot ional activity is  rarely effect ive . 
Let us now see briefly how or in what manner this kind 
of role can pos sibly be assumed by the development adminis­
t rat ion at the lo cal level , and what that would imply for 
planning pro cesses and techniques at higher levels . 
The funct ion that we have in mind is basically one of  
bringing a potential producer and a set  o f  potential consumers 
together and of helping on a contract being struck b etween 
the two . This may sound like a simple enough function , one 
that is being performed undirected and almost unnoticed in a 
developed market economy . Nevertheless this is an important 
intermediary function for lack of  which an economic need is 
left unful filled . We have already referred to the finding 
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of both the Seed Review Team and the Nat ional Commission on 
Agriculture that what is lacking is not so much a potential 
demand or a potent ial supply , but an agency to act ivate and 
marry the two , removing tm.certainties and lack of facilities 
to carry over stocks or market them in distant places . 
We are here thinking primarily of  small producers with 
but limited facilit ies for commercial product ion of seeds , 
and who cannot spread their risks in a b ig tum-over . In a 
situation where none o f  the maj or  institut ions - government 
or private - is equal t o  fulfill ing this need directly , 
improvization has to take the place o f  met iculous planning . 
We have already seen how a planning process that does not 
recognize the limitat ions of macro institut ions to reach 
millions o f  farmers in the cotm.trys ide , but blindly implement s 
target s pres cribed from above , can lead to  quite grotesque 
result s .  The pursuit o f  targets for dist ribut ion o f  improved 
seeds districtwise , blockwise and villagewise , without 
reference to lo cal realit ies , o ften leads to either spurious 
repo rt ing o f  what has been accomplished , or a compulsive 
desire on the part of  the staff to reach the target by 
distribut ing some seed or other , without reference ·to quality 
or suitab ility . This , as seen in Chapter 3 ,  was what was 
do cumented by Dube in the scheme for distribut ion o f  potato 
seeds in the 1950s and by Ramana for a lat er period in Andra 
Pradesh . Planning is liable to be self-defeating under these 
circumstances , spreading cynicism among field staff and 
frustrated expectations among farmers . 
Rigorous planning , with nicely targeted and planned 
op erat ions executed by maj or inst itut ions and based on 
figures churned through computers at the nat ional level in 
input-output table to achieve highly prized even if ever 
elusive cons istencies and balances , does not quite seem to 
work . Is there not a s imple way of going about the j ob ?  
We are searching in effect for a possible , not a guaranteed , 
answer , through improvizat ion aimed at developing local 
potent ial . This would be s imply for the extension worker 
to look lo cally for likely producers to meet an identified 
demand by bringing the two parties together . He can help 
explicit ly with supplying reliab le fotm.dat ion seed ; he can 
ob tain and convey advice as to which variety to go for , how 
and when to  produce it and how to process the seed . These 
are in any case part of  the extension tasks assigned to him. 
But he also needs to b e  taught to look for opportunit ies , to 
catalyse a small group of  farmers with a shared need to place 
an order with a potential producer , backing his int ermediary 
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role b y  his access to superior technical knowledge and 
quality raw mat erial , wherever this is possible . There can 
however be no targets fixed in advance that the extension 
worker must ful fil . The moment this is done , fulfilling the 
targets willy nilly is likely to become the end in itsel f .  
Perhaps the p erson (AEO) next in hierarchy with his more 
specialized t raining can ass ist more actively by helping to 
locate suitable farms where this suggestion can be t ried out . 
But this again cannot be neatly planned in quantitative terms 
and prescribed in advance as tasks to be fulfilled at 
success ive levels .  Not enough is known about soil and water 
condit ions farm by farm, much less about the psycholo gy of 
the farmers concerned , to plan this op erat ion quantitat ively , 
except as a �  of development . activity to promote .  The 
basis of mot ivation here will be some demonstrable benefit 
to the participant , not an appeal to them on grounds of 
some abstract ' community ' or ' nat ional ' well-being . 
Perhaps on this basis in one village a farmer with a 
small tubewell would agree to raise seedlings for a group o f  
ten , 2 0  o r  3 0  farmers in his immediate neighbourhood whom he 
knows personally . Po ssibly in another village a big farmer 
who sees the po ssib ility o f  making a sizeab le prof it by this 
activity would come forward to supply hundreds of farmers in 
a whole group of  villages , provided the terms (prices , t ime 
o f  delivery , s upply of  foundat ion seed , etc . ) could be agreed 
upon in advance . Because of his access to know-how and 
supplies , the local extension worker has perhaps some l everage 
here in s eeing to it that by and large the operat ion is 
carried out equitably and efficiently without discriminat ion 
or exploitat ion . But there are limits here too . He may not 
want to arb itrate personally in regard to the t erms . He can 
at b est make suggest ions which commend themselve s by their 
good sense and impart iality rather than because the operation 
has the backing and the authority of government . 
The essence o f  the operat ion is feas ibility and prof it­
ability for the farmers themselves , and flexibility for the 
extension worker . Coercion is not assumed ; there is no 
appeal to idealism which experience with CD programs shows to 
be an unreliable aid . At the same t ime any compulsion on 
the ext ension worker to fulfil t argets or operate through 
predetermined agencies such as panchayat s can set at nought 
this approach to catalyse development by what is in essence 
a proving method - looking for opportunit ies for development 
by local act ion rather than at targets to  fulfil . 
64 
One advantage in this approach is that in as much as 
the role of each person , including the extension worker , is 
clearly understood by the participant s ,  responsibility for 
the outcome would also perhaps become easier to allocate . 
Where the seed producer has taken the foundat ion seed supplied 
by the AEO and has raised the seed through his guidance , and 
yet the seed fails to pass germination and other tests later , 
the spe cialist has to account for the quality of  the material 
supplied and the validity of the advice t endered by him. 
Perhaps this will inculcate a sense o f  responsibility for his 
act ions directly to the farmers , a feature that is not partic­
ularly prominent in present methods of planning and implement­
ation . In turn , this will call for better standards o f  work 
along the chain - the specialist producing foundat ion seed 
in a government farm, the plant breeder producing nucleus 
seed in his research st atton , the plant pathologist advising 
on seed treatment . This is a practical way in which the much 
sought-after two-way communicat ion between and accountab ility 
of research and extension can be promot ed , both the wings 
having their work assessed in farmers ' fields rather than 
through progress repo rts to higher level officers . 
It is not claimed of  course that a flexible system o f  
planning and operat ion that put s a premium on local init iative 
can by itself work miracles . The farmers will still need 
credit , expert advice and some insurance against risk . Only 
some parts o f  these obstacles can be got over by the approach 
suggested here . In the above illustrat ion one may have 
hel ped a small farmer to gain access to good quality seed o r · 
seedling:; locally through this method ,  thereby meet ing a 
requirement for improved production which was unavailable to 
him otherwise for whatever reason - smallness of his operat �ng 
unit , difficult ies of  commanding independent water supply , 
discriminat ion practised by entrenched inst itut ions , et c .  
Quite po ssibly the extension worker , having commit ted his 
prestige to the op erat ion at the stage of seed supply , is 
more likely to provide guidance and support in the subsequent 
phases of cultivation than might otherwise be the case . But 
all this will be o f  little avail if the farmer cannot get 
credit or the fertilizer because these are in short supply 
and he is not powerful enough to  obtain his share . Other 
measures that have been proposed for correcting inst itut ional 
imbalances , or for relieving overall scarcit ies are thus not 
obviated , but only made more important , by the type of  
planning and implementat ion that is suggest ed in these pages . 
But we may note one impo rtant difference that the new 
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approach makes possible , namely , it  can help directly to 
augment the supply o f  a scarce input , in this case seed , by 
mobiliz ing lo cal potential . This however will not be the 
invariable result if we are considering certain other input s .  
For instance , no local act ion will significantly add t o  the 
supply of some sophisticated pest chemical which can only be 
produced under factory conditions . This is perhaps t rue 
also o f  credit , though the possib ility should not be minimized 
of promot ing thrift in course of time , taking advantage of 
higher product ivity and channelling the savings thus generated 
to satis fy local credit needs . 
There is one further implicat ion to such an apP,roach to 
agricultural development that may be mentioned . It may 
involve compromising on quality to some extent in some o f  
the operat ions . For instance processing of seed i s  important 
in influencing its subsequent product ivity . Some of  the 
process ing operat ions such as threshing , drying , cleaning , 
et c .  can be undertaken at the village level itself under 
the guidance of the VLW or the AEO . Generally one can avoid 
having to invest  in specializ ed equipment for these purposes . 
Some other pro cessing operat ions , while not impossible to 
undertake , are perhaps less eas ily or effect ively attempted 
locally , e . g . seed treatment with fungicide or insecticide . 
Here again the extension specialis t can help by arranging 
supplies and providing guidance . The search for perfection 
o ften leads a government to look for sophisticated equipment 
such as air-s creen cleaners , dimensional sizing equipment , 
spiral and magnet ic separators , elect ronic colour-sorters , 
etc . Over a period o f  time ,  a climate is created where 
everyone tends to look down upon anything except the latest 
and the most  sophisticated equipment . Given this bias the 
local operat ion proposed may be faulted as not sufficiently 
meeting rigorous technical requirement s .  But as the old 
saying goes , the best can be the enemy of the good . There 
is a case fo r settling for the second best where the search 
for the very best is futile . 
Even unbiased technical opinion will perhaps show that 
the likely loss in quality by the failure to provide text­
book treatment is after all only marginal in many instances . 
This point can not be asserted in the abstract , of  course .  
I t  is po ssible that some particular aspect o f  the operat ion 
is so crucial to the out come that if satisfactory observance 
cannot be ensured under local conditions , the operation may 
have to be curtailed or  even abandoned altogether . But this 
is the whole point of the technique of planning and execution 
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that is being argued here - pragmatism and improvizat ion . 
There is in this sense a clear need for .a ' barefoot-doctor 
technology ' in agricultural planning and implementat ion in a 
vast colmt ry . 
Plant protect ion 
The importance o f  prot ecting plants at various stages 
of their growth from pests and diseases is well known . The 
problem assumes special significance for high-yielding 
variet ies , particularly for the rice plant grown under 
tropical monsoon conditions . That effective protection can 
make a sizeable difference to crop yields and farmers income , 
in the context o f  the HYV seeds , needs no great elaboration . 
According to one general assessment (Palmer 1974 : 6 3)  crop 
loss from pests and diseases can be as high as 25 to 45 per 
cent . Field studies in India indicate that actual losses 
are considerable , even if  somewhat lower than the above 
general est imate ( Swaminathan 1972 : 312 ; Gupta and others 
19 7 3 : 20) . 
One feature o f  the act ion to combat pests in agriculture 
dominated by small holdings is its externality . Most of  the 
pests  and some of the diseases spread from field to field 
during the growth cycle of a crop . As a result , act ion to 
prevent their emergence or control their spread is rarely 
effect ive at the level of  the individual farmer . Even though 
the pest itself may show no discrimination between the big 
farm and the small farm, the bigger farmer is perhaps more 
likely to have a better command over the resources needed 
for preventing the attack and for insulating his farm at 
least partially . 
It is p art o f  the general responsib ilit ies of the 
extensiqn personnel to  guide farmers in p rotecting their 
plant s and to arrange for chemicals and spraying equipment 
to b e  sent to affected areas . Facilit ies for contract­
spraying by commercial inst it ut ions are not particularly 
well-developed . The administration usually t ries to treat 
whole areas en masse rather than part icular plo ts where the 
occurrence is first noticed . In mo st o f  the states in India 
there is legislat ion to authorize government to arrange 
compulsory spraying of affected areas where expert opinion 
considers such a step necessary to save the crops . The cost 
is later recovered from the farmers , fully or in part in 
proport ion to the area owned by them. In some States , such 
act ion requires the prior approval o f  the local authority -
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the panchayat or the p anchayat-samiti  - in the form of  a 
formal resolut ion from the council . The formalities connected 
with convening a meeting , of getting a resolut ion passed , 
et c .  can often prove time-consuming .  The method adopted for 
treatment in such extreme cases is aerial spraying,  and local 
councils are usually sensit ive to the criticism that aerial 
spraying pollutes water courses , endangering both human and 
animal life . Hence there is some reluctance on their part 
to approve of this measure , particularly where the crop 
affected is a minor one and also confined to a small 
geographical area in the village . While the pros and cons 
are being debated the disease may of course be spreading 
quite rap idly , making its subsequent control more difficult . 
One way of  get ting round the problem of  convincing 
councils representing an ent ire village or  a group of villages 
to act decisively and in t ime when the problem is more 
localized may be to work on and activate the group of farmers 
whose crops are directly threatened . The operation , where 
it is not aerial spraying,  usually involves mobilizing labour ,  
equipment an d  chemicals . Speed in making a decision and 
acting on that decision with the assurance of neighbouring 
farmers acting in concert is crucial to success . The 
extension apparatus may or may not have to elaborately 
convince farmers about the need to control the disease . 
That will depen d  on how much awareness o f  this aspect o f  
agricultural technology has already spread in a particular 
area. The point , however ,  is that even where awareness 
exists , the individual farmer with a few acres of land is 
hardly well-placed to act on his own. Nor are there ready­
made institut ions that can take over the task for a fee . 
One is thus thrown back upon local initiative in getting a 
group to act together . A local political body is not 
necessarily the b est agency fo r mobiliz ing such action . 
Besides the reservat ions (referred to earlier) that they are 
likely to have , its controlling members may not feel involved 
in the matter to the same extent as the farmers whose crops 
are directly af fected . The extension worker is likely to 
achieve a bett er response through mobilizing the group directly 
involved by emphasizing their stakes in the op eration . This 
may mean working with a set of farmers within one village , 
or living within the borders o f  more than one village . Any 
system that ignores this need for flexibility and lays down 
rather rigidly the unit and agency for act ion in all types 
of developmental activity unnecessarily handicaps itself . 
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Here again , a s  in the seed product ion example , the 
emphasis is on group act ion , flexibility in operation , 
demonstrable benefits to the participants ,  with the extension 
worker playing the role not so much o f  an adviser but o f  a 
catalyst ,  filling gaps in organizat ions and markets . This 
he can do without setting up formal institutions or associ­
ations , but by stimulat ing local initiative and exploiting 
his links with agencies serving agricultural credit , material 
input s , and technical advice . 
The two examples given above relate to possibilit ies 
o f  group act ion and likely advantages from such action in 
current t ransact ions . They need some but not much out side 
assistance in terms of credit or materials . In both cases , 
emphasis was in mobiliz ing certain needed input s  locally , 
overcoming ins titut ional and organizational deficiencies . 
We can now look into the possibility of  securing s imilar 
results in respect of activities that are in the nature o f  
fixed capital investment . They require more sophisticated 
advice and equipment , and above all , credit . Both the skills 
for planning the activity and the finance for carrying it 
out will probably go beyond what the lo cal o fficial or the 
farmers are likely to pos sess . But for this reason they do 
not necessarily cease to be feasible . After all , one o f  
the assumpt ions of  agricultural development policy is that 
inj ection of skills and materials from outside the agric­
ultural sector is essent ial for generating growth at least 
in the initial stages . We are examining the possible role 
of local init iat ive , not in a vacuum, but as a supplement to 
or as a stretching arm of mo re general policies and macro 
institut ions . 
Water supply 
For most o f  the cereals for which high-yielding seeds 
have b een evolved by research scientist s , availab ility or 
otherwise of irrigation water - measured in terms o f  adequacy 
o f  quantity and suitability for controlled supply makes a 
big difference to the farmer as to whether the benefit from 
the new s eeds is substantial o r  only marginal . 
Group act ion for irrigat ion purposes can be relevant 
to a small farmer in two different ways . Firstly , in 
facilitating it s availability by providing a connnonly-owned 
source of irrigat ion ; secondly , even where a public channel 
provides the water , in regulat ing its flow and distribution , 
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cont rolling drainage , et c .  We are here looking at the first 
possib ility . The second , which may be no less important , 
will be referred to a little later , as part of  a larger 
problem of rational land and water-use , through co-operative 
act ion . 
As we saw earlier in India , 22 per cent net area sown 
had irrigation facilities in 19 70- 7 1 .  Of the 31 m. hectares 
irrigated , the area irrigated by wells at 11 . 8 m. hectares 
was slightly in excess of 11 . 6  m.  hectares irrigated by 
government canals by surface flow .  During the past two 
decades , area irrigated by wells increased more rapidly than 
area irrigated by government canals (5 . 8  m. hectares as 
compared with 4 . 4  m. hectares ) .  The following t able brings 
out the rapid progress in the spread of private tubewells : 
No . of  
No . o f  
No . o f  
Table 4 
Progress of private tubewells irrigat ion syst em 
in India 1950-71 
( In thousands ) 
1950 1965 1969 1971 
(anticipated) 
private tubewells 3 100 2 7 9  4 70 
diesel pumpsets 66 4 71 837 1150 
electric pumpsets 19 513 1080 1620 
Source : Vohra 19 72 : 3-7 . 
The rapid spread o f  HY wheat varieties in the Punj ab 
was greatly facilitated by and in turn gave a new spurt to 
well irrigat ion . Subj ect to availability of power for 
pumping , well irrigat ion affords a degree of  control to the 
farmer in water management - which as a rule is not obtainab le 
under pub lic canals . Hence the importance o f  this form of 
irrigation to the HYVs , particularly for rice . 
In certain parts of  India , the problem of salinity 
associated with indiscriminate exploit ation of ground water 
is becoming a serious one .  It is clear that any further 
large-s cale expansion of irrigat ion facilit ies will need to 
be b ased on s cientifically drawn-up surveys and plans for a 
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balanced use of  surface and ground water , and an int egrated 
use of available water and soil resour ces . This awareness 
is now growing among policy makers .  It  would seem that as 
indicat ed by the Irrigation Commission in it s Report (1972 , 
vol . l ,  p . 206 , para . 10 . 13) , the Gangetic basin in the north­
east as well as the deltaic plains o f  the south have a great 
deal o f  water that can be harnessed to provide irrigat ion to 
the important rice-growing States of these regions . But 
when compared to Punj ab , not only is the average size o f  the 
holding smaller , but the subdivision of holdings is more 
pronounced in these States that are said to  be ' sit t ing on 
a lot o f  water ' .  The position is brought out in the following 
t able . 
Table 5 
Parceliz at ion o f  farm holdings in select states 1960-61 
State Number of parcels Average siz e  o f  per holding parcel (beet . )  
Punj ab 4 . 76 0 . 81 
Bihar 7 . 18 0 . 21 
w .  Bengal 7 . 12 0 . 22 
Orissa 6 . 39 0 . 31 
Ut tar Pradesh 7 . 78 0 . 23 
Tamil Nadu 4 . 96 0 . 30 
Source : Government o f  India , National Sample Survey , 1 7th 
Rotmd , 1966 . 
Any privately-based ground water development for 
irrigat ion purposes on the Punj ab model is therefore much 
less likely in these States , but these are the very States 
that need this facility most for achieving a yield break­
through in rice . The difficul ty arises p rimarily from the 
ext remely small size of  the operat ing farm unit for the 
large masses of cultivators . Consolidat ing the holdings on 
a voluntary or a compulsory basis would be one way out of  
this dif ficult y .  Some of  the States have of  late shown 
commendable energy in pushing consolidat ion through . Judging 
from past experience , however ,  rapid progress is perhaps 
unl ikely . Even with 100 per cent progress in consolidation , 
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the average sized farm in most of these States will in all 
probability s t ill not be large enough to afford an independent 
tubewell and pumping arrangement . For a large body of 
farmers there · may b e  no alternative to some form o f  shared 
ownership/ distribut ion arrangement for tapping ground water 
in these States . 
Sale o f  water among neighbouring cultivators is of 
course po ssible . Such private sharing arrangements somet imes 
work smoothly without the int ervent ion of  an out side agent . 
Given the smallness of holdings , it would be sensible for 
government to  encourage such arrangements wherever feas ible .  
The extension approach suggested here is , in fact , a more 
systemat ic exp loitat ion of this device , b ringing the parties 
together , clearing up legal and other· formalities regarding 
t itle to land and water , lo cat ing respon sib ility for operation , 
arrangements for sharing of  cost , etc . , through the extension 
worker where that would help in overcoming exist ing handicaps 
to  such co-operat ive act ion . 
In India government-owned tubewells serving anything 
between 200 to 400 acres each is quite well known . There 
are about 16 , 000 such State tubewells in the country whose 
management is the responsibility of either departmental 
officials or local authorit ies . Management o f  such tubewells 
has not been very efficient ; governments have increasingly 
encouraged the p ractice of compact groups of  farmers 
constructing common wells and operat ing them on mutually 
agreed terms . Operation by the beneficiaries t ends t o  be 
more efficient than operat ion by a third party - usually 
local government unit . In cases where rules st ill require 
that the well should be controlled by a local , pub lic 
authority , such t ransfers are made on paper , but actual 
operat ion is left in the hands of the farmers concerned . 
This is another area where cons iderable flexibility and 
improvizat ion is necessary if  farmers whose farms or rather 
individual b it s  of whose farms are too small to warrant a 
private well and pump of their own , are to be encouraged to  
j oin hands to get over the indivisibility problem in 
irrigation techn9logy . that in turn can facilitate access to 
the HYV seed t echnology . The variables in the situat ion are 
many - the number of farmers , the type of irrigat ion work , 
the method o f  construction , the agency for operat ion , 
principles of sharing costs and benefits , the legal form­
alit ies for the ownership of the irrigation facility that 
is being creat ed , et c .  
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Details b ased o n  sample studies of locally sponsored counnon 
irrigat ion proj ects in three states 
Maharashtra 1 Tamil Nadu2 Ker al a 
Nature of the Jointly Government Government Government 
irrigat ion owned sponsored sponsored sponsored 
proj ect private community community lift irrgn .  
well well well proj e ct 
Number o f  
works studied 12 10 1 3 
Number o f  partici-
pants per work 12 2 6  12 8 85 
Area served per 
well/proj ect 
(acres )  14 21 3 7  8 8  
Area served per 
part icipan-c in 
a work (acres) 1 . 1 7  0 . 81 0 . 2 9 1 . 04 
Cost per acre ( Rs )  
Fixed cost 2000 1000 370 1100 
Operating cost 14 3 42 10 100 
Agency initiating Farmers Farmers - 6 Panchayat Dt . off icials 
proj e ct Local Union 
official s  - 4 
Agency executing Local Local Local Govt dept 
proj e ct contractors contractors contractors through 
contractors 
Agency owning Collectively Local Local A Labour-cum-
the work by farmers authority authority Develop . Banka 
concerned 
Agency operat ing Participants Participants Delegated by Expected to 
proj ect using a paid under Panchayat to be done by a 
operator in official the farmers govt dept 
some cases supervision concerned 
Note : a This is a co-operat ive bank in which labourers working on such proj ects 
as well as landholders benefit ing from them a�e memb ers . The activit ies 
o f  the bank are substantially directed by o f ficial s .  
� 
Source : 1 Reserve Bank of India BuZZetin , vol . 2 7 ,  Aug. 1 9 7 3 : 12 90-1315 . 
2 Field work by author in Ramanathapuram Dt . Tamil Nadu , J an .  1975 . 
3 Field work by author in Ernakulam Dt . Keral a ,  Jan . 1975 . 
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Table 6 shows some details of  a sample of  connnonly­
owned irrigat ion works constructed and operated by groups of 
farmers , based on recent studies in three States in India . 
If there is one message that this table conveys to the 
planners , it is the need for flexibility and improvization . 
The numb er of  participants is as small as a dozen (in one 
case) and exceeds 100 in another . In some cases the 
part icipant s preferred to work on the proj ect themselves ; 
in some others they entrust it to a professional contractor .  
In some cases government sponsorship an d  init iat ive was 
crucial . In certain other cases , government came in only 
incidentally to s traighten out formalities and provide some 
assistance .  The point being made here is that this variety 
is inherent in the situat ion . It defies attempt s at t ight 
planning , targeting or straight-j acketing regarding the 
number of participants ,  the agency or the mode of execut ion . 
What all governments can and need to do is to awaken the 
farmers to the po ssib ilities of such action in the particular 
local cont ext , and then explore j o intly with the farmers 
what will be the mo st effective way of enabling farmers with 
mat erial and technical assistance to get this t ask done . 
This is the ·role of  planning within an overall framework of  
policies and institut ional support , to place agents to 
trigger development in sufficient proximity to the people 
concerned . Techniques of planning should encourage such 
init iative and flexibility rather than st ifle them in the 
name of uniformity and control . 
Soil and water management 
Techniques o f  soil and water use in countries where a 
growing populat ion const antly p resses on a limited area of  
land are impo rtant not  only from the short-term point o f  
view of increasing land yields , but from the longer-term 
point of view o f  maintaining a proper resource balance . 
Unless handled with care , the search for short-term solut ions 
can prove self-defeating in the long run , not j ust by 
dis figuring the environment in an aesthetic sense , but by 
making continued agricultural operat ions themselves 
unproduct ive . 
Developing count ries under pressure to  increase food 
output face a dilemma . The choice of  obj ectives is it self  
fraught with conflict ing pulls . The prob lem is highlighted 
in the policies towards private exploitation of ground water . 
Even where additional wells in an area may not be a desirable 
long-term development , authorities hesit ate to put a ban on 
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on act ivity that seems to be benefit ing the individual 
immediat ely concerned . Faced with this dilemma a compromise 
is adopt ed - while pushing through product ion programs that 
promise quickest result s ,  the planners take on hand other 
programs such as aforestat ion , bunding , etc . , that are 
considered helpful ·in keeping natural resources under some 
balance . 
But sooner or later , the combined effect of  progressively 
smaller holdings and increasing parcelizat ion of holdings 
under the impact of  population growth in a system of  inviolab le 
proprietary rights in land begins to assert itself . It 
proves increasingly clear that a few conservat ion schemes on 
public land are not sufficient . It becomes necessary to 
teach and help private owners of land to use their natural 
resources carefully and s cient ifically . In the glow o f  
opt imi.sm immediately following the int roduct ion o f  new seeds 
and intensive use of  fert ilizers in the lat e 1960s , with its 
descript ion as a land-augmenting technology , the sense of  
urgency on this s core possibly receded in the minds of  
policy-makers . This was unfortunat e because the new technology 
was in any case not wat er-augmenting . In general , it called 
for more and not less discipline in the management of soil 
and water resources . 
The legacy from hundreds of y ears of  unregulated farming 
practices can pose a formidable challenge to  the planner 
interested in promoting a more orderly and rat ional use of 
soil and water resources . In const ructing , for example ,  an 
irrigat ion system ,  it is generally assumed that the planner 
will b_e given such det ails as the lie of the land , the pat tern 
of holdings , of parcels , field boundaries , that make no 
allowance for gradient s ,  and contours or wind patterns . 
Details of  the works regarding the number and type of channels , 
principles o f  irrigat ion , and so on , are adj ust ed to the 
exist ing environment . But as the demands on the natural 
resources b ecome more acute and technologies based on their 
int ensive exploitat ion are sought to be promoted , the 
inefficiencies in the old pattern of use prove more and more 
costly . Farmers find it difficul t even to move from one 
part of  their holding to another . Too much water is being 
wasted because field al ighment s  are not rat ional . Too many 
bunds have t o  be cut for water to flow through to as many 
parcels of land as pos sible . Water has to pass in large 
sheet s by natural gravity from field to field b ecause 
people will not give up small bits o f  land to provide for a 
regular channel . In . the proces s , water get s wast ed , soils  
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eroded , nut rients washed down , and standing plant s get 
damaged . Controlled irrigat ion o f  any sort , or more generally , 
controlled and scientific management of natural resources 
becomes virtually impossible . 
At the t echnical level , substantial skill s are required 
to study the existing situat ion , draw up plans of act ion and 
su?ervise its execution . It is doubt ful whether skill of  
the kind required exists in anything like adequate numbers 
in developing countries . An important deficiency may be at 
the middle and lower levels where the skill required is not 
the design of maj or irrigat ion or drainage schemes , but 
adapt at ion of known techniques and fa:!'.rly standardized 
materials to tackle specific problems of slopes , ravines ,  
drainage , seepage , erosion , et c .  in each given environment 
and in the overall framework o f  the prevailing socio-political 
system. 
In terms o f  the economics , evidence from scattered 
proj ects undertaken so far show that even limited investments 
in a few simple measures of  land development and water use 
efficiency can produce very attrac�ive gains . But one 
problem here is that individual farmers acting on their own 
can get but limited returns from such measures . To quot e  
Dr Minhas : 
• • •  individual behaviour is frequently nonoptimal 
in the p resence of  externalities which , for 
institut ional or other reasons , cannot be 
internaliz ed . The fact of  inter-dependence in 
public works pro grammes is obvious . Construction 
o.f drainage works in particular and , to a large 
extent levelling of land and digging of field 
channels are prime examples of inter-dependence 
in land development . There are also cons iderable 
economies of  s cale in these very act ivit ies . 
Regarding the quest ion of  informat ion , it is o f  
course trivial to show that a set of  strategies 
based on the ignorance of the pay-off funct ions 
may well be disastrous . And that is precisely 
what is involved in not knowing what consolidat ion­
cum-public works will do to the land (Minhas 19 7 0 : 11) . 
The appreciation o f  the above problem is by it self not 
very difficult . What is difficult is the development of 
appropriate policies and organiz at ions that encourage farmers 
to take action which collectively improves the situation all 
round . 
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Farmers will require some outside assistance before 
they can undertake scient ific conservat ion measures collect­
ively . The need arises under two counts : (a) technical 
skill beyond what farmers usually possess to make the plans 
and guide execut ion , and (b ) given the essent ial inter­
dependence of actions of farmers in a neighbourhood , some 
means of  achieving co-ordinated act ion . On both these counts ,  
government s or some outside catalyst agent may need to become 
involved . As a rule , it is they who can perform this role 
and also enforce compliance through coercion if necessary . 
Let us assume that the technical skills and equipment 
for phys ical planning of this type are or can be mobilized . 
One has then to balance the advant ages of a centrally controlled 
and directed program that will economiz e on skill requirements 
and facilitate quality control with the need for decentralized 
planning and implementat ion called for by a program of  this 
kind , tuned to the local situat ion - topo surveys , cropping 
patterns , i rrigat ion systems , wind and other climat ic factors . 
Where the activity is to be planned and executed largely 
with the consent of the farmers so that compulsion will be 
the exception rather than the rule , there will be further 
advant ages in making the unit of . op erat ion as small as 
po ssible so that the farmers concerned will have a clear cut 
idea as to what is being attempted and why . 
It is int eresting to see how different writers on the 
subj ect in India have argued the case for what may be called 
the physical and the human elements respectively in determining 
the unit of  such an operat ion . Thus Pro fessor Dandekar spelt 
out , in the addres s referred to in Chapter 3 (Dandekar 196 7 ) , 
a pro gram o f  reorganiz ing the phys ical features of the rural 
economy . Central to his concept o f  reorganiz ing the agricul­
tur al product ion apparatus , was not a class of cult ivators 
but a block of land with it s soil and water resources . He 
visualized the appointment of a Farm Planning or an Area 
Planning Officer for each block o f  land who will survey the 
soil and water resources and prepare an investory of develop­
ment works-levelling , bunding , minor irrigat ion works , 
irrigat ion channels ,  paths , et c .  to be undertaken in that 
block.  This o fficer was expected to indicate , in consultat ion 
with an agronomist , suitable cropping patterns for the block 
to ensure a scientific use of the available soil and water 
resources . 
Dr Minhas writ ing four years later (Minhas 19 7 0 : 13 )  
preferred a whole-village approach for rearranging irrigat ion 
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an d  drainage works ; for drier areas , however , he thought the 
unit of operations for land-levelling , contour-bunding for 
soil and moisture conservat ion and construct ion o f  storage 
tanks for collect ion o f  rain water may have to be a group 
o f  villages at a time . 
An int erim report from the Nat ional Connnission on 
Agriculture mo re recent ly suggested that a comprehens ive 
program of  s oil conservation and land-shaping be tmdertaken 
for the ent ire village , and irrigation points be located in 
connnon at the b est locations so that for the water available 
the largest area can be commanded effect ively without waste . 
Among what the Connniss ion considered the advant ages of such 
a community approach were listed : (a) consolidation of  
holdings will automat ically follow soil conservat ion and 
land-shaping , rather than the other way around ; (b ) irrigat ioa 
sources will be common and a rout ine will be established for 
the best advantage of  the village ; and (c) cropping program 
can be so arranged as t o  make the maximum use of the 
available resources , including labour ( India , National 
Commis sion on Agriculture 1973 : 4-5) . 
A Task Force on Integrated Agricultural Development 
Proj ects appointed by the Planning Commis sion recommended 
for canal-irrigated areas that the unit for planning of  
integrated development should comprise an area which has a 
substant ial measure of  homogeneity in t erms of land and water 
resource situat ion . It recommended that a program of  this 
sort· be  taken up in eleven locat ions experimentally , each 
falling within a connnand area of  a maj or irrigat ion work 
recently or about to be completed , where the possib ilities 
of carrying out such programs and the benefits  to the culti­
vators are likely to be substantial (Task Force on Integrated 
Rural Development 19 72 : 4 ) . 
It is clear that in planning a program of this kind the 
physical characterist ics of the area will be important in 
choosing the unit . But this will not result in the same unit 
for planning a mo re rational use of the different resources 
for different purposes . The unit for reshaping land from 
the point of  view o f  arresting erosion will not be the same 
as for planning water conservation in an entire irrigat ion 
network . Assuming that the ' right ' size from a purely 
t echnical point of view for a given activity of this kind 
has b een determined , one has to face up to a further problem. 
Is it technically feasible to split up the works , and what 
is the size of  the operat ion that will b e  meaningful to  the 
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farmers whose  assets are to be significantly rearranged ? 
There is no simple answer to this question , of  course .  
There are many factors t o  b e  taken into  account . For one 
thing the agent for change must feel sufficiently well­
informed about the costs and benefit s that he is able , in 
the maj ority of  cases at least , by a pro cess of  persuasion 
to overcome possible opposit ion to realignment of land 
boundaries , irrigat ion canals , pathways , et c .  from the persons 
af fected . The demonstrat ion o f  the potential benefit as the 
rationale of the suggested act ion , and the assurance about 
neighbours j oining in are also ftmct ions of the size of the 
group that is being act ivated . The smaller the group , other 
things being equal , the more concrete will the suggested lines 
of act ion and the potential benefits appear in the minds of 
the people concerned . 
If  experience with Community Development ( CD) is any 
guide , a village-wide consensus on issues of  this sort is 
not likely to materialize easily . Should one wait for that 
distant day when each village will develop a common will ? 
Or will it b e  more practicable to alter one ' s  t actics and 
inst rument s  of  act ion and t ry and get together smaller groups ? 
We seem to b e  back with the problem o f  choosing between an 
' elusive best ' solution , and a ' workable second b est ' , 
solution . 
It seems worthwhile t o  see whether a more modest beginning 
with compact groups is not a feasible proposit ion . Provided 
that such action by an ad hoe group will fit a larger plan 
for a bigger area (or at least not run counter to it ) , there 
is no reason why farmers should not be encouraged to undertake 
such programs on a limited base . They will certainly need 
technicai assistance from . out side , perhaps even to identify , 
and much more so , to plan and execute proj ects for improved 
resource use for the particular tract of land in which they 
op erate . Such out side assistance will be all the more 
required to make sure that this act ion can fit into a larger 
plan when once it does become possible to plan on a larger 
scale and to extend this operat ion to a whole village , group 
o f  villages , water sheds , et c .  But everything need not be 
made to wait t ill such a grand solution becomes possible . 
Granted that the program has in essence to  be put through 
volunt arily , for some o f  the areas at least in the future 
such a technically ideal solut ion may be unobtainable.  The 
quest ion then arises : is the approach to be given up alto­
gether or can only coercion be effective ? The argument here 
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is  simply that more limited and somewhat second-best 
solut ions seem to  exist which can be exploited if the approach 
to planning becomes more flexible and pragmatic and moves 
away from the more ideal and comprehensive . 
Nor is this mere speculation , a case argued only in the 
abst ract . There are many examples where imaginatively-minded 
development workers , working s omewhat against the more 
orthodox approach of authorities for total solutions , have 
achieved notable successes in limited areas and with limited 
groups of cult ivators . The Planning Commission ' s  Task Force 
on Integrated Rural Development (19 72 ) referred to earlier 
documents a proj ect undertaken for as little as 34 hectares 
for 38 cult ivat ing households in a village in the State of 
Uttar Pradesh . The works carried out included land classi­
fication on the b asis of a topo survey and contour map 
prepared for the proj ect , demarcation o f  plots and their 
realignment along contours , exchange of parcels of land in 
order to  consolidate them and make the operat ing unit b igger 
than before , construct ion of contour bunds to conserve soil 
and moisture , and levelling of plots . The wor� was undertaken 
on the basis of  technical data provided by experts . The 
farmers execut ed some of the simpler works (as land levelling) 
with their own resources . They preferred to have the more 
complicated works such as building culvert s executed by pro­
fessional contractors . The full details of this work need 
not be gone into here , but it is of int erest to note that it 
cost  less than Rs .  200 per hectare for the farmers to execute 
the proj ect . Also 2 . 6  hectares formerly wast ed within the 
blo ck o f  39 hectares were added to the cult ivable area as a 
result of  this reorganizat ion of  physical facilities . 
The Nat ional Connnission on Agriculture in its interim 
report referred to has also cited a number o f  such instances 
where compact groups of farmers in small t ract s were he lped 
to reshape their land and rearrange their irrigat ion facilit ies 
at modest cost . The areas b enefited vary from a handful of 
acres to hundreds of acres in whole tract s . The important. 
point for our purpose is this : almost none of this proj ect 
could have been neatly planned , targeted , prescribed as 
proj ect s  and controlled in advance from above . The agencies 
could not have been selected in advance . In one case it was 
the fertiliz er factory which w.anted to promoce a balanced 
applicat ion of chemical nutrient s b ased on soil properties 
of the area . In another case , a bank took the initiat ive . 
In yet another , a private voluntary agency . The emphasis in 
the proj ects varied from plant nutrit ion to moisture 
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conservat ion , from consolidat ion of  holdings to  use of 
part icular new techniques of cultivat ion and crop protect ion . 
These were works that were carried out independent ly o f  each 
other , by different agencies , at different points of  t ime and 
in different areas . The common feature linking them was as 
proj ects , none of  these were at all likely to  have found birth 
in the Planning Departments of State capitals . Local 
init iat ive b acked up by t echnical skill at higher levels made 
certain types of development works feasible that were not 
quite plannable by a central authority . Not much imagination 
is needed to visualiz e what the out come might have been if  
planners at the respective State capitals had att empted to 
fit such act ivit ies int o  a rigidly framed plan that st ipulated 
the number of such proj ects in each area,  the number of  
farmers to  benefit , and the agencies to  act . Government did , 
o f  course ,  play a maj or role in almost every case , supplying 
personnel , credit and backup facilit ies where needed . 
Dif ferent agencies had the freedom in these cases to try out 
whatever approach was felt most promising and which neverthe­
less fitted into an agreed b roader strategy of agricultural 
development (more irrigation , bet ter product ion technique , 
et c . ) .  The farmers had the benefit of  free technical advice . 
There was no compul sion to j oin . Only those who felt they 
would benefit from participat ion did so . There was no appeal 
to lo ft ier s ent iments about community enrichment .  Supply of 
credit helped but was not invariably essential , as , given own 
labour and freedom about the t iming o f  the act ion � uncluttered 
by government budget s chedules , investment by the part icipants 
on their farms was not heavy pe r unit of  land . 
One could add to the list o f  specific act ivit ies in 
agriculture where the small group principle might be relevant . 
One could look beyond agriculture and argue its relevance in 
other rural development act ivities such as purchase o f  
improved equipment b y  fishermen t o  improve their cat ch , 
collect ion of  various types of wastes in the villages with a 
view to processing them into b io-gas , manures , et c .  An 
examinat ion of  such po ssibilit ies in each given environment 
might produce interesting result s .  But let us now go on t o  
analyse the underlying principles behind this phenomenon in 
more general terms . 
In a recent review of lo cal organizat ions - official 
and non-o f ficial - for rural development in 15 count ries in 
Asia , Pro fe.ssors Uphoff and Esman (19 74 : xvii i )  suggested 
that for a local organizat ion to make an effect ive contribut ion 
to development , it must combine the b enefits of what they 
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called ' solidarity and scale ' . While ' scale ' is a funct ion 
of  technology , ' solidarity ' in the sense in which we are 
considering it here , is an attribute o f  psychology in the 
face of an opportunity for economic change . The need for 
combined or co-ordinated effort in economic act ivit ies 
arises where there is an advantage of scale in such act ion 
for either of the two reasons suggested earlier , namely 
indivisibility of a technology (or its proxy ,  equipment ) , 
or , externality . The further point , however ,  is that the 
poss ibility of such co-ordinated or collective action on a 
largely voluntary basis being undertaken depends , among o ther 
things , on whether the size of the group and its composit ion 
is such that it s members feel a sense of  solidarity , o f  common 
purpos e .  This i s  the psychological dimension t o  voluntary 
group action , which is as important as the technical dimension . 
In applying this general concept to problems of  agri� 
cultural development , there are two general considerat ions to 
be kept in mind . One is that there is no one ' right ' size 
from the ' s cale ' point of view in ' agricultural product ion ' 
as such . The concept of the ' right ' or the ' minimum ' size 
from the point of  view of a technology is more meaningful 
when considered for a particular operat ion , such as ploughing 
or irrigat ion . Five hundred farms (of  some average size) 
may be the ' ri ght ' size for pest control work , but not for 
soil conservat ion . One hundred farms again may be the ' right ' 
siz e for contour bunding , but not for producing seedlings . 
Twenty-five farms may be the ' right ' s ize for drainage 
improvement under a public canal , but no t say for providing 
a small dug well for irrigat ion . 
Secondly , we must turn from a consideration of  farms to 
farmers more explicitly . The proposit ion that is being 
suggested here is from the solidarity po int of  view , the 
smaller the size that o ffers some , even if not the maximum, 
o f  the benefit of  scale , the b et ter the chances o f  group 
act ion emerging . ' Small ' is o f  course a relative term and 
can be understood only within the framework of a given activity , 
technology , and society . But subj ect to these qualificat ions , 
the approach itself  is meaningful as a possible way of  
inducing micro-level group act ion , where macro-level act ion 
is not feasible or effective . There may b e  a ' trade-o f f ' 
between solidarity and s cale in the context in which we are 
here considering the concepts . If there is such a trade-off , 
it has important implicat ions for policy in designing t echniques 
of planning and patterns of organizat ion and extension in 
agricultural development . 
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Partly , the trade-of f  arises from the sheer cost of 
disseminat ing informat ion , establishing contacts ,  co-ordinating 
field activities - in short , cost of  ' organizat ion ' - as the 
size of the group or llllit of operat ion increases . This is 
part icularly true in respect of rural development act ivities 
in colllltries served by poor facilit ies of  transport , commlllli­
cat ion , markets , financial institut ions , e t c .  But quite 
apart from the pract ical diff iculties and costs of organizing 
large groups , there seem to be at least two other factors 
making for reduced effect ivenes s of larger as compared with 
smaller groups . 
The f irst of  thes e  has to do with the fact that the 
larger the group the more difficult it is to achieve that 
degree of consensus without which co-ordinated act ion is 
frustrated . Even in a smaller group , there is no guarantee 
that the interests of all the participants will be ident ical . 
But the possibilit ies of divergence , if not conflict of  
interests , are likely to increase with the size  of the group . 
Correspondingly , any workable arrangement that will evoke 
sufficient interest among the part icipants to make co-operative 
act ion feas ible becomes more difficult . We can illustrate 
this with a common work for water sharing . Working out a 
system of turn-irrigat ion for a group of  five , 2 0  or 40 
farmers is one kind of  an enterprise . The participants can 
llllderstand the arrangement s more eas ily than would be the 
case if the number was 500 or 1000 . The mechanisms and the 
proces ses are easier to llllderstand where the group s ize is 
small . Without this llllders tanding , there is lit tle bas is 
for the part icipants to satis fy themselves about the rough 
costs  and benefit s to thems elves and to others . But where 
the number r\llls to hlllldreds , encompassing farms and farmers 
out side the direct and daily touch of the individual partici­
pating farmer (the point becomes particularly relevant when 
we are considering group act ion among farmers with limited 
contacts and horizons) , the possibility of  their agreeing on 
and working to a suitable common arrangement through lo cal 
group act ion becomes less likely . Action on these lines 
might be facilitated by a more formal int ervent ion by 
government setting up impersonal rules of operat ion for this 
purpose . But not , it would seem, on a volillltary basis and 
by lo cal act ion . This approach is also helpful in assessing 
where informal , small group action on local init iat ive can 
pay dividends ; and where , on the other hand , more formalized 
act ion , through somewhat impersonal channels and organizat ions  
would be needed . The essence o f  agricultural development 
planning is to arrive at this appropriate mix of  macro- and 
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micro-level policies o f  formalized and non-formalized collect ive 
act ion , of  big and small groups for the range of  relevant 
act ivit ies so that the obj ect ives o f  policy are effect ively 
realiz ed .  
The second reason which reduces the likelihood and 
effect iveness of large-sized group activity for the type of 
ftm.ct ions , and the context we have in mind , is that even 
without a conflict of interest s , it becomes progressively 
more difficult for the individual to feel sufficiently 
involved in a j oint action as the size of the group increases . 
For one thing , it becomes dif ficult to make the individual 
feel convinced that his act ion will make a dif ference to the 
final outcome for himself . For another , there is less and 
less assurance in the mind of the individual participant as 
the group siz e  increases that others will play their part 
in part icipating in the activity and sharing in it s cost . 
The likely result is withdrawal from the proposed act ivity 
altogether or attempt s  at deriving the benefit without 
participating in the effort where possible . 
It is interesting t o  refer to the discussion of this 
concept in the context of a developed cotm.try by Mancur 
Olson . In The Logic of Co l lective Action , he presents the 
argument s in the following terms : 
Whether a group will have the possibility of 
providing it sel f  with a collective good without 
coercion or  outside inducements therefore depends 
to a striking degree upon the number of  
individuals in the group , since the larger the 
group , the less likelihood that the contribut ion 
o f  anyone will be perceptible (Olson 1965 : 45 ) . 
The capacity o f  a group , whether of  a market or non­
market variety , to act in its group interest ' depends on 
whether the individual act ions of  any one or more memb ers in 
a group are noticeable to any other individuals in the group . 
This is most obviously , but not exclusively , a ftm.ction of 
the number in the group ' ( Olson 1965 : 45 ) . 
Mr Olson then goes on to illustrate this principle with 
reference to a phenomenon observed in the more advanced 
cotm.tries . He contrasts for this purpose the effectiveness 
of  control exercised on management by shareholders in j oint 
stock companies which have a large number of  stockholders , 
with control on management in companies which have only a 
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limited number of  stockholders . His explanation rtms as 
follows : 
in a large corporation , with thousands of 
stockholders , any effort the typical s tockholder 
makes to oust the management will probably be 
tmsuccess ful , and even if the stockholder should 
be success ful mos t  of  the returns in the form of 
higher dividends and stock prices will go to the 
rest o f  the stockholders ,  s ince the typical 
stockholder owns only a trifl ing percentage of  
the out standing s tock.  The income o f  the 
corporat ion is a collect ive good to the s tock­
holders , and the stockholder who holds only a 
minute percentage of the total stock • . .  has no 
incentives to work in the group interest .  
Specifically he has no incent ives to work in the 
group interest .  Specifically he has no incentive 
to challenge the management o f  the company , however 
inept or corrupt it might be • . •  (Olson 19 65) . 
Is this relevant to the rural situat ion in a cotmt ry 
like India ? 
One of the connnonly ob served phenomena in India is the 
state of disrepair of irrigation works whose maintenance is 
the responsib ility of the farmers who draw wat er from those 
works . In the pas t  a feudal type of leadership in the 
villages more or less ensured that sufficient labour was 
mob ilized in advance of the irrigat ion season to undertake 
such routine maintenance operat ions as removing s ilt , clearing 
obst ructions to the free flow of water , minor masonry repairs , 
etc . In more recent years , however ,  such act ivity has failed 
to materialize in many cases . Planners have deplored the 
withering of what they regard as the old connnunity spirit ; 
local ftmct ionaries are flooded with instruct ions and 
exhortat ions to revive that spirit by an appeal to the 
farmers based partly on idealism and partly on self interest . 
But the results  have been as a rule disappoint ing . 
There are o f  course many factors behind this trend . 
But perhaps the principle of  group act ion referred to  above 
provides one plaus ible clue in tmderstanding why farmers 
freed from feudal compulsions fail to act in their own 
int erest voluntarily in such cases . The difficulty is that 
for the typical farmer (as for the typical sto ckholder in 
big companies in Mr Olson ' s  example ) there is no guarantee 
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of other people acting in concert . Even where action by an 
individual farmer is effective the benefit cannot b e  intern­
aliz ed by him. The result is that group action fails to 
mat erialize .  Perhaps similar phenomena relative to agriculture 
and irrigat ion are observable elsewhere . David Penny (196 7 : 
45-9) cites some concrete instances of the failure on the 
part of farmers in certain villages of West Java to engage 
in such simple but obviously profitable act ivities in main­
tenance of irrigat ion works , even though the resources for 
carrying out such works were well within the reach of  the 
farmers concerned . He refers to the inability of the farmers 
to organize themselves to get such s imple j obs done . While 
Dr Penny does not explicitly relate this phenomenon to the 
size of the group and the principles referred to above , it 
would appear that part of the explanation for such phenomena 
might b e  sought in the logic of  group act ion as developed 
in Mr Olson ' s  book. 
In any case it seems plausible to argue that at least 
one of the reasons why much official exhortation in favour 
of co-operative group act ion by farmers has produced such 
disappoint ing results is that the size of the group being 
indi fferently chos;en , such strategy leaves the individual 
farmers unconvinced . The siz e  of  the group must , no doubt , 
be large enough for it to be technically feasib le and prof it­
able ; but at the same t ime it should be small enough for the 
potential part icipant to tmderstand what the activity is all 
about , what his part in it is , and that of the others and 
what roughly are the b enefits to himself and to the others 
of common action . An incentive among the memb ers of  the 
group to see that the collective good is provided is a 
necessary condit ion for group act ion . But it is usually 
( in the absence of extraneous rewards or penalt ies ) no t a 
sufficient condition . The further requirement is that the 
individual member should be able to see and ensure whether 
others benefit ing are playing a part in rough proportion to 
their share of the benefit s . (Mr Olson ( 1965 ) also 
discusses the case where one particular individual has such 
a large stake in the outcome that he will embark on that 
activity , even though others also benefit but may not 
participate or otherwise share in the cost . This is an 
interest ing theoret ical possib ility , but perhaps rare in 
pract ice in the context in which we are looking at this 
phenomenon here . )  
The ' free-rider ' problem as James Buchanan (1965 : 1-14 )  
calls it , arising from the inability t o  internalize all the 
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benefits ,  is implicit in some categories o f  group act ion . 
This is of more general relevance and will be ref erred t o  
again lat er in this study . The theory i s  not valid , o f  course ,  
where there are a sufficiently large number o f  farmers in 
the community who are j ust not interested in bettering their 
output or incomes . There probably are such farmers completely 
impervious to considerat ions of economic rationality . 
Experience seems to suggest however that they are probab ly 
the exception rather than the rule . Whether one such typical 
farmer should be allowed to set at nought a group act ivity 
by say 100 ( in ,  for example , taking a drainage channel 
through his field or getting rid of a p est  in his plot of  
land) or whether some mechanisms to compel him to  participate 
and if so under what conditions , will be touched upon a 
little later . But at this stage the point simply is that 
even in terms of social incent ives or alt ruist ic motives , 
the greater efficacy of small group act ion seems to  hold 
goo d .  A non�material incentive in terms of social approval 
or recognit ion , as Mr Olson has pointed out , is concrete  in 
a compact social group and tends to be blurred or vague in 
a large group . 
As regards altruist ic act ion , one cannot do better 
than cite the example given in Mr Olson ' s  book : 
A farmer who placed the int erests  of other farmers 
above his own would not necessarily rest rict his 
product ion to raise farm prices , since he would 
know that his sacrifice would not bring a 
not iceable benefit to any one • • .  Selfless behaviour 
that has no perceptible effect is somet imes not 
even considered praiseworthy . A man who tried to 
hold back a flood with a pail would prob ably be 
cons idered more of  a crank than a saint , even by 
thos e he was t rying to help (Olson 1965 : 64) . 
Chapter 8 
The implications 
The ' solidarity-plus scale ' principle provides one clue 
in understanding why the effective siz e  for co-ordinated 
act ion at the working level is likely to be small . The 
Cornell study on Asian Rural Local Organizat ions (Uphof f  and 
Esman 19 74) , referred to in Chapter 7 ,  illustrates this 
phenomenon concretely , for dif ferent socio-economic environ­
ment s .  This principle appears to have been in evidence quite 
persistently . But more recent events seem to  invest it  with 
added import ance . 
The rising concern with the inability of  small farmers 
to participate in nation.al programs de signed to improve 
techniques of production adds urgency to the search for the 
' right ' o rganization that would help small farmers to get 
over the handicap of smallness . One o f  the lessons for 
policy of this situation is a reallocation of development 
resources in favour o f  the small farmers .  But as we tried 
to show in preceding chapters , the very nature of agricultural 
operat ions and the characteristics of the t echnology that is 
being pushed through seem to imply that the problem goes 
beyond reallocat ion of seeds , fertilizers and credit . The 
returns from the technology is also a funct ion of the 
inunediate environment in which the farmer operat es . As the 
International Rice Research Institute ( IRR!) put it : 
. • •  poor management practices are a maj or factor 
constraining yields on many farms , but also • . •  
poor environment has a substantial yield-reducing 
impact too . Further , several factors that were 
beyond the individual farmer's control , but which 
are potentially controllable by inst itut ional or 
group action also constrain yields under farm 
condit ions ( IRR! 1974 : 195) . 
Part of  the poor management may have to be traced to  
the poor environment . This is t rue of  both small and big 
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farms ; but the smaller the farm , the less probable is the 
ability to control the surrounding environment . Correspond­
ingly the greater the importance of group act ion for these 
farmers . 
Organized group act ion among farmers could , broadly 
speaking ,  t ake two forms . One is organizat ion on the basis 
of phys ical cont iguity of farms , the size being determined 
by whatever is con sidered efficient or workable with reference 
to the tasks on hand or the capabilit ies of  the instruments 
available for promoting o rganizat ion .  The other type is 
organizat ion cut t ing across physical contiguity , and based 
on commonality of  int erest s . In societ ies characterized by 
sizeable inequalities in the ownership of rural assets , a 
s trong case can be made out for grouping farmers on the basis 
of the size of  small-holdings . A series of field workshops 
convened by the Asian regional office of  the FAO in 19 74 saw 
merits in the latter course for many of  the countries in 
this region (FAO 1 9 74 ) . 
The choice between these alternatives has to be related 
to the part icular socio-economic environment as well as the 
obj ectives o f  policy . The illustrations of small group action 
described earlier will not readily fit into one or the other 
types for all activities . Thus , for purposes of seed 
production there is no reason why land cont iguity need be 
the criterion for select ion of participants . Provided the 
agro-climat ic conditions are uniform enough to permit the 
p lanting of a given variety of seed at a given t ime , the 
participant s could be chosen on any principle that one may 
like to choose . Perhaps it is a set of small farmers who , 
driven by their inability to get certified seeds from 
exis t ing agencies , would feel sufficiently interested in 
creating a local source . The b igger farmers may not need 
group act ion in order to sat is fy this particular requirement . 
In a group of 50 farmers of whom 40 are small and who do 
have a need for a local source o f  this input , the fact that 
there are also ten who do not share this need does not mean 
that group action for those who des ire it will be frustrated . 
It may be frus trated for other reasons , o f  course . These 
40 may not be lucky enough to find a farmer somewhere in the 
neighbourhood who has the extra land and water to take on 
this supply function on mutually acceptable terms . But it 
need not be frustrated by reason of the fact that a few 
farmers within a block of land choose to opt out . The 
principle of  small group act ion is consistent with the 
principle of interest-group organizat ion , in this particular 
example . 
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But land contiguity becomes an important criterion in 
programs connected with reshaping land , improving drainage , 
or controlling plant diseases . Given that the holdings of 
the b ig and the small farmers are mixed up , in a phys ical 
sense , the approach to group act ion based on holding-size 
may not be very effective . Unless therefore it is assumed 
that the b ig holdings have b een abolished and do not int erpose 
themselves in a mass of  smallholdings ( in which case , of 
course , the rationale for grouping by farm-size would also 
presumably have vanished) the quest ion arises whether it is 
realistic to pursue this principle of  group action . 
The answer depends on whether one is inclined to deny 
any possib ility of the ' b ig '  and the ' small ' working together , 
even on an ad hoe basis , in rural society . Where such a 
view is taken there can be no group action for a common 
purpose . An alternative view is also possible , namely , that 
while the potential for conflict is to be recognized , it is 
also realistic to think o f  the ' b ig '  and the ' small ' acting 
together for specific purposes . Such accommodat ion could 
emerge in the face of  a common threat (e . g . a pest attack on 
a standing crop ) , or when co-operative action can be mutually 
beneficial (e . g . controlling drainage) . Farmers with varying 
farm sizes may feel it worthwhile to act to gether under such 
circumstances . 
One device to keep in check possible domination by an 
ent renched elite of decisions about group act ion , either 
positively or negatively , is to keep the groups small , 
in formal and purely funct ional . The group organizers could 
also be specially trained to be on their guard against possible 
distortion or disrup tion o f  group act ivity by particular 
elements in the villages . All these are less than perfect 
devices , however .  One may have to fall back upon more direct 
control mechanisms , based on coercion . 
Coercion i tself can take many forms . At the simplest , 
it may amount to  no more than taxing away a windfall profit 
which may accrue to tho se who canno t be effect ively excluded 
from the b enefits of group act ion , but who nevertheless refuse 
to share in the effort . This is the type of  case where the 
individual merely seeks a ' free-ride ' ,  but is not opposed to 
the group act ion . This can happen , for instance , in the 
maintenance of an irrigat ion source . It is easy to j ustify 
imposit ion of  a tax on an occasional evader . S imilarly , 
where inaction by one results in external diseconomies -
failure to control plant disease by one farmer causes damage 
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to  the crop nearby - there will b e  general agreement about 
enforcement through penalt ies . It is where an individual 
want s to keep out of group act ion or positively oppo ses it , 
on the basis o f  a genuine doubt about the benefit or on an 
expectat ion that his personal interests will actually suf fer 
(ob s truct ion to a new well whi ch needs a facil ity , such as 
access for a dis tributory channel through land owned by an 
individual who anticipates that completion of  the work will 
mean the end o f a bus iness in sale of irrigat ion water to  
neighbouring farmers , for  example) , that use o f  coercion will 
be cont roversial . This is the kind of issue that arises in 
the course o f  economic development , and which calls for 
clear-cut policy decisions . In India , there is already 
legislat ion providing for compuls ion in regard to pest 
cont rol , soil conservation , and in some cases , consolidation 
o f  holdings . There are clearly laid down principles as to 
who can be compelled , for what purposes and by whom. Rarely 
is the lo cal ftmct ionary allowed the discretion to apply 
compuls ion . There are requirements for consultat ions upwards 
within the bureaucracy and horizontally with elected councils . 
Subj ect to these safeguards , there are good grounds for 
arguing that a society cannot have modern technology without 
the dis cipline that goes with it . 
We have already hinted at the changes in the approach to 
planning and in its techniques implied by this view o f  
agricultural development based on local init iat ive , an d  
' proj ect izat ion ' only in consultat ion with farmers . Planning 
for the agricul tural sector will have to be indicative rather 
than p rescrip t ive . This will , in turn , call for innovat ions 
in f inancing mechanisms , b udgeting and monitoring pro cedures 
at successive levels o f  government , particularly in a federal 
set-up . These can be explored in concrete det ail when once 
the bas ic idea is accept ed . 
Some specific comments on the organizat ional aspects for 
promo t ing agr icultural development and on p ersonnel for 
extension work will be in order at this stage . 
On the organizat ional aspect , one way to  as sess the 
changes needed is to  look at approaches so far tried , 
precisely where the aim has been to promote group act ion and 
see in what resp ect they have been found want in g .  The two 
types that we shall cons ider here are the ColIDilunity Development­
Panchayat Raj ( CD-PR) sys t em and the traditional type o f  
co-operat ive societies . 
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Since its inception , the CD-PR has had strong advocates 
as well as vigorous critics in India . Speaking about this 
experiment in promoting rural development through locally 
elected councils , Nehru (1969 : 88) had in 1961 claimed (on a 
slight variat ion of the Leninist theme) that for India 
pro gress is panchayats  plus electric power . Yet , only s ix 
years later , the Administrative Reforms Commiss ion came out 
with the f indin g  that ' The impact of Panchayati Raj on 
agricultural product ion has been only negative ' and recommended 
specifically that these institut ions should not be entrusted 
with agricultural administrat ion ( India , Admin . Reforms 
Commission 196 7 : 41) . This is not the place to get involved 
in a general assessment of the system. There is no doubt 
that as an agency to get the rural people thinking in terms 
of  improving their lot , of  experiment ing with new methods of  
cult ivat ion , etc .  - and as  an inst itut ional infrastructure 
for bro ad-based extens ion work in the villages the achievement 
has been quite impressive . But the demands on the system 
today are not what they were earlier . In most areas now , it 
is no lon ger a question o f  merely giving general lectures 
about the need for change , to experiment with new input s ,  etc .  
This need while it  continues is being overshadowed by  the 
need to organize specific acts of improvement . And it is in 
this context that an tmchanging extension set-up is showing 
up it s inadequacies . 
The point is not s imply that local councils tend to be 
dominated by the rural elite . Even where new interest 
groups come into prominence , act ion to bring about basic 
changes in the pattern of land and water use can be bltmted -
the ' why provoke trouble ' type of argument is common in a 
group that has an eye on the next elect ion . Even where a 
council does want to act positively , it is likely to f ind 
it self as a clumsy unit organizat ionally . Action that can 
improve product ion condit ions for a handful of ten or 20 
farmers is unl ikely t o  interest a whole council . And without 
the whole council concurring,  no worthwhile initiat ive may 
be possib le .  A similar difficulty arises where the act ivity 
cut s across cotmcil boundaries . Even where a decision does 
emerge in favour of some act ion , it is perhaps after much 
delay . And delay in matters connected with agricultural 
operat ions could be fatal . This is not to deny , of course , 
that some of  the panchayats-run CD Blo cks have done ext remely 
well . The point is only that as a fairly rigid pattern o f  
organizat ion for carrying out the type o f  operations that 
have been des cribed and which appear essential for promoting 
further development , it is perhaps not the b est that could 
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be devised . A similar handicap affl icts the bureaucracy 
too , in those areas where panchayat s have been , by and large , 
kept out o f  the developmental act ivities . In this case also  
lack of manoeuverabil ity is a serious handicap . 
The limit at ions of  the usual type of co-operative 
so ciet ies for performing the trigger role for group act ion 
is again the rigidity o f  its structure and organizat ion . 
The size of membership is rarely chosen with reference to 
the solidarity principle ment ioned earlier ; this l.s a 
part icular weakness in societ ies that have been o fficially 
sponsored and set up , and have not emerged voll.llltarily to 
perform a specific ftmct ion . Even in the latter type of  
case , tmles s the size , structure and composit ion o f  the 
society is specifically related to the particular act ivity 
that is proposed to be tmdertaken j ointly , difficulties can 
arise . A society that takes in as many members as possible 
either becaus e  it thinks it is a good thing in itself , or 
because the memeership is related to that activity which 
thrives on the broadest base ( e . g . retailing groceries )  can 
find that it has handicapped it self for other activit ies where 
a more compact group is of greater advantage (e . g . digging 
an irrigat ion well ) . One can , of  course , have different 
societies for different purposes ; but the very act o f  
formaliz at ion into a registered society with a defined 
membership , rules of behaviour , o f  management , etc .  can curb 
init iat ive . What is being suggested here is the co-operat ive 
society p rinciple , but without formaliz ation or st ructuring , 
funct ional but flexible . 
Flexibil ity will not come about automatically ; nor can 
it be left to chance . It has to be provided for quite 
delib erately .  It i s  assumed that the role o f  government is 
paramount . If  there is one view that seems to be shared 
both by the intellectuals and by the peasants themselves in 
developing cotmt ries , it is the view that , in the words of  
Professor Rosen (1975 : 2 7 ) the government is ' the only 
institut ion with the prest ige to init iate maj or changes in 
direct ion and to introduce new inst itut ions on a large s cale '. 
Religious and voluntary agencies may be able to help at 
select locat ions . While their experience may provide valuable 
les sons to the planners , it seems realistic to assume that 
the general body o f  development workers must have links with 
a central power base , and to a body that has direct respons­
ib ility to promote development in the cotmtry . Whether these 
workers belong to a party cadre , the civil bureaucracy , or 
the military establishment , the field tasks will remain the 
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same , given the overall obj ectives o f  policy . The approach 
to work and the degree of effectiveness will , o f  course , 
vary between these categories o f  workers . We are looking at 
the situat ion where the obj ect ive is to bring about techno­
lo gical changes among the masses of  cult ivators and the main 
instrument of  change is the civil bureaucracy . 
Given the nature and the processes of technological 
change in agr iculuure on the lines explained earlier , it 
follows that the development agent at the local level has to 
be not merely an ' extender ' of know-how , but an organiz er o f  
farmers . Without the coming together of  the farmers , the 
possibilit ies o f  their improving either their ' environment ' 
or their 'management practices ' will remain restricted . 
This is what analysis as well as experience seems to indicate .  
This brings up the question o f  what kind o f  extension 
agent , or more appropriately , development worker , one would 
need at the local level to work the kind o f  arrangement s 
that we have in mind . Obviously , the answer will depend on 
the local s ituat ion . The type of  qualit ies or qualifications 
that one may need in a State like Punj ab would not be the 
same as those that one may have to build in for a less 
dynamic region . But one can perhaps advance a few general 
point s about the worker himself ,  and about him as part of a 
larger chain . 
One problem to consider is whether a worker with a high 
s chool base plus some 1 8  months special training in agriculture 
and in extension methods would suffice , or whether one should 
look for a more elaborately t rained worker , with perhaps a 
graduate degree in agriculture . On the face of  it , it would 
seem that the type o f  role here envisaged will require 
technical competence of a sub stant ial order . The local worker 
must have a reasonable grasp o f  the principles of crop 
husbandry , soil management , irrigat ion , et c . , before he can 
start ' foment ing ' improvement . As technological change begins 
to occur , the level of  technical skill needed in the extension 
worker also keeps going up . The demands on the VLW today 
are not what they were 2 0  years back .  
But one must also take into account the practical 
po ssib ility o f  f inding sufficient highly trained ext ens ion 
workers in close proximity to the farmers . In the Indian 
situat ion , for in stance , there is  one VLW for every ten 
villages ; and ten VLWs for every graduate extension worker 
in agriculture . Given dif ficult ies of communicat ion , 
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transport , et c . , the number of  cont act po ints have to be 
necessarily large . The type of  close organiz ational , probing­
approach based development that is being suggested here will 
not permit a reduct ion in the exist ing number of contact 
point s .  While the availab ility of  graduate extension workers 
can and should be increased , there may be no alternative , 
for the fo reseeable future , to  working with para-technical 
aides at the level closest to the farmer . 
Moreover , it is not clear in exactly what discipline 
the VLW must be an expert for this type of act ivity , if the 
expert path to development is cons idered vit al . He cannot 
possibly be an expert in agronomy , soil s cience , irrigation , 
et c .  all at once . It would be virtually imposs ible for the 
last  link in the chain , or for that matter for a link anywhere 
in the chain , to combine expertise in all these disciplines . 
From a pract ical point o f  view , therefore , all one can 
hope to establish at the village level is a para-t echnical 
aide who has access to several experts located at higher 
levels . That there is an urgent need for expanding the pool 
of such specialist back-up staff in extension as agri­
technical change proceeds will be readily appreciated . In 
India it is explicitly acknowledged in the Draft of  the Fifth 
Five Year Plan ( India, Planning Commiss ion 19 73 , Part I ,  p . 102 ) . 
One final comment while on this point . Perhaps there 
is some t rade-off b etween technical sophisticat ion and the 
ab ility to enter into a dialogue and influence the act ions 
of illiterate farmers . One does not have to be a full 
subs criber to the ' cultural revolution ' principle of China 
to concede the possibility of such trade-off . Much will , 
of  course , depend on the orient at ion and b ias of the graduates 
coming out o f  the universit ies . If  the bias happens to be 
away from the rural environment , the ability of the product s 
o f  such inst itut ions of higher learning to work closely and 
directly with farmers and be effect ive in that environment 
is likely t o  be limited . This is more than an academic point 
in the Indian context . 
Thus we arrive at a view of  effect iveness o f  the village 
level extens ion worker which is partly a funct ion of technical 
skill and partly also of backgrounds and att itudes which 
influence acceptability in the first instance . Without this 
acceptability , the sophisticated extension worker is in 
danger of  los ing his audience . 
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We must now turn t o  consider whether the kind o f  person 
now on the j ob in India is a promising enough raw material 
for undertaking the new tasks that have b een outlined in 
this study . Over the years , there has b een some disenchant­
ment with the potent ial for positive action on the part of  
the VLW . Opinions vary as  to whether the VLW is up to his 
j ob at all . Some have presented a picture of him as a 
disgruntled man of low competence ;! some as a worker who is 
not part icularly known in the villages where he is suppo sed 
to be working ( Chamb ers and Wickremanayake 19 74 ; Govt of 
Kerala Report 19 71 : 24 ) . Others have recorded , on the bas is 
of field studies , the extent of his contact and influence 
with farmers (Pro grannne Evaluat ion Organisat ion 1968 : 72 ,  
Table 3 . 3 ;  Progranune Evaluat ion Organisat ion , November 1969 : 
2 0-1) . The truth is perhaps in between these extreme vers ions . 
One point noted by independent , non-of ficial observers has 
been that the system of planning and administrat ion that is 
being pract ised leaves but little room for the VLW to exhib it 
any initiat ive that he may have (Dube 195 8 : 15 7-92 ; Johnson 
19 72 : 345 ) . With a deliberate change in planning and admin­
istrative techniques des igned t o  encourage lo cal initiat ive , 
the effect ivenes s  of  the local worker would be better put 
to test . What does seem to be established as of now is that 
the VLW is by and large an accepted category among the 
farmers , that the farmers do take him seriously and in fact 
turn to him for advice in matters relating to new techniques 
of product ion and management . This is good enough to go by , 
until conclusive evidence comes in to show that the kind of  
non-expert local extens ion worker now in posit ion is unfit 
to trigger off any worthwhile change . That would be the 
time to start cons idering a brand new ext ension staff for 
the 550 , 000 villages of India . 
The local extension worker does not , of  course ,  work 
in a vacuum and it is necessary to examine his links with 
the rest of the administrat ion . The strength of the VLW 
derives from the fact that he has access to experts and 
inst itut ions that are meant to serve agriculture , but are 
located out s ide and beyond the inunediate contact of the 
farmer . It is these links that will need to be systematically 
st rengthened in a functional sense .  Whether this would mean 
that the VLW should himself be given powers of  allo cation 
of scarce input s has b een debated in India . The argument 
in favour of  following this course is that it would enable 
1E . g . A . D .  Gorwala in Mysore Administration , quoted in 
Hanson 1966 : 42 7 . 
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the VLW to follow up his advice with supplies , and that as 
a consequence , he can he held responsibie for the final 
result s .  On the other hand ,  there are some who cons ider 
that ent rustment of distribut ion work to the ext ension staff 
t akes their t ime and attent ion away from the more basic 
responsib ilit ies of teaching farmers how to farm bet ter 
( India , Admin . Reforms Commiss ion 196 7 : 149-87 ) . The argument s 
are somewhat evenly balanced ; but from the point of  view of 
preserving the general acceptability of the extension worker 
among the masses of farmers , there would be advantages in 
not giving him powers of  patronage . 
There is one further point and that touches ' st atus ' .  
This is important in determining effectiveness and promoting 
self-conf idence in Indian administration . Block Development 
Off ices in India have not b een immune to concerns for status 
(Beteille 19 74 : 65 ) , and to the extent that the very agent 
through whom government is to communicate with farmers is 
as signed a low status , he is not likely to develop qualit ies 
of init iat ive and leadership . This is a problem that needs 
to be tackled anyway , irrespective of  changes in planning 
philosophy or of extension techniques . It assumes added 
significance in the context of a more amb it ious approach to  
extension .  A variety of measures may have to  be considered 
for this purpose . These would include direct upgrading of 
status within the hierarchy , higher emoluments , and freedom 
for the village worker to establish links and get decisions 
from above , cutt ing acros s  hierarchy . 
We have b een using the two terms - the lo cal extension 
agent and VLW who is a specific funct ionary under the CD 
set-up - somewhat interchangeably so far . The t ime has 
come to clarify this point . For reasons already gone into , 
the complement of  extension personnel already in po sit ion 
are being thought of as the first candidates for triggering 
development among farmers . They need not , however , be the 
exclus ive agents of change . What the FAO regional seminar 
referred to as the ' extra-governmental ' sector can be 
usefully pres sed into service . Even now other agencies play 
a part - a cigarette-manufacturing company in tobacco 
development at one place , and a sugar company in cane 
development elsewhere . Local agents of banks and other 
commercial organizat ions , s chool teachers ,  university student s 
who are interested , or who could be induced to take an 
interest in such work can play a very useful role . When 
such persons do come in , they will probably bring to bear 
approaches and styles of work which may be unobtainable 
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within the bureaucracy . In the more advanced areas , private 
consultancy as a commercial proposition may become feasible . 
The following extract from a recent report from one of  the 
States will be o f  interest : 
Government should encourage private initiat ive 
in the field of  agricultural services . Since all 
the advice and services of the department are 
presently o ffered free of charge ,  they partake 
the character of selective patronage • • •  Also the 
fact that the service is offered free of charge 
by civil servants whose stake in the consequences 
of their advice/service is so minimal as to be 
almost non-existent detracts seriously from the 
value and the quality of the service . It would 
therefore appear to be desirable to promote private 
init iat ive in such fields as farm consultancy , 
production and sale of  seeds • . •  and also in the 
field of pest control . There is no reason why 
individual graduates or a small group of them 
cannot off er a farm consultancy service covering 
the area of one or two villages , for a modest fee 
and earn a comfortable living out of such a venture 
(Tamil Nadu , Admin . Reforms Commission 19 74 : 14 7-8 ; 
India , Planning Commiss ion 19 7 3 ,  Part II , p . 12 ) . 
It would b e  tmrealistic to assume that such ext ra­
government al agents can take over from the regular staff as 
a general pattern everywhere . It will thus h.e necessary to 
rely on the official extens ion agent as a rule , but provide 
sufficient flexibility in the apparatus so that where a 
different agent happens to be available for either a given 
area or a given act ivity , that agent is also made use of , 
as a colleague or as a replacement for the regular agent . 
It may well happen that there are individuals in an area -
within the bureaucrat ic frame or out side it - who are good 
at organiz ing farmers in construct ing small irrigation works ; 
o thers who may prove their worth in get t ing a plant protect ion 
campaign going ; and yet others who underst and how to raise 
common nurseries . There will be obvious merit in shifting 
such people around from area to area , so that they propaga te 
a part icular practice to some effect and get it generally 
accepted . The extension machinery should build such flexi­
b ility as an es sential part of its structure and work style . 
We can now turn to look at the processes by which 
developmental work of this nature in the rural areas might 
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work , or be made to work . The first step i s  for the planners 
to define a framework of policy , the obj ectives and st rategies . 
The next step is fo r the technical experts to t ranslate the 
general strategy in more c�ncrete terms in each local 
context . Without this step being taken , neither the extension 
workers nor the farmers are likely to  know where to begin 
and what type of  proj ect they should examine . This trans­
lat ion will be in t erms of the types of act ivit ies that are 
considered useful in a part icular environment - water cont rol , 
addit ional irrigat ion , prevent ive act ion against plant 
diseases ,  soil conservat ion , product ion of quality s eeds , 
et c . , or the particular combinat ion that promi ses the best 
and the most concrete payoff . The next step is one of 
reconnais sance at the very local level , for parts of  a 
village . This is an act ivity which the village level worker 
can as a rule undertake , though higher level experts. would 
also do well to try a little reconnaissance o f  their own , 
to make sure , if for no othe� reason , that what they are 
prescribing is relevant to the environment and makes sense 
to the farmers . It is on the basis of such reconnaissance 
that the next stage of probing can start : contacting a group 
of farmers to raise the possibility of  their undertaking a 
specific act ivity , the manner of  att empting it , the resources 
they can raise themselves and the help they will need from 
the out side . As suming some pos it ive response , the local 
extension wo rker will have to throw the ball back into the 
court of the higher level experts ,  so that the acceptance 
of a particular idea could be made manifest in a specific 
proj ect , with all the technical and financial details . The 
suggest ion will then have to go back to the farmers concerned 
for its final acceptance . The way this descript ion has been 
develope d ,  it would appear as a smooth , i terative operat ion . 
In pract ice , the path may have to be more j agged . But that 
is precisely what is involved in the so-called feedback 
process of agricultural planning . 
No detailed comparison with the process by which planning 
and implement at ion takes place now is necessary . The points 
that the Nat ional Commission on Agriculture made in it s 
interim report on agricultural research , extens ion and 
training - about involvement of the s cientists in the univer­
s ity with extens ion in the farmers '  field , close liaison 
between the extens ion personnel and the higher level experts 
in government department s ,  l.filiversit ies , et c .  - are , o f  
course ,  important . What we have tried t o  do i s  t o  suggest 
ways of work in the rural areas that would build such 
involvement and liaison into  the processes of developmental 
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action , and to relate all this to a new style of planning .  
This link with overall techniques o f  planning an d  implement­
ation are important , at least in the Indian context , and 
needs to be explicitly spelt out . Our earlier discuss ion 
shows that merely adding to  the size  of the extension 
contingent , enhancing their technical skills ,  promot ing 
exchange of  staff b etween tmiversit ies and departments of 
government s ,  while all necessary , may not be fully effect ive 
in terms of the overall obj ectives of policy without some 
change in the vision and the approach to planning for 
agricultural development . 
Chapter 9 
The perspective 
The di scuss ion of the organizat ional and extension 
types of activit ies for technolo gical change in the agricul­
tural sector has b een in the specific context of  the rice 
crop , grown on numerous small-sized farms . Some of  the 
concept s developed here have perhaps a larger relevance ; 
but , obviously , there is a ' varietal select ion ' prob lem for 
organizat ions and techniques of  act ion for different crops 
and di fferent inst itut ional settings . Focus on the rice 
crop is explained by two factors . It is the s ingle most 
important agricultural crop grown in India , in t erms of 
output and also area plant ed . IRR! ( 19 74 :xiii) est imates 
that the primary or secondary staple food of nine-tenths of 
the low income people in the most densely populated regions 
of the world is rice . The other cons iderat ion is that it is 
in respect of rice that particularly intractable problems of 
diffusion of  innovation have been encountered in South and 
South East As ia compared to , say ,  wheat or corn in the same 
area or elsewhere in recent past . 
We examined the problems of organiz at ion at the local 
level ; and it s links with b igger organizat ions . But the 
interest in organizat ion it self  has to be put in some 
persp ect ive .  We looked at organizat ional behaviour an d  
patt erns not in the abstract , but in the specific context of  
changing t echniques of cult ivat ion among masses of farmers . 
The as sumption has been that t echnology is , in a sense ,  the 
mainspring of growth , and that mere organiz ational innovations 
without the underpinning of a technological breakthrough are 
not likely to be very product ive . The Indian Community 
Development experience and the ' Great Leap Forward ' experiment 
of  China during the fift ies illustrate this point . 
Mino r changes in some aspect or the otber of agricultural 
product ion and processing become feasible or are devised from 
t ime to time . Maj or advances in product ivity , however , occur 
but infrequently . They are like securing b ridgeheads in a 
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milit ary campaign , requiring careful planning and investment 
o f  resources . In agriculture this can take the form of either 
a decisive improvement in a technique , the development of a 
new input , or of  a big infra-structural investment . In a 
large developing country , at any given time there are perhaps 
areas where without such a n ew bridgehead being secured - a 
new irrigation/ flood control work , a new seed that can thrive 
under extreme moisture stress , or under recurrent flooding 
as the case may be - extension act ivity for farmers is poss ibly 
no more than s cratching the surface . At the same time we 
should keep in mind that there are sizeable areas where one 
could advance on the bridgehead already secured . In H .  
Myint ' s  words : 
Unlike in the advanced count ries , the more 
important ' residual ' factors of economic growth 
in the underdeveloped countries may be found in 
the better ut ilisat ion , adaptation and diffusion 
of  the already exist ing technology rather than in 
' dynamic ' changes in technological knowledge and 
innovat ions ; in the development of  market 
institutions which improve the transmiss ion of  
the relevant economic informat ion rather than 
crash programmes in educat ion and massive 
investment s in human capital ; in overcoming the 
' indivisib ilit ies in the small ' which confront 
the small economic unit s in the ' unorganised ' 
sector in trying t o  invest in small s cale but 
highly product ive pieces of capital equipment 
rather than in overcoming the ' indivisibilities 
in the large ' , or the huge lumpy investments 
required by modern technology in the field o f  
heavy industries (Hla Myint 19 7 3 : 4-5) . 
The organizat ional factor assumes a special significance 
in areas and during periods when absorbing available tech­
nology is itself a main challenge . 
What the experience in India and perhaps a few other 
countries in the region seems to indicate in regard to 
absorpt ion o f  new technology in rice cult ivat ion is the 
complexity of the mopping-up operat ion on a potential for 
advance already opened up . Experience further suggest s that 
what we need to seek is not one unique pattern of organiz ation 
that will work everywhere , but a range from which individual 
select ion has to take note of condit ions of farmers , farms 
and the farming environment . The suggest ions made here are 
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offered as a candidate for field test s in administrat ion and 
organizat ion for a particular set of  these factors . 
There are two different aspects in the spread o f  HYV 
technology whose implicat ions together deserve special 
at tention . The first aspect is the package concept , based 
on the complementarity of  inputs .  The other is the anxiety , 
under compuls ions of  socio-economic policy among developing 
countries (and this is certainly true of  India) to extend 
the technology as rapidly and as widely as possible , often 
beyond what available supplies of essential input s would 
perhaps warrant . In India the pattern of farm holdings 
among rice cult ivators separately is not known . But on the 
basis of the overall pattern , it would be seen that startin g  
a t  the top an d  drawing the line a t  around 3 hectares , one 
could cover about 70 per cent of the area by reaching only 
25 per cent of the total farmers . This might sound like a 
cheap administ rat ive route to  modernizat ion ; but such an 
approach is ruled out because the obj ect ive of  policy is to 
moderniz e  on a broad base , ' to weave the processes of distrib­
ut ion into the processes of production ' and ensure that 
everyone benefit s from the new technology . Writ ing about 
the tasks of extension in the context of the HYV technology , 
Dr Steir (19 74 : 45 3) argued for instance , and quite right ly , 
that extension service must take it s cue from more bas ic 
obj ect ives of a country ' s  agricultural strategy and concentrat e  
on certain areas o r  on certain progressive farmers if  an 
increase in total crop product ion is the maj or concern , and 
that the approach should be different if income distribut ion 
is of maj or concern . We need to look also at s ituat ions where 
these two obj ect ives cannot be neatly separated . 
One implicat ion of the package technology that came to 
be highlighted in the earlier years was that farmers must 
be t aught how to manage the new input s  to gether , with some 
underst anding and dis cipline . The approach to  extens ion was 
based on this philosophy ; emphasis was on demonst rat ion .  
Demonstrat ion is o f  course bas ic t o  diffusion , but soon 
doubts  began to emerge . Perhaps what was missing among those 
who were not ' innovat ing ' was not some superior knowledge , 
but simple wherewithal! - the resources . Field invest igations 
which showed that awareness spread fast er than adopt ion 
seemed to lend weight to this view (Kivlin and others 1968 : 1 ;  
Programme Evaluation Organisat ion , June 1969 : 2 3 7-8 , Tab le 7 . 6 ) .  
There followed a flood o f  lit erature deal ing with allocation 
o f  input s ,  credit , fertilizers , et c . , etc . The emphasis was 
on who should get the scarce input s . Some of  the writers 
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(Rao 1974) argued that a reallocat ion in favour of the small 
and hitherto neglected farmers was not only an equitable but 
also an efficient ( in terms of the overall effect on output ) 
solut ion . Whether there would be enough of  the crucial 
input s to go round even for the small farmers was itself not 
specifically investigated . What would be the impact on 
output under conditions of partial package and less than 
perfect management , whether for the large or for the small 
farmer was also not very clear . In the meanwhile , a third 
candidate came into prominence as a factor in explaining 
poor yields on actual farm condit ions as compared with 
experimental dat a .  IRR! has undertaken special studies to 
try and isolat e  the contribut ion o f  poor management and o f  
poor environment to sub-optimal yields . Whether one i s  in a 
posit ion or not to exactly and quantitatively gauge the 
influence of part icular sets of factors such as ' management ' ,  
' resources ' , or  ' environment '  on yields under the HYV 
technology under field conditions , it would seem that all 
these three factors have to be tackled before any b road-based 
moderniz at ion can occur . 
It is in this overall context , in terms of its potential 
for conveying knowledge , to augment resources lo cally , and 
to reshape the physical environment , that the concept of 
small group act ion has b een considered in this study . The 
point is not that this is an unknown principle , but that it s 
systemat ic exploitat ion can lead to good result s .  It would 
be o f  interest  to see , even if very briefly ,  how this 
principle has b een ut ilised in a few other countries , either 
by the farmers themselves ,  or by act of deliberate policy by 
the government . We shall only look at a few countries that 
have a distinct tradit ion o f  rice farming and that too in 
small farms . 
Even countries which have socialized land ownership 
seem to pay special attent ion to this principle of small or 
compact group act ion , as a s imple practice of management .  
This is despite the fact that the greater the proliferation 
o f  the bas ic units of management , the more difficult is the 
problem of co-ordinat ion and monitoring act ivit ies and 
exercising control in such societ ies . In China , for instance , 
the b as ic unit for planning and operat ional purposes in the 
rural areas was , to start with , the commune , with an average 
of 4000 to 5000 households . Within a few years , however , 
the s ize of  the commune was drast ically reduced .  This was 
achieved by subdividing s ome 2 7 , 000 communes into about 
74 , 000 communes . While there was perhaps more than one cause 
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for this development , one of the cons iderat ions seems to have 
been ease in management , and po ssibly the solidarity principle 
for concerted action lo cally . What is most interesting , 
however ,  is the fact that in the course of  t ime the basic 
management unit appears to have become the Product ion Team ,  
composed of 2 0  to  60 families living in a hamlet or a village . 
It is this product ion team, and not the connnune , which is 
said to own the farmland , and most farm tools and draught 
animals . Higher level format ions such as b rigades and 
communes appear to come in essentially in a co-ordinat ing 
role , as far as agricultural management is concerned ( Stavis 
19 74a : 46-61 ) . 
In North Vietnam, the farming co-operat ive on an average 
was said to cover less than 60 families ( Chaliand 1969 : 44 ) . 
The same principle appears t o  have weighed with farmers 
and policy makers in two other As ian countries , but which 
priz e private ownership in land . Historically , hamlet 
settlements ,  typically containing 50  farm families ( and not 
more than a 100 families if non-farming families are included) , 
have functioned for a long t ime as important unit s of  agric­
ultural product ion in Japan . Despite the fact that growing 
commercialism has made inroads into the neighbourhood spirit 
o f  an earlier age which helped to knit the hamlet together , and 
that village level political inst itut ions came into prominence 
towards the close of the nineteenth century , hamlet groups 
st ill app ear to play a s ignificant role in agricultural 
operations . Fukutake (196 7 : Ch . VI) reports that some 84 per 
cent of the hamlet s spray their lands together collectively , 
and in 80 per cent of  these cases , the Agricultural Practice 
Union (which is the organized body in the hamlet to help 
improve cult ivat ion pract ices)  is the body which organizes 
it . Forty-eight per cent of  hamlet s are said t o  make 
communal use o f  machinery and in 80 per cent o f  these cases , 
the machinery is owned either by the Union or by the hamlet , 
rather than by the Agricultural Co-operative which covers 
the whole village area (Fukutake 19 6 7 : 92-3) . 
Taiwan , with its pronounced tendency for structured 
control had to resort to the ' agricultural small group ' 
principle , with a memb ership o f  150 to 250  on an average 
for operat ional purpo ses in agricultural act ivit ies , though 
for market ing o f  inputs and for larger planning and co­
ordination roles , Farmers ' Associat ions , with much larger 
memb ership and coverage are the important tmits . Even within 
the Agricultural Small Groups , it would app ear that when it 
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comes to propagating some new aspects of  farm management , 
the basic  l.lllit for the extension worker is  a group o f  15 to 
2 0  farmers (Stavis 197 4b : 64-5 ) . 
The Compact Farm s cheme of  agricultural development in 
the Philippines also appears to lend support to the general 
principle that is being put forth in this paper . 
It would b e  absurd to suggest that it is the attachment 
to the small group principle that explains agricultural 
progress in these col.llltries , with their diverse ideologies , 
administrative structures , et c .  But this common thread is  
an interesting phenomenon , as  also the resort to more 
flexible group format ions to deal with specific problems in 
agricultural management . Nor is this reference meant to 
ignore the role o f  other incentives and penalties that these 
systems exhib it and within which agriculture f\.lllctions . 
One final word that may be worth noting explicitly is 
the fact that b ehind all these discuss ions about the right 
s iz es for , and techniques of organiz at ion , is the assumption 
that what the planners are t rying to do for agriculture 
corresponds , in some broad measure with what farmers think 
is worth doing . There is no a priori reason why this 
correspondence should always exist . The point is , however , 
that the divergence between the two where it exists  is  likely 
to show up better llll.der the type of planning here envisaged 
than in a situat ion where officials at the periphery are 
mechanically ful filling target s set for them at the Centre . 
There is o f  course the larger quest ion as to whom or 
to which sect ions within the rural society the obj ect ives 
are acceptable . Even a little experience in working develop­
ment programs is sufficient to bring home this fact of 
conflict , or the potential for conflict , of int erests among 
different sections of  the rural · commllllity . There is no 
llllique general will which the planner by some extra diligence 
can ascertain and translate into action for the good of all . 
More specifically , we must consider the fact that in pushing 
new techniques , one may be generating forces that worsen the 
prob lems of tenants , or threatens the livelihood of the 
landless . The consequences of the chosen st rategy need to 
be evaluated in full . Effective implementation can serve , 
at the least , to bring into clearer focus what the overall 
b ias in planning really is , and to what extent and in what 
manner certain tradit ional social structures , economic 
organizations or ins t itutions of private property and the 
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like are , in fact , promoting or impeding progress . 
The thrust of  development act ivities proposed here is 
improved farm management , not j ust innnediately -but in a more 
enduring sense . This it seeks to d9 by improving the use of  
land and water resources . This approach will call for  the 
introduct ion o f  addit ional labour inputs on a siz eable scale , 
not under a t raditional public works program, but in 
improving the quality of a whole complex of  public as well 
as privately-held land . The principles of flexible planning , 
innovat ive implementat ion and small group act ion can be used 
to advantage for this pu�pose .  A graded syst em of making 
farmers pay for the improvement over a period of  time can 
be devised , to make the program as self-sustaining as 
po ssible , and also on grounds of equity . The harnessing of 
science to sys tematically ut ilize under-utiliz ed labour for 
improving under- and badly-ut ilized natural resources would 
seem to provide an acceptab le , even an attract ive , philosophy 
of development in the condit ions of Indian agriculture , and 
possibly elsewhere in Asian agriculture . 
Appendix I 
Pattern of investment for agricultural development in India 
Item 
Agricultural Development Programs : 
I .  Resear ch and Educat ion 
I I .  Extension and Organiz at ion 
i) Nat ional Extension Service 
and Panchayat Development 
ii) Co-operat ives for credit 
marke t ing and warehousing 
iii) Agrl . Credit Organiz at ions , 
o ther than co-operat ives 
Sub-tot al : 
I I I .  Infras t ructure Development 
i) Irrigat ion 
ii) Rural Elect rificat ion 
iii) Soil Conservat ion 
iv) Lo cal Dev . Works
. 
Sub-total : 
IV . Other Dev . Programs 
All Programs : 
Total Plan Outlay : 
I Plan 
(1951-52 to 
1955-56) 
( a) (b) 
(Negligible) 
101 
7 
108 11 . 44 
595 
27 
15 
6 3 7  6 7 . 4 8 
199 21 . 08 
944 100 . 00 
2 , 069 
II Plan 
(1956-57 to 
1960-61) 
( a) (b ) 
14 1 .  52 
212 
4 7  
259 2 8 . 15 
44 7 
75 
20 
15 
557 60 . 54 
90 9 . 7 8 
920 100 . 00 
4 , 800 
III Plan 
(1961-62 to 
1965-66) 
(a)  (b ) 
2 8  1 .  8 8  
2 88 
103 
391 2 6 . 31 
7 76 
105 
11 
IV Plan 
(1969-70 to 
19 73-74 ) 
(a) (b ) 
85 2 . 4 7 
115 
2 73 
V Plan 
(19 74-75 to 
19 78-79 ) 
(a) (b) 
243 3 . 58 
129 
557 
426 324 
712 20 . 6 7 1 , 112 16 . 40 
1 , 4 70 
445 
159 
3 , 202 
1 , 09 8  
2 9 9  
8 9 2  60 . 03 2 , 074 60 . 2 0 4 , 599 6 7 . 83 
175 11 . 78 5 74 16 . 66 826 12 . 18 
1 , 4 86 100 . 00 3 , 445 100 . 00 6 , 780 100 . 00 
7 , 500 15 , 902 3 7 , 2 50 
Note : A word of caut ion is necessary in interpretin g  these data . The outlays given above are what are technically classified 
as ' Plan '  expenditure . Thi s  gives only a p art ial measure of total resources committed for any given purpose . Also 
some o f  the programs do not neat ly fit into the above classificat ions . To some extent , therefore , there is some 
arb it rariness in the groupin g .  
( a) Outlay in crores of Rs .  (b)  % 
Source : Successive Plan documents . 
Year 
1950-51 
1955-56 
1960-61 
1965-66 
196 8-69 
1969 -70 
19 70- 71 
19 71-72 
1 9 7 2 - 7 3  
1 9 7 3 - 74 
Improved seeds 
( coverage in 
m. hect ares) 
Foodgrains 
only a 
1 .  9 
19 . 8 
4 8 . 6 
9 . 2  
11 . 4  
15 . 4  
18 . 2  
22 . 1  
25 . 5  
Gross 
irr igated 
area 
(m. hect . )  
2 2 . 6  
2 5 . 6  
2 8 . 0  
30 . 9  
35 . 4  
37 . 3  
38 . 6  
) 
) -c 
) 
Appendix II 
Trend in the use of agricultural input s 
Chemical 
fert iliz ers 
used (NPK­
m. tonnes) 
0 . 1  
0 . 3  
0 . 8  
1 . 8  
2 . 0  
2 . 3  
2 . 7  
2 . 8  
2 . 8  
Green 
manure 
( coverage 
by m. hect . )  
4 . 5  
8 . 7  
7 . 5  
6 . 3  
5 . 9  
7 . 8  
8 . 3  
6 . 0  
Plant 
prot ection 
( coverage 
by m.  hect . )  
6 . 5  
16 . 6  
4 0 . 0  
46 . 0  
52 . 0  
58 . 0  
64 . 0  
60 . 5  
Soil 
conservation 
(coverageb 
by m. hect . )  
0 . 3  
1 . 0  
4 . 0  
1 . 2  
1 .  3 
1 . 4  
1 . 4  
1 . 1  
Credit advanced per 
year by credit co-op . 
society ( Rs .  crores , 
short , medium, plus 
long term) 
2 4 . 3 
52 . 5  
2 14 . 4  
342 . 0  
652 . 1  
697 . 5  
748 . 2  
768 . 9 
956 . 7  
996 . 3 
Note : a Figures up to 1965-66 relate to coverage by improved local variet ies .  For subsequent years , they relate to 
High Yiel d ing Variet ies Seeds only . 
b Relate to addit ional agricultural area covered during the previous five years , up to 1965-66 , and annual 
addit ions beyond 1968-69 . 
c Comparab l e  data no t availab le ;  there is indirect evidence to suggest that the expansion cont inued after 
19 70-71 also , roughly at the rate of  2 m.  hectares per year . Economic Survey 19 74-75 , p . 6 7 .  
� 
Sources : 1 Indian Agriculture in Brief - Thirteenth Edition , 1974 , pp . 185-6 ; 226-7 . 
2 Economic Survey 1 9 74 -75 , pp . 62-8 . 
3 Annual Report 19 74-75 , Department of Agriculture , pp . 40-9 . 
4 Draft Fifth Five Year Plan , Part I I , pp . 4-6 . 
I-' 
0 
00 
Appendix III 
The community development program 
Infrastructure for rural development - some details 
Nature o f  the staff 
Block Development O f f icer 
Gram Sewak (village level 
extension worker) 
Gram Sevika (village level 
female extens ion worker) 
Animal Husbandry Offi cer 
Agricultural Extension Officer 
Co-operative Activities 
Extension Of ficer 
Rural Inds . Dev . Off icer 
Social Educat ion , local sel f­
government dev . worker 
Mukhya Sevika (Block level 
female extension worker) 
Engineering Assistant 
Medical Off icer 
Progress As sistant 
Total 
Number in 
posit ion 
4 , 464 
58 , 002 
6 , 22 7  
5 , 5 5 3  
6 , 123 
4 , 3 7 6  
1 , 1 76 
5 , 7 9 3  
1 , 992 
4 , 836 
2 , 6 79 
3 , 068 
104 , 2 89 
Number of C . D .  Blocks : 
Population covered : 
Villages covered : 
Area covered : 
Nature of the facility 
Seed Mult iplicat ion Farms 
Workshops for the manufacture 
of agricultural implements 
Veterinary Hospitals under 
quali fied veterinary doctors 
Stockmen Centres under para-
technical aides 
Artificial Insemination main 
centres 
Artificial Insemination sub-
centres 
Cat tle breeding farms 
Repair workshops for agricultural 
implements 
Primary Health Centres 
Rural Dispensaries 
Maternity and Child Welfare 
Centres 
Family Planning Cent res 
Year 1970-71 
4 , 89 3  
4 0 5  m .  
566 , 900 
3 . 2  m .  sq . km. 
Sources : 1 Ministry of Agriculture , June , 19 74 . Community Deve lopment 
Statistics 19 ?2-?3 . 
2 Highlights of the Pro gramme C . D. , Special Programmes , 
Panchayat Raj , March 19 71 , Ministry of Food , Agriculture C . D . , 
and Cooperation . 
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Numbers 
1 , 91 7  
7 , 597 
7 , 86 3  
7 , 7 70 
1 ,  724 
5, 770 
969 
1 , 4 2 7  
4 , 681 
16 , 158 
11 , 199 
9 , 22 6  
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